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Edited on Sat Jan-07-06 01:33 PM by dusmcj
Iraq along with Egypt and Syria was one of the significant proponents of pan-Arabism of the 50s and 60s. I see multiple factors playing here:
- Saddam was one of the crop of secular socialist "revolutionary" leaders of newly decolonized third world states in the postwar world, just like Qaddafi Duck and all the corruptocrats of Africa. So from the current secular political sphere of the last 50 years, there is a strong Moscow-Marxist influenced strain of leftist nationalism, somewhat similar to, but weaker than and less well formed than that of Ho, for example (because there was no individual leader like Ho who built and worked from a deep understanding of the liberty impulse and the role of the nation concept in realizing it).
- tribalism is a very strong influence in the region, but exists in a matrix with other bindings, including religion, and more recently pan-Arabism and nationalism. I will claim that just as Saudi saw the emergence of a nation after WWI with the House of Saud arising out of a melange of desert tribes to create a sense of nation and a national government, so the Iraqis, who have a history of fierce resistance to colonization (the Brits and the Russians after WWI in their usual realpolitik nosepicking) became aware of a sense of a People, and wanting a nation for their people.
- the Iraqis had the experience of living in a comparatively modern secular nation state for something like 30 years, growing out of the time of pan-arabism. Certainly under Saddam, there was a modicum of modern quality of life, at least in the cities, in the realm of the practical (and with much Soviet assistance) and in the social, with some equality for women, access to education, pressure to participate in modern economic activity, etc. I.e. they have lived the life, it is not foreign to them. Of course this may be true of city dwellers and not of the peasantry, but nevertheless, this is not the Pashtun frontier, this was a third world client state of the Soviet Union. The people had the experience of the thought-mode of citizens of a nation state, and of the benefits the nation state brings.
- one of the fundamental flaws of Bush's new strategy for Iraq is in its mischaracterization of the insurgency as consisting of a marginal fringe of "rejectionists" (malcontent children who don't want to eat what's good for them ?), foreigners and disaffected Baathist privilege. This is another instance of him not listening to people who actually know how to collect and evaluate intelligence, since the CIA, IMHO very accurately, concluded sometime shortly after the invasion that we were facing a "classic insurgency" - this land is my land, and it ain't your land, and if you don't get off, I'll blow your head off. This is the same equalizer between internally competing groups which was visible in China for example during the Japanese invasion - the Nationalists had pursued the Communists almost to extinction in the 1930's, but they broke off conflict to unite in resistance against the foreign invader Japanese. Only when the foreign threat was neutralized did they return to finish their internal squabble. Iraq is interesting in that the Shia are to some extent jumping the gun, and spending a fair amount of time killing Sunnis while they also fight the Americans. So there may be a chance that internal divisions will be more significant than opposition to our occupation, and internal combatants will choose alliance with us (which the Shia have been doing to some extent, at least in the person of their moderate statesmen) as a means to vanquish their internal opponents rather than alliance within the nation to eject us. But none of this alters that fact that all parties are motivated to oppose our presence, by the simple fact of its existence - the notion of an Iraq, with borders which have been violated is a requisite for this reaction to form.
I forgot to add that: the foreigners entering Iraq are the tail on the dog of the indigenous Iraqi insurgency, whose significance Doober and Rummy are desparately (to the point of word choice) trying to minimize. So that there are two concerns here: an indigenous and I would claim nationalist insurgency which will make our assumed task of nation building and maintenance of order notably more difficult, and an influx of external radicals, which is largely incidental to the action in Iraq itself, but which has portentous implications for us in the broader war on terror. The externals are the stateless fanatics you speak of, but again, in Muslim nations which have been radicalized by what they perceive as western exploitation and injustice, the Madrassah boys are not a marginal extreme, but representatives of their people and their generation. They do not give up national affiliation by joining the jihadis, and the initial core crop of international gunslingers who united under a Muslim banner is rapidly being replaced by a cacophony of the fanatic disaffected, but also the fanatic children of their countries. This courtesy of Mr. Bush's (well, actually PNAC's) invitation to them to come visit Iraq. And they are.
I think there is a blend between the old and the new at play here, where the old mode of a pyramidal hierarchy of fealty in the secular plane from tribal sheiks to regional nobility to sultans and caliphs exists concurrently with modernist notions of secular nation states and the advantages they bring in terms of practical organization (including military) and centralization of control and resources. One question which arises is, which will dominate, moment to moment on the insurgent battlefield, and more broadly and abstractly at the level of attempts to unite competing factions and form a functioning (and as requisite reasonably strong) national government competing against very current factional motivations to have one ethnic grouping or another reign supreme. Claims that these are alien cultures which are based on fanaticism (maybe by extrapolating from observations of actual fringe groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban ?) and which have no knowledge of nation state modernity are deeply flawed; we are all much more alike than we would like to admit at times, and the global spread of tangible and social culture has ensure that and made it irreversible.
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