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Was there a proper decision process? -- Haaretz

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spindrifter Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Wed Jul-26-06 09:54 PM
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Was there a proper decision process? -- Haaretz
Thu., July 27, 2006 Av 2, 5766

By Aluf Benn

1. Decision making The decision to launch a broad military operation in Lebanon, in response to the abduction of soldiers near Zar'it on the morning of July 12, was made with lightning speed. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided almost immediately on a strong military response, and in the evening he presented for cabinet approval a plan for an air assault on Hezbollah's rocket launchers and symbols of the Lebanese government, topped by Beirut International Airport. Ministers were told that Haifa might be hit by retaliatory fire, and that the operation would not be brief. The government approved it unanimously. Shimon Peres' question whether the planners know what will happen in phases two, three and four received no serious reply. Two days later, the "septet forum" approved the bombing of Hezbollah headquarters in south Beirut and Hassan Nasrallah's home. This decision meant further escalation. The third strategic decision, which was not properly presented to the public, was a ground invasion of southern Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah's front line. The impression the government and army created in the first few days was of an air operation, not a return to "the Lebanese quagmire." As bombardments proved insufficient, the ground activity expanded. Olmert explained on July 12 that "there are moments when a country says 'Enough.'" Following Gilad Shalit's abduction and the IDF's futile entry into the Gaza Strip, he had no choice but to respond. Olmert believes that his fierce response surprised Hezbollah and altered the strategic equation in the North.

2. Goals The down side to the hasty decision was that the operational goals were vague and changed in the course of battle. Breaking Hezbollah turned out to be impossible, and the attempt to assassinate Nasarallah also failed. Army top brass settled, in the first days, for a less ambitious objective: "weakening Hezbollah." After several days, the operation was cloaked in new political terms: The Israeli military maneuver is only the prelude to an international diplomatic move to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for disarming Hezbollah and deploying the Lebanese army. Israel announced it would establish a buffer zone on the Lebanese side, and forcibly prevent Hezbollah's return. The approach placed the onus for resolving the crisis on the international community. Israel agreed to a large international force over the border, to help the Lebanese army deploy and prevent Hezbollah's return. Israel gave up its earlier demand to forcibly disarm Hezbollah and monitor the Lebanese-Syrian border for weapons shipments. It's too soon to know if the goals have been achieved. The impact on the balance of deterrence, both in the North and vis-a-vis the Palestinians, will become clear when the war is over.

3. International standing Israel has succeeded in presenting the conflict in the North as a test of "the border doctrine." The international community has demanded for years that Israel set her borders in order and stop conquering. Here Israel was attacked from its recognized border with Lebanon, having withdrawn from every inch of Lebanese soil in 2000. If the border is no barrier to attacks, it will be hard to persuade Israel to withdraw from additional territories. "The world" blamed Hezbollah and agreed to put off a cease-fire until a broader agreement is reached on southern Lebanon. World media this week turned against Israel and focused on Lebanon's destruction, but sources in Jerusalem say this is not reflected so far in the important governments' positions.

4. Convergence? For now, it looks like the unilateral policy - "leave and toss away the key" as in Gaza - has sustained a lethal blow. With no serious Palestinian partner in sight, the convergence has been shelved for now. Olmert will have to redraw his plan, knowing that the international recognition he wants for the new border in the West Bank will require him to evacuate the IDF, not just settlers, thereby taking a security risk.
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http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/742746.html
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