Do you think any claims are unjustified claims? Any ideas are bad ideas?

[Silent3]

If the scientific method is merely "one way" of knowing things, merely one epistemological approach no better than any other, what exactly are other valid epistemologies? Do they demonstrably "get somewhere", filter out the good from the bad, or do they simply provide an open door for justifying practically any claim as being off limits to validation or refutation?

One caveat: I'd like to set aside the "truth" of individuals subjective perceptions as a separate case. There's typically no practical or realistic application of the scientific method to claims like "Alice felt sad last Tuesday" or "Bob thought for a moment he smelled roses when he got out of his car this morning". No doubt many such claims often reflect factual circumstances even though on an individual case-by-case basis proving or disproving these claims would often be nearly impossible. Even when theoretically amenable to scientific verification, verification would seldom be worth the effort, since claims of these sorts are neither extraordinary nor likely to have broad ramifications. In day-to-day life we have to evaluate such claims on the basis of the fuzzy metrics like trustworthiness of individuals making these claims, the existence of possible motives for error or deception, the possible impact (or lack thereof) of acting on bad information, etc.

This is not to say that subjective experience is outside the reach scientific investigation, only that the accessible truths regarding subjective experiences are more often going to be statistical and aggregate in nature.

What about claims which are often cast as being personal and subjective, but clearly have broader implications far beyond any one individual? Can an epistemology which can be used to justify nearly any such claim be said to truly justify anything at all? Should claims which contain within themselves "escape clauses" excusing the difficulty or impossibility of proving the claim be taken seriously?

If a person making a claim says they don't care about proving anything to anyone, should that person's claims be taken seriously? Do their claims deserve respect, perhaps even a special category of respect, if you apply the labels "spirituality" or "religion" to their claims?

What brings these questions to mind for me is an argument in a recent thread where the idea of a "non material" God was trotted out. The non-materiality of God was offered not merely as an excuse to render the concept of God outside the reach of the scientific method, but as a reason to laugh and be amused that anyone could be so absurd as to not see how obvious, true, and reasonable this exemption was.

Even setting aside the logical difficulties of a non-material deity having any relevant impact on the material world, I don't see how you can build any kind of solid epistemology around such an idea. How you can claim solid reasoning under any such approach for the existence of God while also ruling out, say, invisible pink unicorns, and without the case for God simply being a case of special pleading?

[jdlh8894]

1. "Then help yourself to me" (Thanks Kris!) n/t

[USArmyBJJ]

2. Good questions

and worth thinking about. I, for one, would like a few days to mull them over. Hopefully, others will weigh in because it does seem to cut to the heart of a lot of the issues. Until then, I think Luke Muehlhauser of Common Sense Atheism does a good job of explaining the apologist response to your question WRT special pleading. He argues that their response to your specific question works, but that God is still a poor explanation. It's worth checking out:

http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=7992

[Silent3]

3. I think the point made about a "Contingent God" vs. a "Necessary God"...

...approaches the point I was trying to get at to a large degree.

Why insistence on a "Necessary God"? Why make "necessary" part of one's definition of a deity? That strikes me as very suspicious, an attempt to make the case for one's God by declaring victory that the case has already been made, or that the case automatically makes itself for you.

Do invisible pink unicorns become more believable if I call them Necessary and Eternal Invisible Pink Unicorns?

[trotsky]

5. You are absolutely correct.

By including "necessary" as a required attribute of "perfection," theists attempted to weasel their way into proving their god's existence by definition. QED, duh!

[Jim__]

6. That's the cosmological argument.

So, no, it doesn't apply to unicorns.

From wiki:

In the scholastic era, Aquinas formulated the "argument from contingency", following Aristotle in claiming that there must be something to explain why the Universe exists. Since the Universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist (contingency), its existence must have a cause – not merely another contingent thing, but something that exists by necessity (something that must exist in order for anything else to exist).<6> In other words, even if the Universe has always existed, it still owes its existence to an Uncaused Cause,<7> although Aquinas used the words "...and this we understand to be God."<8>

Aquinas's argument from contingency allows for the possibility of a Universe that has no beginning in time. It is a form of argument from universal causation. Aquinas observed that, in nature, there were things with contingent existences. Since it is possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which these things did not in fact exist. Thus, according to Aquinas, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If this is so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Contingent beings, therefore, are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings: there must exist a necessary being whose non-existence is an impossibility, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is derived.

And, while there are, of course, arguments against this, neither Dawkins nor Hitchens addresses the argument.

[Silent3]

9. Why does it have to be a "being" or "Being"?

If something has to be eternal, or a First Cause, a Prime Mover, etc. why can't that thing be the physical universe itself?

It makes more sense to me say "I don't know" to answer the question "Where did everything come from?" than to invent some circular, self-serving definition for the answer to that question, and give that answer a label like "God", a label that carries with it a whole lot of baggage that has nothing to do with answering the question.

Maybe Dawkins could have done better by at least making a nod to the "Necessary" God before going on with his contingent deity argument, but it's still an argument that needs to be stated, especially in a world that's not full of trained theologians, where plenty of ordinary people often ask the question (and often with the tone, "Answer me this, you smartypants atheist!") "If there's no God, where did everything come from?", people who haven't yet learned the more sophisticated dodge (and it is just a dodge) of the "Necessary" God.

[USArmyBJJ]

13. I hope my tone isn't misread

If something has to be eternal, or a First Cause, a Prime Mover, etc. why can't that thing be the physical universe itself?

Generally, the arguments against this go as such:

1) An infinite number of past events cannot actually exist. Because the universe is temporal, it cannot be actually eternal (Craig uses Hilbert's Hotel for this); and
2) Our best theory for the beginning of the universe is the Big Bang, which has a temporal beginning.

It makes more sense to me say "I don't know" to answer the question "Where did everything come from?" than to invent some circular, self-serving definition for the answer to that question, and give that answer a label like "God", a label that carries with it a whole lot of baggage that has nothing to do with answering the question.

Personally, I think the most "rational" decision from a purely objective standpoint is agnosticism. But people aren't rational - we carry biases and experiences, etc. We debate what these mean. If you think it makes sense to say, "I don't know," then why are you debating the issue at all? Probably for the same reason I am - it's fun and interesting and it can either help to confirm or disconfirm your worldview. I tend to think that everyone, at their core, is really an agnostic. They are just a religious agnostic or an atheist agnostic. There's nothing completely irrational about making these leaps; but it isn't necessarily completely rational either.

Also, if you're going to call the cosmological argument "circular," I'd like to hear the warrant. It seems like a straightforward deductive argument to me. If you're worried about the baggage that comes with using the term "God," then call it something else. Whatever else you'd like to call something that is personal, uncaused, beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful. That's what accepting the premises basically means the "cause" of the universe must be. I'm not sure what you'd get out of changing the vocabulary - but I suspect it would be better to argue with the premises, than with the conclusion.

Maybe Dawkins could have done better by at least making a nod to the "Necessary" God before going on with his contingent deity argument, but it's still an argument that needs to be stated, especially in a world that's not full of trained theologians, where plenty of ordinary people often ask the question (and often with the tone, "Answer me this, you smartypants atheist!") "If there's no God, where did everything come from?", people who haven't yet learned the more sophisticated dodge (and it is just a dodge) of the "Necessary" God.

If the conclusion is required, through deductive reasoning, from the premises, then it's not a dodge just because you call it one. The cosmological argument seems to require, as a matter of logic, that the cause of the universe be necessary. If you want to argue that Kalam is a bad argument, do that. There are plenty of ways to do so. But don't just call it a dodge and consider it a day.

[Silent3]

17. "An infinite number of past events cannot actually exist"

Oh, really? Why not? What imposes this limitation? Hilbert's Hotel is surprising and counterintuitive, but I don't see how it rules in or out anything about the nature of the physical universe.

2) Our best theory for the beginning of the universe is the Big Bang, which has a temporal beginning.

Not really. Time itself begins with the Big Bang, the Big Bang does not occur within a flow of time, it starts the flow of time. The question "What was happening before the Big Bang?" is meaningless unless another time dimension apart from the one we experience exists. Positing that sort of idea, however, would merely mean that what we think of as "the universe" isn't really a "universe" at all, because it would then be something less than the sum total of all things, it would merely be a part of a larger phenomena.

Personally, I think the most "rational" decision from a purely objective standpoint is agnosticism.

Atheism and agnosticism are compatible except in the case of "strong" atheism, i.e. adamant insistence that there can't possibly be a God, a position which defines only a small portion of atheists.

We debate what these mean. If you think it makes sense to say, "I don't know," then why are you debating the issue at all?

Because not only do I not know, I think it's highly unlikely that anyone else knows. I don't have to have an alternate answer ready to go in order to say that someone else's answer is probably wrong.

If there is a very large jar of jelly beans, you look at the jar and assert, "The jar contains 12 jelly beans", a quick count of the beans clearly visible can confirm that you are in error as soon as I reach a count of 13, without any knowledge of the actual number of jelly beans, without any more counting being necessary.

If you assert a larger but more likely number given the size of the jar, and tell me you know the answer because an invisible pink unicorn whispered the answer in your ear, I can still assert that you are quite likely wrong, and further assert that even if by chance you are correct your methodology is suspect.

Also, if you're going to call the cosmological argument "circular," I'd like to hear the warrant.

Maybe "self-serving" or "gratuitous" might be better descriptions than "circular", but for me the issue is this: If you start with a contingency argument, that argument is clearly endlessly recursive: every cause requires a previous cause, and there's no beginning that can be reached.

So, how do you break out of that endless loop? One answer that you don't get to break out. The question could simply unanswerable, the assumptions about causality could be incorrect, and the fact that the human mind has a hard time shedding an implicit flow of time from steps in a logical progression could get in the way.

Another answer is that there must be something which is either eternal or self-creating. But you can stop right there. There is no compelling logic that turns that first thing into a God. It doesn't have to be great, it doesn't have to be perfect, it doesn't need a personality, it doesn't need motives.

[USArmyBJJ]

8. Still thinking about your questions

Part of the hold up for me is that I'm reading a very interesting book on the philosophy of science, so my thoughts on it are really in flux!

But, I don't think that your pink unicorn analogy succeeds. (Side Question: Can an invisible object really be described as pink? ;)) Theists argue that IF God exists, he exists necessarily because he is a maximally great being and a maximally great being that exists in one possible world, necessarily exists in all possible worlds (true because part of maximally great is to exist in every possible world). It's a modal logic claim.

It is not, as Trotsky claims, an attempt to avoid a discussion of the epistemic possibility of God's existence. Rather, it's a claim of metaphysical necessity. In other words, it is epistemically true that God may exist, or that God might not exist. But, metaphysically, the theist argues that God is either necessary or impossible, regardless of epistemic uncertainty. So, philosophically speaking, it isn't special pleading for God, it's just the necessity of the logical conclusion.

This, at least, is how I understand it. Others who are better trained in philosophy would probably be able to exlpain it better. I can try to clarify if the argument isn't making any sense.

You ask whether pink unicorns become more believable if you call them Necessary. That clearly wouldn't be the case unless you either provided a reason for them to be metaphysically necessary, or simply redefined "Invisible Pink Unicorn" to mean a maximally great being - our traditional definition for God. But then, you wouldn't have proved anything except that you can call "God" by whatever you want.

[Silent3]

12. Or the converse...

But then, you wouldn't have proved anything except that you can call "God" by whatever you want.

...you can call whatever you want "God".

These types of theological arguments, involving silly and essentially meaningless terms like "maximal greatness", can at best produce conclusions which are as dry, impersonal, and abstract as the convoluted arguments that support them. You might call the answer to these circular-logic puzzles "God", and might even claim you're using a definition of "God" that includes many attributes often associated with God (eternal, perfect, "great"), but none of these conclusions support the existence of a being that has a "personality" of any sort, cares about human lives, has rules about how people should treat each other, has prophets and self-incarnations wandering the Earth teaching important Truths, etc.

Such abstract theological deities could simply be nothing more than synonyms for an impersonal physical universe. When they do more than that, they do so only by slight of hand, trying to sneak through common assumptions about the nature of God, or by using frame like "if there is a God, then...", which makes any conclusion that follows as arbitrary and unnecessary at the necessary assumptions.

At any rate, why must things like "metaphysical necessity" and "maximal greatness" be linked? What consistent set of rules says I can't arbitrarily insist on "metaphysical necessity" for my invisible pink unicorns?

[USArmyBJJ]

14. I agree

You might call the answer to these circular-logic puzzles "God", and might even claim you're using a definition of "God" that includes many attributes often associated with God (eternal, perfect, "great"), but none of these conclusions support the existence of a being that has a "personality" of any sort, cares about human lives, has rules about how people should treat each other, has prophets and self-incarnations wandering the Earth teaching important Truths, etc.

I agree. Arguments like the argument from contingency and the cosmological argument are essentially deist arguments. They don't imply that God has a personality, cares about us, has rules (although the Moral Argument would logically lead to this conclusion), has prophets, incarnations, etc. They simply give you a general outline of the attributes of the being called God. But everything you've noted so far is debating the attributes of God, rather than the existence of God.


Such abstract theological deities could simply be nothing more than synonyms for an impersonal physical universe. When they do more than that, they do so only by slight of hand, trying to sneak through common assumptions about the nature of God, or by using frame like "if there is a God, then...", which makes any conclusion that follows as arbitrary and unnecessary at the necessary assumptions.

I guess they "could" be. But I'd have to hear the argument. They don't assume anything about the nature of God. The argument from contingency simply states that God is a "maximally great being" and works modal logic from there. The cosmological argument requires, but dint of its premises, the attributes listed above (in the cosmological discussion) as a "cause" of the universe. Most people attach God to those attributes because it is how we have always pictured what God is. If you don't want to call it that, don't. It doesn't change anything really.


At any rate, why must things like "metaphysical necessity" and "maximal greatness" be linked? What consistent set of rules says I can't arbitrarily insist on "metaphysical necessity" for my invisible pink unicorns?

Logic.

[Silent3]

15. There is no clear logic of "greatness".

"Greatness" is a very subjective judgment. The kinds of arguments I've read like, "in order to be great, a great as possible, a thing must exist". Frankly, that's word play bullshit, not logic. Why isn't non-existence "great"? Maybe non-existence is even stupendous, awesome, and mightily impressive. :)

But everything you've noted so far is debating the attributes of God, rather than the existence of God.

The attributes in question arise from a supposedly logical investigation of questions like "Why is there a universe?" or "Where did the universe come from?" Calling whatever it is that supposedly answers those questions "God" is arbitrary, and often misleading.

Logic.

What some call logic, I call word play and mental masturbation.

[USArmyBJJ]

16. Maybe

"Greatness" is a very subjective judgment. The kinds of arguments I've read like, "in order to be great, a great as possible, a thing must exist". Frankly, that's word play bullshit, not logic. Why isn't non-existence "great"? Maybe non-existence is even stupendous, awesome, and mightily impressive.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga (1974) goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omnscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses “maximal greatness” if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/

This definition seems to avoid the circularity problem you're identifying. I would go on, but it seems like that link goes through the pros and cons of the argument better than I could ever hope to do.

The attributes in question arise from a supposedly logical investigation of questions like "Why is there a universe?" or "Where did the universe come from?" Calling whatever it is that supposedly answers those questions "God" is arbitrary, and often misleading.

If you have another word you'd prefer to use for something that is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful then use that. But I think everyone, atheist or not, generally concedes that that's what we think about when we think about God. So, it seems just as easy to call it God.

What some call logic, I call word play and mental masturbation.

This is the interwebz. If you aren't here for mental masturbation, go home! ;)

[Silent3]

18. "Excellence" is just as subjective as "greatness"

Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omnscient, and morally perfect."

Say whatever you like, but why say it? Why even decide this is a good starting point for an argument?

"Omnipotence" and "omniscience" are themselves very suspect terms. True omnipotence is self-contradictory. A crude but still valid indication of self contradiction is the old question, "Can God create a rock so big that He Himself can't lift it?".

I could argue other points that follow, but since the premise is just as shaky as "Say that an entity possesses 'maximal goofiness' if and only if 6 times 9 equals 42", why even go further?

[struggle4progress]

4. ?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQjDCqOyjF0

[Jim__]

7. Thanks for that - I enjoyed listening to it. - n/t

[Silent3]

10. Nice music

And the point is?

[Name removed]

11. Deleted message

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