2. makes the funded audits a valid measure of election results accuracy and eliminates a major loophole
3. requires audits to do ballot reconciliation of all printed ballots,
4. requires audits to evaluate public verifiability of ballot security/chain of custody
5. requires audits to reconcile number of ballots cast with number of voters processed
6. requires the emergency paper ballots to be offered to any voter who wants to use them (and changes the signage required to reflect that)
Kathy Dopp is putting together suggestions and has asked for input
http://utahcountvotes.orghttp://electionmathematics.orghttp://electionarchive.orgHistory of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdfVote Yes on HR5036
http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/legislation/SummaryFlyer5036.pdfVoters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf"Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1816
ROUGH DRAFT: Suggested Amendments to H.R.5036
Note: Text in ALL CAPS is suggested new text. Suggested amendments to HR5036 are in orange text. Suggestions are listed in order beginning with the most important.
1. REQUEST: Fund only election audits that measure the accuracy of unofficial election results and would detect errors in the unofficial vote counts
a. Remove sec.3.(b)(6) which funds audits which check only one stage of the tabulation process but never check the accuracy of the final unofficial vote counts
Section.3.(b)(6) The State shall determine the stage of the tabulation process at which the audit will be conducted, and shall apply that determination in a uniform manner for all audits conducted in accordance with this section, except that the audit shall commence within 48 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) in each precinct in which votes are cast in the 16 election which is the subject of the audit.
JUSTIFICATION: Checking only an early stage of tabulation, for example only checking that DRE paper ballot printouts match vote totals printed from the memory card used on the same DRE machine, does not check whether or not these vote counts are accurately uploaded to or tallied by the central tabulator, and do not check whether or not all such DRE vote tallies, if they were publicly recorded and added together would equal the unofficial election results.
b. Amend sec.3.(b)(7) to require that any funded audits compare the manual audit tallies with the final unofficial vote counts as reported publicly prior to the random selection of precincts or other units to audit.
Section.3.(b) (7) With respect to each precinct or alternative audit unit audited, the State shall ensure that a voter verified paper ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in the precinct or alternative audit unit, and that the tally produced by counting all of those paper ballots or paper ballot printouts by hand is compared with the corresponding final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State)COUNTED AND PUBLICLY announced with respect to that precinct or audit unit in the PRIOR TO THE RANDOM SELECTION FOR AUDIT OF PRECINCTS OR AUDIT UNITS.
1. Yet this is the procedure required to be performed by the Utah Lt. Governor, which prevents any jurisdictions in Utah from performing valid election audits that actually would check the accuracy of their unofficial vote tallies. (Some of Utah’s county clerks say that they would like to perform valid election audits but that they do not have time during the canvass period to do both the sham “audit” required by the Lt. Governor as well as a valid audit. The Colorado Secretary of State likewise requires Colorado counties to perform a similar exercise that does virtually nothing to detect inaccurate vote counts. If HR5036 were to require audits that were a valid check on the accuracy of unofficial vote counts, it would give incentive to many states which similarly perform sham audits, to perform valid audits.
JUSTIFICATION:
c. Remove the loophole which permits all but 2% of absentee and provisional ballots to be miscounted without detection.
There are three choices to remove this loophole, either
i. Remove entirely the requirement for the audit to begin within 48 hours of poll closing (in conjunction with a requirement for publicly verifiable ballot security & reconciliation of all printed ballots as part of the audit);
Section.3.(b)(6) The State shall determine the stage of the tabulation process at which the audit will be conducted, and shall apply that determination in a uniform manner for all audits conducted in accordance with this section, except that the audit shall commence within 48 hours after the State announces the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) in each precinct in which votes are cast in the 16 election which is the subject of the audit.
JUSTIFICATION: This would permit a one-stage audit to begin after all provisional and absentee ballots have been authenticated, counted, and publicly released, but in addition, flexibility is needed to allow election officials to conduct two stage audits (I.e. stage one audit of early, and Election Day vote counts and stage two audit of absentee and provisional ballot vote counts).
OR
ii. Require that
WITH RESPECT TO EACH PROVISIONAL AND ABSENTEE BALLOT PRECINCT OR ALTERNATIVE AUDIT UNIT AUDITED, THE TALLY PRODUCED BY COUNTING ALL OF THE ABSENTEE AND PROVISIONAL PAPER BALLOTS BY HAND SHALL BE COMPARED WITH THE CORRESPONDING UNOFFICIAL VOTE COUNT (AS DEFINED BY THE STATE) AS COUNTED AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED WITH RESPECT TO THAT PRECINCT OR AUDIT UNIT IN THE UNOFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS PRIOR TO THE RANDOM SELECTION OF ANY PRECINCTS OR AUDIT UNITS OF ABSENTEE OR PROVISIONAL BALLOTS TO BE AUDITED, AND AT LEAST 2% OF ALL ABSENTEE AND PROVISIONAL BALLOTS SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE SELECTED AUDIT UNITS.
JUSTIFICATION:
OR
iii. Amend
(8) IF A STATE HAS PUBLICLY REPORTED ITS ABSENTEE AND PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN ITS UNOFFICIAL VOTE COUNTS PRIOR TO BEGINNING AN AUDIT, THEN Within each precinct or alternative audit unit, the audit shall include all ballots cast by all individuals who voted in or who are under the jurisdiction of the precinct or alternative audit unit with respect to the election, including absentee ballots (subject to paragraph (9)), early ballots, emergency ballots, and provisional ballots, without regard to the time, place, or manner in which the ballots were cast.
(9) If a State BEGINS AN AUDIT OF ITS EARLY AND ELECTION DAY VOTE COUNT PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE COUNTING AND PUBLIC REPORTING OF ITS ABSENTEE OR PROVISIONAL BALLOT RESULTS THEN A STATE establishes a separate precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in the election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable SORT by precinct OR include those ballots in the hand count described in paragraph (7) which is administered with respect to that precinct, the State may divide absentee ballots into audit units approximately equal in size to the average precinct in the State in terms of the number of ballots cast, and AFTERWARDS shall randomly select and include at least 2 percent of those PRECINCTS OR audit units in the audit. Any audit carried out with respect to such an audit unit shall meet the same standards applicable under paragraph (7) to audits carried out with respect to other precincts and alternative audit units, including the requirement that all paper ballots be counted by hand.
JUSTIFICATION:
d. Require audits to reconcile/account for all printed ballots
JUSTIFICATION: so that ballot substitution or ballot box stuffing would be detected
e. Require audits to evaluate ballot security procedures so that ballot tampering, ballot box stuffing or ballot substitution could be detected.
JUSTIFICATION:
f. Require audits of sufficient number of precinct or other auditable units. I.e. manually count at least 3% of ballots
Sec.3.(b)(5) The audit shall be conducted in not less than 2 3 percent of the precincts or alternative auditing units in the State (in the case of a general election for the office of Senator) or the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress).
(9) If a State BEGINS AN AUDIT OF ITS EARLY AND ELECTION DAY VOTE COUNT PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE COUNTING AND PUBLIC REPORTING OF ITS ABSENTEE OR PROVISIONAL BALLOT RESULTS THEN A STATE establishes a separate precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in the election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable SORT by precinct OR include those ballots in the hand count described in paragraph (7) which is administered with respect to that precinct, the State may divide absentee ballots into audit units approximately equal in size to the average precinct in the State in terms of the number of ballots cast, and AFTERWARDS shall randomly select and include at least 2 3 percent of those PRECINCTS OR audit units in the audit. Any audit carried out with respect to such an audit unit shall meet the same standards applicable under paragraph (7) to audits carried out with respect to other precincts and alternative audit units, including the requirement that all paper ballots be counted by hand.
JUSTIFICATION: For many states, especially smaller states with close elections, a 2% overall audit of
2. REQUEST: Allow Emergency Paper Ballots to Be Used by All Voters
a. Amend section 2.(c)(1) and section.2.(c)(2)(A) re. sign
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall pay to each eligible jurisdiction an amount equal to the documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to obtain, deploy, and tabulate backup paper ballots (and related supplies and equipment) that may be used in the event of the failure of a direct recording electronic voting system OR UPON VOTER REQUEST, in the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office to be held in November 2008.
(A) assurances that the jurisdiction will post, in a conspicuous manner at all polling places at which a direct recording electronic voting system will be used in such elections, a notice stating that backup paper ballots are available at the polling place and that a voter is entitled to use such a ballot upon the failure of a voting system;
JUSTIFICATION: Many voters, especially those who have studied computer science and voting systems, do not have confidence that their ballots will be recorded or counted correctly by Direct Recording Electronic Voting (DRE) machines. As long as the paper ballots are available, any voters should have the right to cast ballots that they can verify are cast correctly. Studies show that roughly only 10% of voters accurately verify machine-printed paper ballots.
3. REQUEST: Fund only reliable, economical voting systems that are fully auditable
Remove Section (2)(b) REIMBURSEMENT FOR RETROFITTING OF DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS TO PRODUCE VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORDS.—in its entirety
(b) REIMBURSEMENT FOR RETROFITTING OF DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS TO PRODUCE VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORDS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall pay to each eligible jurisdiction an amount equal to the documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to retrofit direct recording electronic voting systems so that the systems will produce a voter verifiable paper record of the marked ballot for verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, including the costs of obtaining printers to produce the records.
(2) ELIGIBLE JURISDICTION DEFINED.—In this subsection, an ‘‘eligible jurisdiction’’ means a jurisdiction that submits to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time and in such form as the Commission may require, an application containing—
(A) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will obtain a printer for and retrofit each direct recording electronic voting system used to conduct the general elections for Federal office held in November 2008 so that the system will produce a voter verifiable paper record of the marked ballot for verification by the voter;
(B) such information and assurances as the Commission may require to make the determinations under paragraph (1); and
(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require.
(3) DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF COSTS.—The determinations under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by the Commission.
JUSTIFICATION:
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