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I thought a book report in order.
The book is "My Year In Iraq," by Paul Bremer.
This is Bremer's pretty much day by day account of his year as coalition leader in Iraq which ended with Iraq getting its sovereignty back in June 04.
It's a pretty useful read to see what the US government was up to during this period, though I suyspect a lot of what Bremer writes is CYA stuff to protect his own name in history.
Anyway, the points I found interesting.
"Rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic," is a well overused phrase, but I kept thinking about it as I read this book. As Bremer reports on the insurgency growing and the security situation getting worse, he spends his time in endless meetings of trying to get one politician to cooperate with others on supporting this coalition of parties to fiull the Secretary of Transportation cabinet position.
Some points I got out of the book.
* The situation in Iraq was no surprise to the US government. Month to month, Washington knew how things were going and which direction they were going. That wasn't the problem. The problem was they didn't have any solutions. Each time there was bad news, the answewr was "how can we speed up training of Iraqi forces," and the answer was that they were already going faster than they should. When half trained Iraqis were sent out as police or army, they melted away.
* When Bremer first got there he was met by the Seven Exile leaders (Chalabi was one) and they told him he should immediately hand over power to them. The US position was that they had no support in Iraq and didn't represent anything close to broad enough concensus to form a government, so the process would have to be done orderly with leadership from every Iraqi community a written Constitution and an elected government. The exiles told him he didn't have that kind of time, and the Iraqi people wouldn't put up with US troops for very long. While you could see the US point, looking back, it sure seems like a blunder.
* While he constantly talked about the brave men and women of the US army, Bremer was actually quite critical of the armed forces. He didn't think they were there to fight. Rather he worried that they were more concerned with meeting their next troop rotation goals. He said he wanted Muqtada Sadr arrested many times and each time it wasn't done for one reason or another, until he grew too strong to fight.
* He was scathing in his criticism of the coalition of the willing. He said most of the armies were worth less than nothing as they had to be supplied. Each country had its own rules of engagement, and some just wouldn't fight. The Spanish were singled out for particular criticism as they contrlled a vital area, and wouldn't move. In one scene a government building was besieged and the Spanish troops nearby would't move. After hours of delay, they went to the building, but took the government people out and let the Sadr Army take the building. The only troops he praised were the Central American units which he said fought.
* To the charge that he disbanded the Iraqi Army, he said that it had already disbanded itself by the time he got there and most soldiers (Shi-ites) were back on their farms and wanted nothing to do with the army anymore with its cruel Sunni officers. I found this defense weak.
* Politically there was a constant tug between the three parties (KUrds, Sunnis, Shi-ites) which he described as a three dimensional tic-tac-toe game. Every committee or group had to be balanced among the three groups plus exiles versus Iraqi nationals, woman and men, rural versus Baghdad and religious versus secular. Each time one person changed, the whole equation would have to be redone and this kind of stuff is what Bremer ended up spending his time doing. (Titanic reference).
* On Iraqi politics, Bremer claimed he couldn't get the Iraqi governing council to actually work. They wanted the jobs, but then wouldn't show up to work, or meetings, and certainly wouldn't make decisions. Even after decisions were voted on 20-4, the next day it was like nothing was decided. He claimed it was the mentality of dictatorship where no one would do anything unless absolutely told to do it, but there was a scene in the book where one Iraqi elder said he (Bremer) was to blame for this as they would step up as he gave them authority. Bremer's answer was he'd love to give them more authority if they'd show they were willing to take on any, but I thought that an interesting exchange.
* The US really had no idea who the insurgency was and probably still doesn't.
* The Grand Ayatollah Sistani is an interesting case. Overall he was a positive influence, but he gave the coalition constant problems. He wouldn't meet with Bremer, but they were in constant touch. He was a supporter of democracy, but had little understanding of what he supported. He would issue fatwas, sometimes on minor points which would throw the government into complete disarray. he Shi-ites had a majority of the council and they would never do anything unless Sistani had agreed with it, so he in fact had a veto power over everything the government did. So Sistani would issue a fatwa on some form of elections, and probably half the book was Iraqis and Un people and Bremer's people trying to work with the Grand Ayatollah's people to find a face-saving way around the fatwa since he couldn't take back his fatwa.
* Chalabi was also interesting. He was a complete pain in the ass, with no Iraqi support, but he was about the only Iraqi politician who knew how western governments work, so while decisions sat on the table for months and everyone just stared at each other, he was the one guy who would be meeting with everyone and lobbying for his side. He often ended up winning because of this. He was a help on economics as he was also one of the few Iraqis who understood market economies.
* The economy had many of the same problems as communist economies had. Factories employed four times more workers than necessaary and made goods that no one would buy, but state stores were forced to buy them at set prices. The banking system was completely corrupt and there were multiple currencies in circulation. Bremer blamed US regulations for holding up reconstruction projects. He'd turn in 500 projects to the government and months later none of them had come out of the vetting system for approval.
* Powell came off pretty well. All he kept doing was warning that without security, there'd be nothing else to talk about.
* Bush was just a broken record. "Hang in there Bremer," "You do what's right and I'll keep support for you here," "Don't cut corners. Let's do this thing right."
* Rumsfeld didn't come off well. Bremer complained that Rumsfeld had his aides so scared they wouldn't make any decisions. Bush asked him about Rumsfeld, and Bremer said he micro-managed and made his job difficult.
Anyway, an interesting read. Obviously we're only getting his side of the story but it's a book that will be needed to someday figure out why things went so wrong over there.
Book report finished.
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