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LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Kerry.
KERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying, also, how much I have personally enjoyed working with you, Ambassador, and with your staff, and I congratulate all of you, and I thank them for their service and what they're putting up with over there. That's very difficult. And, also, since you are the principal representative to the troops and everybody over there, we all continually express our gratitude for their sacrifice and service.
You are very skilled. I think you are regrettably undermined by a lack of adequate central focus within the administration of some of these choices. I mean, the fact is that 2.5, three years ago, a number of us on this committee were loudly calling for this international conference. It is finally happening, too many lives later, too many limbs destroyed and lives destroyed later. mean, it's a tragedy that that kind of international effort isn't happening more.
Senator Hagel has just referred to the money not given by those countries pledged. That really goes to some of the fundamental challenges that you face now, because those countries are Sunni, and there is, I think you will agree, a reluctance among some of the Sunni surrounding neighbors to play out here, because there's only a 20 percent Sunni population and that's what the insurgency is about.
So, is it fair to say that we are engaged in probably the most complicated and largest nation-building experiment in the history of this country, with the exception of ourselves?
KHALILZAD: Well, Senator, with regard to your broader point, I have no doubt that we have made mistakes in how we have dealt with this issue, and although I don't tend to look back, but rather to work with what I have to move forward. But I believe that no matter what one's view was and what one thinks about the mistakes, now that we are where we are, we need to do what we can to make this...
KERRY: Well, I understand that, Mr. Ambassador. The problem with the mistakes is that every time options have been put on the table and ignored, the situation gets more complicated. So the mistakes have to be taken into account in measuring what are our options, then.
KHALILZAD: You're right on how we got to where we are. I agree with that.
KERRY: Well, let me speak to that for a moment. But just let me get the answer to that. Is this the most significant nation-building effort we've ever engaged in, except for our own?
KHALILZAD: I believe that this is a very difficult, complicated enterprise that we have taken on. It involves state building, it involves nation building, it involves fighting terror, because there is an element of fighting terrorists, the global network that has also made headway in Iraq, although I believe that part of it has weakened in the past 12 months.
But it's a very, very important, complicated, difficult task that we have taken on. Yes, I agree with that.
KERRY: And misreading, in a sense, of that international terrorist enterprise is one of the reasons that things are more complicated today, in many ways, because the Al Qaida presence, as you know, was not significant in the beginning, but now has been.
I agree with you. I think that part of it has diminished, but let me come to the harder issues. The number of insurgent attacks has increased from five per day in May of 2003 to 90 per day in May of 2006. The incidents of sectarian violence have increased from five per month in May of 2003 to 250 per month in 2006. The number of Iraqis kidnapped has increased from two per day in May of 2003 to 35 per day in May of 2006. The number of civilian deaths has increased from 250 per month in 2003 to 1,500 per month.
So, every indication of violence, every indication of disorder, is up. Now, on March 7th of this year, you said the potential is there for sectarian violence to become full-blown civil war.
On Tuesday, you said violent sectarianism is now the main challenge to stability. Over 100 Iraqis have died in sectarian violence this week, including more than 50 in Baghdad alone on Tuesday. Yesterday, Heidar el Abadi (ph), a prominent Shiite legislator said, quote, Certainly, what is happening is the start of a civil war.
Saliel Mutiak (ph), a leading Sunni legislator, described the recent violence, quote, as the start of the civil war.
Do they know something that we don't know and that we're not willing to admit?
KHALILZAD: (OFF-MIKE) With regard to your overall point about the levels of violence and the ratio between different elements within that violence, the data varies depending on what baseline one chooses. I think, at times subsequent to your baseline of '03, there have been higher...
KERRY: Sure, but come to the heart of the question. The heart of the question is, do these leaders, these members of the government who are defining the civil war, do they see something that we're unwilling to admit?
KHALILZAD: With regard to the point that I was making is that I believe that the attacks on the U.S. and the coalition part as a proportion of the level of violence is down, has been down, and the sectarian violence has gone up, which gets us to the point of what you just said as to the bottom line.
I believe that whether this is the beginning of a civil war or is something that can be contained and reversed only retrospectively we can judge.
KERRY: Well, we're not judging it retrospectively, because General Casey announced in the papers today that he's considering bringing troops in in order to deal with this, put them into Baghdad, because there is increasing violence.
What are our troops going to do to stop sectarian violence, when they've already declared that this can't be resolved militarily, it has to be resolved politically?
KHALILZAD: Let me say that whether we can judge that what's happening right now is the beginning of a full-blown civil war, which was your question...
KERRY: Well, let's not fight about full blown, small blown -- is it a low-grade civil war?
KHALILZAD: Well, I just think that whether it's going to become a civil war, whatever the term of full blown or not, will be something that we judge later on with regard to what happens subsequently. It would be, I think, a mistake to judge it, that this is the beginning of an overall civil war.
KERRY: Let's not quibble over the descriptive term. Let's agree the violence is up, there is increased sectarian violence. The heart of the question is, if you would agree it can't be resolved militarily.
KHALILZAD: Well, I say the following, Senator Kerry, which is that in order to deal with this problem, you need both political steps and security steps. You can't count on...
(CROSSTALK)
KERRY: We agree. The policy of the administration has been that as the Iraqi troops are trained, we will stand down. As they stand up, we stand down.
KHALILZAD: Right.
KERRY: We are told by our general that they will be fully trained and completed by the end of this year. But we're not standing down. There's been no stand down. There's been an increase in the violence.
KHALILZAD: I believe the policy has to be, and I believe it is, that we want Iraq to succeed and for Iraq to stand on its own feet, to take care of its own security. But that depends on building Iraqi capacity, but also on conditions. And I believe that's why we have talked always about a condition-based framework.
And there are places that there could be adjustments downward inside Iraq in terms of the presence. There are places because of conditions and the help that the Iraqis need that we may have to increase the level of our forces. But that will be calibrated and we will do constant recalibration depending on the circumstances.
But the target, the objective is an Iraq that can stand on its own feet as soon as possible.
KERRY: Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. It's hard to do this in seven minutes and get through the kind of series of questions that are important to really understanding a point, so if I could just summarize quickly.
You used the word abandonment earlier, and you used the word adjustment, now, for success. None of us who have articulated alternative policies have suggested it as an abandonment, or believe it is.
In fact, in the policy that the three of us sitting here proposed as an alternative to the Senate, we specifically allowed the president the discretion to be able to determine to leave certain number of troops to deal with training, to fight Al Qaida, to protect American facilities, to have an over-the-horizon capacity in order to encourage success.
But there's a strong belief, based on a lot of the statements of Sunni and Shia politicians themselves, about how our presence attracts insurgency and increases violence, and how I think there are plans right now within the military to actually garrison troops, begin to move them out, to take a very different posture, which is in effect the policy we've prescribed.
So I think using the word abandonment is the wrong way to frame what the real choice is. The question here is how do we get success? And there are many people who believe that it is only by pushing the Iraqis with the same kind of deadline that required the elections, the transfer of authority, the constitution, all of which they met, with your pressure, may I add, that's the only way to really effect the kind of transition necessary.
KHALILZAD: Well, I'm in complete agreement with you, Senator Kerry, that we need to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to take on more responsibility, to deliver, to do the right things. And I appreciate the sentiment behind some of the efforts, and I don't dismiss the utility of those efforts.
So to the extent to which efforts to encourage self reliance is the motive, that's welcome. But the extent to which it signals abandonment, undermining of confidence, I think that will be counterproductive to our goal.
KERRY: But you don't believe General Casey, in making a recommendation for a timetable for withdrawal has undermined, do you?
KHALILZAD: I don't believe that General Casey has recommended a timetable fir withdrawal.
KERRY: He made a presentation to the Pentagon with respect to plans.
KHALILZAD: As you know, the Pentagon and I have worked, and I used to head the planning and policy shop there. We have a lot of plans and adjustments are made as the plans are reviewed. There has been no discussion yet with the Iraqi government on the way forward. When I get back, we will form a joint committee of Iraqis...
KERRY: But that's specifically to talk about withdrawal of troops.
KHALILZAD: About the conditions. Today, for example, a whole province was turned over to the Iraqis, the province of Muthanna, that they are taking the lead in terms of security for that province. So there will not be as much requirement as there was before, but in Baghdad, I believe, now we have a requirement for additional capability to bring down the level of violence.
So there will be adjustments, and we have to remain flexible, with the goal, with the intent, to bring the level of U.S. forces down and to get Iraqis to take on more and more responsibility.
KERRY: But I'm confident you would agree that when the national security adviser, Mr. al-Rubaie, wrote in The Washington Post a few weeks ago that there already is an unofficial road map for foreign troop reduction that will eventually lead to a total withdrawal of U.S. troops he was not undermining his own government, was he?
KHALILZAD: No, I believe that all Iraqis, or most Iraqis, let me say, would like the foreign troops to go out. We would like the troops to come out, but if you ask Iraqis do you want them out now or in six months, I think the overwhelming answer will be no...
KERRY: But our plan didn't do that. I just want it clear, our plan didn't do that.
KHALILZAD: No, I'm not saying that...
KERRY: So we should take the word abandonment off the table. We should leave the word success on the table. Different words.
Thank you.
LUGAR: Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
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