In Iraq, Military Forgot the Lessons of Vietnam

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Sunday, July 23, 2006

Early Missteps by U.S. Left Troops Unprepared for Guerrilla Warfare

By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/22/AR2006072200444.html?nav=rss_world/mideast

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There is some evidence that Saddam Hussein's government knew it couldn't win a conventional war, and some captured documents indicate that it may have intended some sort of rear-guard campaign of subversion against occupation. The stockpiling of weapons, distribution of arms caches, the revolutionary roots of the Baathist Party, and the movement of money and people to Syria either before or during the war all indicate some planning for an insurgency.

But there is also strong evidence, based on a review of thousands of military documents and hundreds of interviews with military personnel, that the U.S. approach to pacifying Iraq in the months after the collapse of Hussein helped spur the insurgency and made it bigger and stronger than it might have been.

The very setup of the U.S. presence in Iraq undercut the mission. The chain of command was hazy, with no one individual in charge of the overall American effort in Iraq, a structure that led to frequent clashes between military and civilian officials.

Exacerbating the effect of this decision were the U.S. Army's interactions with the civilian population. Based on its experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Army thought it could prevail through "presence" . . .

more: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/22/AR2006072200444.html?nav=rss_world/mideast

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1. while I agree entirely that the Military forgot just about everything

I don't agree that Hussein was the 'mastermind'.

It's pretty simple, folks. If someone invades the place you live, you fight back. If China, say, invaded the US, you don't their would be an insurgency?

It's really just silly.