Voting System Standards: All Form and No Substance

[Wilms]

Washburn's World

Voting System Standards: All Form and No Substance

by John Washburn

Thursday, June 12, 2008

I have been a long time critic of the 2002 Voting System Standards (2002 VSS) and of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (2005 VVSG). In fact, both sets of standards are virtually worthless. There are two reasons for this. First, the requirements enumerated in the standards are, in and of themselves, much too weak for something as vital as administering an election. Second, both sets of standards have an explicit loophole that allows almost all the requirements — weak as they are — to be ignored. This second objection was first brought to my attention two years ago by Howard Stanislevic.

We now have proof that this loophole is used by the labs in order to “pass” systems that don’t meet the standards. In the most recent certification test report submitted to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), SysTest labs (one of the labs accredited by the EAC and the NIST) recommended certification for a voting system. SysTest recommended the system certification even though their findings showed 79 specific failures to meet the standards.

As you read this article, keep in mind that the standards actually allow 77 of these 79 failures to be ignored!

Last February, SysTest labs wrote its certification test report for a new voting system manufactured by Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold). The report listed the 79 problems the lab found during testing. Even so, SysTest recommended the system be certified by the EAC.

snip

SysTest’s report demonstrates that with the broad nature of the loophole found in paragraph B.5, there is almost no failure that would prevent a system from being certified by the EAC, or that would have prevented qualification under the previous NASED/ITA program . So, it should come as no surprise to anyone that we read about failure after failure, in election after election, by voting systems “certified” by the NASED Voting Systems Board .

snip

The labs are quick to state that they do not certify equipment. The EAC is quick to point out that the testing is done by the labs and not by the EAC. For years the voting equipment vendors have claimed that the 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG are "comprehensive and rigorous". This real world application of the 2002 VSS to an actual voting system by a NIST-accredited laboratory should demonstrate how toothless and ineffective the 2002 VSS and 2005 VVSG are.

snip

Certification test reports, listing the deficiencies of the systems certified by NASED, will never be published. This is because the reports are considered trade secrets by the vendors. The reports are also considered trade secrets by the ITA testing labs that tested the systems. Most importantly, the reports are also considered trade secrets by the chairman and every member of the NASED Voting Systems Board.

snip

http://washburnsworld.blogspot.com/2008/06/voting-system-standards-all-form-and-no.html

[Captain Hilts]

1. Let's go retro!

These machines worked great!

[kster]

2. Mechanical paperless machine" same as touchscreen "machines"

without the screen, which are both paperless.

MECHANICAL PAPERLESS...


NEW AND IMPROVED PAPERLESS VOTING MACHINE...


PAPER VOTING MACHINE


When paper is involved the CROOKS need to convince the people that they need not count their optical scanned paper ballots by hand in their neighborhood, thats the biggest hurdle that the crooks have to over come with PAPER elections.

K&R

[Bill Bored]

3. Dude, the thread is about CERTIFICATION of Voting Systems

If you don't want to discuss that, please take your posts elsewhere.

This is an important topic of national significance. Try to follow the discussion before you post. Thanks.