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there is the argument that the warrantless NSA surveillance is needed given the WOT.
The question actually is, once the government has collected the information, what does it do with it ?
Will it be used for purposes other than fighting terror, i.e. like chilling free speech, intimidating critics, coercing citizens, entrapment, humiliation, etc.
The fundamental issue is intent. Why are Americans suspicious of what their government does ? Because the government does not make its intent crystal clear.
This has been exacerbated by the Bush administration, which has repeatedly crafted exceptions or diminutions of legal respect for inherent civil rights that are ostensibly justifiable or maybe even harmless if the government's intent is good, but open loopholes or provide tools for illegitimate behavior if the government's intent is harmful or illegitimate.
Since a promise isn't good enough (because the historical record shows that American government tends to abuse powers to surveil the domestic populace), controls need to put in place. Controls that institute oversight and public accountability.
The question of public accountability gains particular significance because much surveillance activity and organization is classified, so that structures need to be put in place that do not compromise legitimate national security interests, but do ensure public accountability.
So that for example, the FISA appeals court and review process needs a pipeline which scrubs the classified aspects of the information about FISA activity, and produces unclassified reports which can be made public and provide proof to the public and its representatives that surveillance carried out under its purview is legitimate. The role of the legislative branch, as the venue for such review, is critical here, and structures need to be established so that Congressional oversight committees become the entity that implements that pipeline, being cleared to review and assess classified data about surveillance activity, and either act immediately within that classified space, or sanitize the material and present it for action in the general nonclassified space.
Returning to the fundamental issue though, it is again one of controls. Other modern nations are able to accomplish their domestic security missions without raising widespread fears among the public that a police state is being facilitated. One reason for this is that those governments hew far more clearly to the social contract that government is constituted of representatives of the people, who unequivocally serve the people and their interests. Government acts according to the fundamental principle that it serves to facilitate a civil society, and that the elemental basis for such a civil society is respect for the inherent civil rights of each citizen. Power over the public is not an end for government, it is a tool which government uses with restraint in serving the public.
American government has consistent difficulty with behaving according to that framework. It is as though we are still an immature society, and those who are drawn to institutions of control are polar opposites of those who are not and have a deep-seated distrust of government. This is of course fertile ground for an authoritarian state with a disloyal opposition. So that one hopes that in general we can all grow up, and specifically that government will rediscover its place in the power structure of a nation, constituted of government, the public and the estates of society such as media and business.
Specifically, other modern states have instituted extensive legal protections for data acquired by both government and business. We need the same thing here, addressing legitimate means for data collection, processing, compartmentalization (or not, as in information sharing for terror prevention), dissemination (who may see it) and retention. This would be an incremental change, since the US does have some data privacy legislation, but of a far cruder and less extensive nature that that of western European nations, for example.
Since the US government's history of disregard for inherent civil rights in carrying out domestic surveillance reveals what can be labeled with the overused phrase "human nature", i.e. that in this case if power is available it will be used and abused, oversight and penalties are a core requirement of such data protection legislation. The classified realm has its particular complications as described, but they are not insurmountable. In the general case, it needs to be clear that information streams which have been acquired about citizens by government privilege will be retained within their compartmented realm of appropriateness, so that for example, someone visiting a strip joint (i.e. doing something which is not illegal but carries connotations of social controversy) will not have his license plate read by the establishment's personnel, linked to his identity via motor vehicle records (i.e. state involvement) and then be asked whether he had a good time when he arrives at work the next day by people who were not at the club with him (but who presumably acquired the information about his visit via an information pipeline most probably originating in a government agency). Or that his credit card purchases of sex toys are not made known to his family members. Failure to respect the significance of government's privilege in having access to information about citizens which is private and would normally be under their exclusive control needs to result in clear, swift and sufficient criminal and civil penalties including dismissal from government employment, and the right to civil suit against both the individual offender and the government agency under whose authority they acted.
If treatment of private data in the US were regularized in this way, i.e. if the public were tangibly assured that government was required to respect the inherent right to privacy as opposed to just having the choice to be gracious or not, then the flipside of the issue, the right to link data streams in order to effect more functional government activity, again under adequate oversight, would be made less of a public controversy. For example, the national instant check system for suitability for firearms ownership might more effectively join datastreams from felony conviction databases and mental health records to more effectively screen against unsuitable persons. Since antiterror operations function largely in the classified realm to begin with, the roadblock of public concern about appropriate utilization of terror surveillance exceptions might be alleviated, and tasked agencies could share data more broadly within the sealed bubble of the classified space, aware always that their activities were both clearly delineated and under steady review.
But of course, instead we have Romper Room in the Oval Office, and a chief executive who has far too much of an inclination to focus on whether his authority is being challenged, and a need to prove to any presumed antagonists just how much he has.
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