Here's an idea about open and verified elections...

[garybeck]

This has been brewing in my head for a while. I realize it's pretty radical compared to what we're doing now but it seems almost foolproof.

First, get rid of all the DREs. That seems to be happening anyway.

Now, take the optical scanners and reprogram them so that in addition to reading the votes (colored in circles) on each ballot, it also scans the entire ballot and makes a JPG or GIF image of the ballot.

After the "initial" count by the scanners, allow anyone to download all the JPGs and count the ballots themselves. This way, anyone can verify the election was correct. Verification could be done by multiple people or groups of people independently. We could employ independent organizations to recount every election. If there's a discrepancy, have an official recount.

simple as that.

the only missing piece of the puzzle is that it would be possible for the manufacturers of the scanners to rig them to produce false JPG images that would match a rigged count, if they wanted to rig the results. here's my answer to that: put a blank space on each ballot for people to put in a "pin" number. The pin number is secret, only the voter knows their pin number. This provides a way for voters to verify that their ballot is correct and was not corrupted by the machine (the JPG file matches the ballot they voted on). they could go online, punch in their pin number, and view the JPG of their ballot, the same JPG that would be downloaded by anyone who wants to recount the entire election.

Voting rights organizations could organize a statistical number of people to verify their ballots on each election.

This is the ultimate way to count the votes in public - put the ballots out there and let anyone count them if they want to. And with the pin code, it would be impossible for anyone to rig the results, as long as some people check (validate) their ballots.

What do you think?

[EmperorHasNoClothes]

1. I love this idea.

It's completely practical today to do something like this. Let anyone who wants to manually verify the election.

[shraby]

2. Great idea except there needs to be

a way to avoid duplicate pins in a precinct. Since each precinct is separately counted, you'd only have to be concerned with getting duplicates in any single precinct.

[garybeck]

5. yeah, i've been thinking about that...

i think it's a relatively easy problem to solve. one thing to consider, if the pin is long enough, the chances of dups goes way down. another thing is, if there is a dupe, you could just let both people with the number view both of the ballots. they'd be able to tell if one of them is their ballot.

[snot]

3. Brilliant, as usual, garybeck!

I'm no techie, but one possible technical hurdle is that I expect a readable jpg would take up a lot more data than a digital tally, so the amount of computer necessary to house and make available all this info might jump.

I wonder if distributed computer power donated by individuals in the same way as they now do for NASA's SETI project could do it? (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SETI%40home )

[Wilms]

4. Not so sure about this.

The pin number idea means we let go of secret balloting. That vote could be sold or coerced.

You'd need a way to know that the ballot your pin number reveals is the ballot that was counted.

And there'd be a digital infrastructure even more complex than the one we're dealing with now. Not very transparent.

On the positive side, I think a few of the current crop of scanners, like the ImageCast, will produce a ballot image for you.

No thanks!

[garybeck]

6. pin number is secret and so is the ballot

no one knows your pin. it is secret. the pin does not reveal your identity. it's still a secret ballot.

i disagree there will be a "digital infrastructure even more complex than the one we're dealing with now."

maybe i didn't make it clear in my description. if the ballot is scanned into a JPG and the voter verifies their JPG ballot, it doesn't matter how much digital infrastructure there is. It's verified. The whole purpose of that is to eliminate the digital infrastructure. And the pin does not in any way reveal your identity so it is still a secret ballot.

[Wilms]

7. Gary

I vote. I get a pin #. I show it to the person buying my vote. Or to the person coercing me.

:shrug:

What do you mean...in exact technical terms...by "It's verified". We verify votes NOW and they get flipped, etc. One of the reasons that VVPAT isn't that great an answer is that only so many people verify their vote when standing right there. How many will be able to get on line and check?

And I mentioned, "You'd need a way to know that the ballot your pin number reveals is the ballot that was counted."

[shraby]

8. There is no foolproof way to vote and know

it's counted the way it was cast. That's a given. I think Gary's idea goes a long way toward accomplishing the goal. We know everyone cannot check their vote online, but those who would try to cheat can't know who will check and who won't...people use the library computers, friends computers, school computers so a large percentage can be expected to check and see if their vote is there.

[garybeck]

11. uh...

I guess I see your point about the PIN, but you're not supposed to give anyone your pin number.

I disagree that we verify votes now. Even with VVPAT, you only verify that the VVPAT has your vote on it. That doesn't mean it was counted.

In the system I propose, your pin allows you to see your ballot - in the stack of all the ballots - which anyone can count. So if someone counts the ballots and they match the machine count, and you have verified your ballot with your pin, you can be sure that your ballot was counted correctly.

Also, in my system, there is no "line" to wait in to verify your ballot. You go home, get online, and view your ballot with your pin. If you're worried about someone figuring out who you are from your IP address, then you can go to a library and view your ballot anonymously.



This brings up an issue I think doesn't get discussed enough. We need to have a way to verify things, obviously, whether it's HCPB or whatever. Some proposals provide a way to verify things but people complain that a large percentage of the people won't check. IN this scenario, one could say that most people won't go online and check their pin. But I'd say that first we have to provide a way to do the verification. Then we can worry about getting more people to do it. It may be true that if you just suddenly add a verification and don't adequately educate people about it, it will probably be ignored. BUT I believe that people can be educated and we could convince people of the importance of verifying. And this is 100% better than having no way to verify. You could add a verification step and some people would say "ah that's nice but no one will check it." I disagree. Once there is a way to verify, then people like you and I can get organized and make sure verifications are taking place. The alternative, no means of verification, is 100% worse.

[Wilms]

12. A few points.

I may have been wrong about the pin idea. A friend pointed out that there may be a way to do it where it wouldn't be clear to a coercer (is that a word?) or vote buyer what they were looking at. So this would permit legitimate viewing but not enable coercion or sales.

Next, when I said we already verify elections I should have added (sic) as in supposedly that's what we do.

As far as getting the level of participation increased I'll point to DRE VVPATs.

I already mentioned the issue of knowing if and how your vote was recorded. And there's a problem with some people...like me...not too willing to accept a computerized system. I still really can't SEE what goes on in the backgraound.

Call me Old Fashion.

[Peace Patriot]

9. I think it's an interesting idea. ANYTHING that increases transparency of the

vote count is better than what do now--virtually zero transparency.

I do have several concerns:

1. Giving these shit-heads who stole our democracy--Diebold, ES&S and Sequoia--ANY MORE OF OUR MONEY. Yeah, they'll do jpgs for us--for another $5 billion. And they'll use our money to figure out how to fuck us over once again.

2. Even the least compupter-literate voters should be able to understand how his/her vote is counted. Otherwise it is not democracy.

3. Rushing to yet another untested technical solution--as was done with the first e-voting boondoggle (the one we are cursed with now)--to find out 4 years, 8 years later, that we have empowered yet another fascist junta (or they have empowered themselves by zapping our jpg's).

4. We need to get together as communities, as grass roots groups, as voters, as vote counters, as election monitors and volunteers, as citizens looking over the shoulders of our election officials (and all other officials), NOT do LESS getting together, by relying on another tech solution. What's the matter with hand-counting paper ballots, taking our time, watching each other, being vigilant, chatting, participating, belonging? Your solution has some level of participation--better than now--but why not go whole hog and become communities of citizens again?

4. Not addressed: The need to punish the evildoers--the corrupt election officials and legislators, lobbyists and billionaire e-voting CEOs, political party mucky-mucks, and unelected war criminals and war profiteers who have padded their pockets, and tortured and slaughtered people for profit, by destroying our election system. The requirements of transparent vote counting are OBVIOUS. Anybody including most five year children could think up a better system than this one. Optiscan with 100% handcounting comes to mind. Why wasn't that done--at least for the first few election cycles? It's not the vote counting system. IT'S THE WAR, and the greed--the people in our corrupt political establishment! Find a new technical solution now that they've stolen everything and ruined our country? It doesn't seem enough somehow. I know, I know...we've got to get some kind of transparency going, so we can hold them to account. Just sayin. The "technical" solutions were there all along--including the original "primitive" technology of putting pen to paper ballot and counting the paper ballots. Why. Was. The. Most. Non-transparent. Method. Imposed?

5. Did I say, giving these shit-heads who stole our democracy--Diebold, ES&S and Sequoia--ANY MORE OF OUR MONEY?

[kster]

10. We need to take these weapons (secret vote counting machines)

out of the crooks hands there is no negotiating about the counting of ballots, not our my America.

All the ballots have to be hand counted out in the open, before they are allowed to leave the polling place, no exceptions.

Time to take back our country!!

Good idea, but why go through all that trouble, it just allows the crooks to continue to count our votes in secret.

Screw that and screw them.

[diva77]

13. hmmm, maybe tiptoeing around the elephant in the room?

why not video people handcounting paper ballots at the precincts? that way the only machinery required is a video cam and we don't need voting machine vendors or software or elections officials in cahoots with vendors and operatives, and we don't fleece the public

:think: