... No. 05-0916 ...
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, Reverend Lloyd A. McCutchen, Rod Linzay, Holly Linzay, Sandra Smith, Becky Bickel, and Paul Patterson, Petitioners,
v.
Laura Schubert, Respondent ...
Argued April 12, 2007
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O’Neill, Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, and Justice Willett joined.
Chief Justice Jefferson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Green joined, and in Parts II-A, III, and IV of which Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Green filed a dissenting opinion.
Justice Johnson filed a dissenting opinion ...
... We .. conclude the case, as tried, presents an ecclesiastical dispute over religious conduct that would unconstitutionally entangle the court in matters of church doctrine and, accordingly, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the case.
I
On Saturday June 8, 1996, Tom and Judy Schubert left town, leaving their three teenage children at home. While the Schuberts were away, their seventeen-year-old daughter, Laura, spent much of her time at the .. Pleasant Glade Assembly ...
On Friday evening, before her parents left town, Laura attended .. Pleasant Glade in preparation for a garage sale ... The atmosphere .. became .. charged after one of the youth announced he had seen a demon near the sanctuary. The youth minister .. called the group together to hear the story .. agreed that demons were indeed present. Linzay .. led a spirited effort throughout the night to cast out the demons. Finally, on Saturday morning at about 4:30 a.m., Linzay gathered the exhausted youth together to announce .. a vision to him. Although exhausted, the young people assisted with the garage sale later that morning.
At the Sunday morning worship service the next day, several young people gave testimonials ...
Later that afternoon, Laura returned to church ... During the evening service, Laura collapsed ... According to Laura, church members forcibly held her arms crossed over her chest, despite her demands to be freed. According to those present, Laura clenched her fists, gritted her teeth, foamed at the mouth, made guttural noises, cried, yelled, kicked, sweated, and hallucinated. The parties sharply dispute whether these actions were the cause or the result of her physical restraint.
Church members .. disagreed about whether Laura’s actions were a ploy for attention ... Laura had not eaten anything substantive that day and had missed sleep ...
On Monday and Tuesday, Laura continued to participate in church-related activities ... Her parents returned .. on Tuesday ...
On Wednesday evening, Laura attended the weekly youth service presided by Rod Linzay ... Laura testified that she curled up into a fetal position because she wanted to be left alone ... Again, there is conflicting evidence about whether Laura’s actions were the cause or result of being physically restrained by church members and about the duration and force of the restraint ... During the incident, Laura suffered carpet burns, a scrape on her back, and bruises on her wrists and shoulders ...
In July, Laura’s father, himself an Assembly of God pastor and missionary, met twice with Senior Pastor McCutchen to discuss the June incidents ...
... The Schuberts subsequently left Pleasant Glade to attend another church.
Over the next months, several psychologists and psychiatrists examined Laura, documenting her multiple symptoms, such as angry outbursts, weight loss, sleeplessness, nightmares, hallucinations, self-mutilation, fear of abandonment, and agoraphobia. Despite the psychiatric counseling, Laura became increasingly depressed and suicidal ... Finally, in November 1996, Laura was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, which the doctors associated with her physical restraint at the church in June 1996 ... Ultimately, Laura was classified as disabled by the Social Security Administration and began drawing a monthly disability check.
Thereafter, Laura and her parents sued .., alleging negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, assault, battery, loss of consortium, and child abuse. The Schuberts further claimed that the defendants’ conduct had caused Laura “mental, emotional and psychological injuries including physical pain, mental anguish, fear, humiliation, embarrassment, physical and emotional distress ..." ...
In response, Pleasant Glade .. moved to dismiss the Schuberts’ lawsuit as an unconstitutional burden on their religious practices ...
In the mandamus proceeding that followed, the court of appeals granted the church’s request for relief, agreeing that the Schuberts’ “religious” claims were barred by the First Amendment ... The court defined “religious” claims to include the Schuberts’ claims of negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, child abuse, and loss of Laura’s consortium ... The church did not ask for mandamus protection from Laura’s claims of false imprisonment and assault, and those claims were not included in the court’s definition of religious claims ...
Following the mandamus proceeding, the trial court signed a protective order, prohibiting the Schuberts from inquiring into or debating the religious teachings, practices, or beliefs of the Pentecostal or Assembly of God churches. Laura’s remaining claims proceeded to trial, where a jury found that Laura had been assaulted and falsely imprisoned ... Finally, the jury awarded Laura damages of $300,000 for her pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, and medical expenses. Following the verdict, Laura moved for judgment, and Pleasant Glade moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting once again its free exercise rights under the state and federal constitutions. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict of false imprisonment, awarding Laura the damages found by the jury and adding Pleasant Glade as a judgment debtor with joint and several liability for the amounts apportioned to its senior pastor and youth minister. Pleasant Glade and the other defendants appealed.
The court of appeals eliminated the damages awarded for lost earning capacity, concluding that these damages were too remote and speculative, but otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment ... Regarding the First Amendment claim, the court concluded that the church and pastors were judicially estopped to assert their constitutional rights because they had taken a contrary position in the previous mandamus proceeding ...
II
The doctrine of judicial estoppel “precludes a party from adopting a position inconsistent with one that it maintained successfully in an earlier proceeding” ... Contradictory positions taken in the same proceeding may raise issues of judicial admission but do not invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel ... The doctrine is not strictly speaking estoppel, but rather is a rule of procedure based on justice and sound public policy ... Its essential function “is to prevent the use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair advantage” ...
The doctrine does not apply to the church’s free exercise claim here for at least three reasons: (1) the asserted inconsistency did not arise in a prior proceeding, but in this same case; (2) the church did not gain any advantage from the asserted inconsistency; and, most importantly, (3) the church has consistently asserted its First Amendment rights throughout this case, including the mandamus proceeding in which it sought relief from certain tort claims implicating church beliefs and practices ...
... Pleasant Glade .. did not seek mandamus relief for Laura’s “pure bodily injury claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment.” It is this omission from Pleasant Glade’s mandamus petition that the court of appeals now views as an estoppel to the church’s present First Amendment claim.
Pleasant Glade’s petition for writ of mandamus, however, stated in relevant part:
Plaintiff, Laura Schubert, a teenager, does bring a secular complaint against the church and its pastors. It begins when, according to her own pleading, she “collapsed” while standing at the altar of the church during a church service. She alleges she was physically grasped, taken and held on the floor of the Church against her will. This was allegedly done as part of an “exorcism” in an alleged attempt to exorcise a demon from her. However, this religious context is actually irrelevant. Since Laura Schubert alleges she was held on the floor against her will, she brings claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. This is a “bodily injury” claim . . . Relators, the church and the pastors, concede that this is a “secular controversy” and does not come within the protection of the First Amendment. That is, no church or pastor can use the First Amendment as an excuse to cause bodily injury to any person . . . .
* * *
. . . If this were the sum total of this dispute, Relators would not be here before this Court . . . No religious beliefs would be implicated. The First Amendment and the free exercise of religion would simply not be an issue. Therefore, Relators do not request that this Court issue mandamus to stop litigation of this “secular controversy for bodily injury.”... From this, it would appear that Pleasant Glade viewed Laura’s claims of emotional damages as religious in nature; whereas any claim for physical injury, the church deemed secular. Based on this .. Pleasant Glade only sought mandamus relief for .. emotional injuries.
The court of appeals, however, observed that “<h>aving obtained, in the prior mandamus proceeding, the dismissal of all but Laura’s assault and false imprisonment claims, which they swore under oath should ‘go forward’ because they were purely secular and entitled to no First Amendment protections, <Pleasant Glade> cannot now ‘play fast and loose’ with the judicial system by taking the opposite position in this appeal to suit their own purposes” ...
Pleasant Glade’s mandamus petition, however, merely distinguished Laura’s bodily injury claims from her emotional damage claims. That distinction is consistent with its present appellate contention that the award of damages for Laura’s emotional injury is barred by the First Amendment. It is not apparent, therefore, how Pleasant Glade’s previous concession that Laura’s purely physical injuries were secular, rather than religious in nature, is inconsistent with the church’s present position. Pleasant Glade argues on appeal that the First Amendment protects it from liability for Laura’s emotional injuries connected with its religious practices, and the court of appeals agreed in its mandamus opinion that the conduct alleged in the Schuberts’ petition was “inexorably intertwined with Pleasant Glade’s religious beliefs” ...
Nor is it apparent how Pleasant Glade has obtained an unfair advantage by omitting the assault and false imprisonment claims from its mandamus request. But aside from that, even assuming the church’s mandamus and appellate contentions were contradictory, the mandamus proceeding is a part of this case, not some prior proceeding. Judicial estoppel does not apply to contradictory positions taken in the same proceeding ...
... Thus, we hold that the church is not estopped to assert its First Amendment defense.
III
... Pleasant Glade contends the First Amendment protects it against claims of intangible harm derived from its religious practice of “laying hands” ...
... “<a> religious organization has a defense of constitutional privilege to claims that it has caused intangible harms ... ” ...
Laura asserted .. the events at the church caused her both physical and emotional injury, and the church concedes that the First Amendment does not protect it from Laura’s claim of physical injury. But Laura’s case was not about her physical injuries. Although she suffered scrapes and bruises during these events, her proof at trial related solely to her subsequent emotional or psychological injuries. Laura testified about her fear and anxiety during these events, recalling that she had hallucinated, had trouble breathing, feared that her leg might be broken, and feared that she might die. Her memory of the experience also included many details. She could name the people who held her, where they had placed their hands, and even in whose lap her head rested during part of her ordeal. She also remembered being given water to drink, being walked with, and having a cold compress held to her forehead. Her final memory of the Wednesday evening episode was of her parents coming to take her home and walking with her father in the sanctuary. She could not recall events after that, including her family’s stop at a restaurant for dinner on the way home. Laura did not assert that the church-related events had caused her any physical impairment or disfigurement. She did not complain of physical injury that night, and her scrapes and bruises went unnoticed until the next morning when she showed them to her parents. Her medical proof at trial was also not about physical injury but about her psychological evaluations and treatment. Under this record, any claim of physical pain appears inseparable from that of her emotional injuries.
Indeed, her case at trial was not significantly different from what she would have presented under her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim the court of appeals agreed should be dismissed ...
We do not mean to imply that “under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity,” commit intentional torts upon their religious adherents ... Freedom to believe may be absolute, but freedom of conduct is not, and “conduct even under religious guise remains subject to regulation for the protection of society” ... Moreover, religious practices that threaten the public’s health, safety, or general welfare cannot be tolerated as protected religious belief ... But religious practices that might offend the rights or sensibilities of a non-believer outside the church are entitled to greater latitude when applied to an adherent within the church ... Particularly, when the adherent’s claim, as here, involves only intangible, emotional damages allegedly caused by a sincerely held religious belief, courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances so as not to become entangled in a religious dispute ...
The “laying of hands” and the presence of demons are part of the church’s belief system and accepted as such by its adherents. These practices are .... to be expected and are accepted by those in the church. That a particular member may find the practice emotionally disturbing and non-consensual when applied to her does not transform the dispute into a secular matter ...
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits courts from deciding issues of religious doctrine. Here, the psychological effect of church belief in demons and the appropriateness of its belief in “laying hands” are at issue. Because providing a remedy for the very real, but religiously motivated emotional distress in this case would require us to take sides in what is essentially a religious controversy, we cannot resolve that dispute. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the case.
David M. Medina
Justice
Opinion delivered: June 27, 2008
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