E-voting is good for you - but only if it's open to scrutiny
John Naughton
The Observer, Sunday March 23 2008
As the US presidential election approaches, minds are again being concentrated on the electronic voting machines on which the American electoral process largely relies. You may recall that in 2000 and 2004 there were widespread concerns about the reliability and security of the technology. Voting machines lost votes, subtracted votes instead of adding them and even doubled votes. And because many machines have no paper audit trails, a significant number of votes in both elections went uncounted - or were wrongly counted.
But it's not just the accuracy of the machines that is questionable, it's also their security. Several projects have demonstrated how voting machines from all the major makers can be hacked into with comparative ease. This is not an argument for not using machines: who would want to replicate the 'hanging chads' fiasco of the 2000 election? But before a society entrusts its central democratic process to machines, it ought to take reasonable steps to instil public confidence in the technology.
This requires only two very basic provisions: all machines must leave a paper trail that can be independently audited after the election; and software used in voting machines must be open to public scrutiny to allow any interested party to examine it and find bugs, which can then be corrected. This will increase public confidence in the voting process because, as one security expert puts it, 'if the software is public, no one can insinuate that the voting system has unfairness built into the code'.
The strange thing - and the reason conspiracy theories about voting machines abound on the net - is that the leading manufacturers have so far fiercely resisted one or both of these reasonable requirements.
Their resistance to providing paper trails, like the Peace of God, passeth all understanding and is enough to turn even a sceptical observer into a conspiracy theorist. The companies' hostility to allowing scrutiny of their computer code is more understandable: it's a by-product of paranoia about intellectual property. An intriguing insight into this mindset was provided by an email published last week by Professor Edward Felten of Princeton, a world expert on voting technology and a penetrating critic of current systems.
The background is that electoral officials in New Jersey were puzzled by discrepancies in the returns obtained from a Sequoia AVC Advantage voting machine when the polls closed at the end of the presidential primary election on 5 February. (This particular machine does produce a rudimentary paper trail, which is how the discrepancies came to light.) The officials decided that they would send one of the machines to Princeton for analysis.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/mar/23/usa?gusrc=rss&feed=technology