So, why is Hassan Nasrallah in charge of Hezbollah in the first place?

[eridani]

Much of what takes place between Israel and the Hizballah in Lebanon is an outgrowth of Israel's follies and strategic errors since its 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israeli troubles with the Palestinians exhibit the same pattern.

Without belittling the Hizballah and the Palestinians' responsibility to the present clashes, Israel reaps the fruit of a series of entrapments that have taken place over the last two decades. Unfortunately, the military and political leadership in Israel are in a state of continued denial. If Israelis do not realize the futility of the overwhelming emphasis on military force in the current conflict, they will pay the price not only in the next few days, but in the years to come.

The Hizballah, one of Israel's most bitter enemies, is an unwanted child of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, a reaction of Lebanese Shiites to the megalomaniac plan of Menahem Begin and Ariel Sharon to impose upon the Lebanese people a Christian-dominated state. Hassan Nasrallah, the extremist leader of the Hizballah replaced the more moderate Abbas Mussawi, who was assassinated by Israel in February 1992.

The Israeli military had kidnapped a number of Hizballah operators and spiritual leaders such as Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Ubeid, imprisoning them for a long time without trial. This induced the Hizballah to kidnap Israelis in order to bring about a prisoners' exchange. And it had worked. In 2004 Israel released 400 prisoners (including Dirani and Ubeid) in exchange for an Israeli businessman and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers that had been held by Hizballah. The Israeli government refused, however, to include in the deal, Samir Kuntar a Palestinian terrorist who had been responsible for the murder of an Israeli family in Nahariya in 1978. Kuntar is now on top of the current Hizballah list of prisoners it demands in exchange for the two Israeli soldiers abducted last week.

[whistle]

1. The CIA selected him...

[DELUSIONAL]

2. because he can get the attention off the real issues behind this war

and for the real issues -- how about evidence from a NEOCON website?? From a area they call "News behind the News"

http://www.iasps.org/nbn/nbn70a.htm

The Geopolitics of Water
In the great geo-strategic game known as the Middle East, peace politics get much of the press and the attention of policy leaders. On occasion, oil takes center stage but often for the wrong reason (see, e.g., "The End of the Oil Era and the Price of Oil"). What is important to understand is that water is in fact the key strategic resource in the region and if you follow the flow of water, you'll follow the politics and policy machinations that lie at the heart of the Israeli-Syrian dialogue. IASPS Fellow in Strategy Paul Michael Wihbey co-authored an analysis of the water question that appeared in the Washington Times, Wednesday, March 29, 2000, reproduced below.

March 29, 2000


Geopolitics of water

Paul Michael Wihbey and Ilan Berman



From the start, water has been a central theme in the Israeli-Syrian dialogue. Suffering from over-irrigation, excessive pollution and a growing population, Syria has viewed negotiations with Israel as a means by which to alleviate its chronic water problem. Hence Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's insistence on an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 border. Aside from the political victory that such an action would signal, the demand is also an effort to gain control over water sources on the Golan Heights. An Israeli withdrawal would give Syria access to the eastern half of the Jordan River headwaters and bring it to the shores of Lake Kinneret. This would make Mr. Assad a partner to Israeli water, giving Syria legal rights to use Lake Kinneret as it deems fit, including piping fresh water back to Damascus.

By contrast, the United States and Israel have sought a regional approach. The original idea seems to have been to stave-off Syrian demands for sharing the Kinneret by integrating Turkey into the talks to provide additional water. To this end, State Department spokesman James Rubin emphasized on Jan. 12 that "water, given its nature, is an issue that is not only between Israel and Syria but has a regional dimension as well, including Turkey, and any solutions must take on that same regional dimension." Turkey, however, has clearly signaled its lack of enthusiasm. A recent report in the Turkish Daily News (Feb. 10) stated that, according to a senior Turkish diplomat, the United States and Israel understood Turkey's message that Turkish water could not be bargained over in the equation of the Middle East peace process.

This reluctance stems from a mature Turkish reading of Syrian intentions. Since the 1980s, relations between the two countries have been strained at best, in part due to Turkey's construction of the ambitious Southeast Anatolia (GAP) Project on the headwaters of the Euphrates. Despite efforts to allay Syrian fears, such as a protocol between the two countries in 1987 that codified Turkey's water commitments to Syria, Damascus has bridled at the loss of control over Euphrates water, and has consistently attempted to regain the strategic initiative. In Mr. Assad's mind, integrating Turkey into the negotiations might just do the trick. A Turkish commitment to water-sharing as part of an Israeli-Syrian peace deal would shift the momentum in Syria's favor, making Ankara accountable to Damascus for its water use and allocations. With this in mind, Turkey has understandably chosen to keep a safe distance from the Syrian-Israeli talks.

<snip>

Thus, by targeting Israel's most vulnerable strategic asset, its dwindling water supplies, Syria has been able to position itself to profoundly influence Israel's bargaining posture over borders and security. This, more than any other factor, may be the reason why Israel has not committed itself to a written agreement regarding a redeployment to the June 4, 1967 line. To do so would be to signal an irrevocable surrender of both the Jordan River and the Kinneret. But renewed rhetoric in Israel seems to suggest that policy-makers are seriously considering just such a move. This would be a win-win situation for Syria. At best, Mr. Assad would not only score a major victory by gaining back the Golan, but also dramatically alter the water equation, and by extension the balance of power, between Israel and Syria. At the very least, the water issue could drive a wedge between Israel and Turkey.

As policy planners struggle to revive the Syrian-Israeli dialogue once again, resolving the topic of water remains the most difficult task for the two countries. It is also the most important. The way the water issue plays out will have major repercussions not only for Israel, but the region as a whole. The ensconcement of Syria on the Golan would allow Damascus not only to virtually dictate terms to Jerusalem, but exert influence over Amman and create a rift in the Israeli-Turkish military partnership as well. Given the signals made by Israel's continued efforts to reopen talks with Syria, Jerusalem has not yet understood the geopolitical significance of water to its relations with its neighbors. As a result, Mr. Assad has been given an incentive to continue to apply the appropriate pressure, diplomatic as well as military to achieve his goals.

To this I add:

The wars of this century will be about water resources -- and whoever has the biggest weapons and is willing to kill as many people as it takes to secure the water resources -- will be the "winner". This is why the CIVILIAN infrastructure and civilians are being targeted in Lebanon.

To make it real easy for the news media -- Israel is killing civilians to secure a water source in Lebanon.



http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2249599.stm

And yes I am real pissed about being used by the NEOCONS and by Israel -- or are they one and the same??? Who knows?? Does Rummy know? Does Condi know?