today, referring to the more significant source of NK plutonium. His use of this phrase proves that Snow knew about the two sources of NK plutonium, and that Snow's distortions apparently were deliberate. But Gregory did not follow up or even seem to know what Snow was talking about. Gregory allowed Snow to imply that unobservable "enriching uranium" was the source of the bomb material exploded this weekend, not the fully observable (before late 2002) thousands of easily reprocessed spent fuel rods that were locked away under IAEA seals until about two years into Dubya's watch.
The transcript of the press briefing now is up, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061010-5.html :
"October 10, 2006; Press Briefing by Tony Snow; 11:50 A.M. EDT
Q Tony, in 2003, the President said very clearly that we will not tolerate North Korea with nuclear weapons.
MR. SNOW: Right.
Q And here we are in 2006 operating on the assumption, as the government is, that, in fact, they tested a nuclear devise. So what went wrong?
MR. SNOW: I'm not sure anything went wrong. The failed diplomacy is on the part of the North Koreans because what they have done so far is turn down a series of diplomatic initiatives that would have given them everything they have said they wanted ... And yet they've walked away from all of it. So if there's a failure in diplomacy, it's on their part.
But what also has happened, David, is that over that period of time you have seen the six-party talks continue to evolve ... So rather than having something going wrong, what you really have is the emergence of a process ...
Q In 2002, though, and since then, this President likes to focus on results. So here's the result: In 2002, the President said that he didn't want the so-called "axis of evil", the worst regimes in the world, to get the most dangerous weapons, WMDs. And here we are in 2006; this President has invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons, and there is a country that in that process has been able to acquire more nuclear weapons.
MR. SNOW: Well, it's an open question about what the status -- as you know, there was speculation even back in the Clinton years, did they have six, did they have eight nukes, and the intelligence on that, I think, has always been a little varied. The fact is that the North Koreans --
Q You dispute the idea that they have more today than they had when you came into office?
MR. SNOW: I don't know, I honestly don't know. And I think intelligence analysts will tell you that they're teasing through the question, as well. You'll have to ask a technical question of whether they've had the capability to build additional weapons since they unlocked Yongbian a couple years ago. Don't know. But I think the most significant -- so let's set a couple of benchmarks. Number one, going back to the 1990s, it was clear that the North Koreans were attempting to try to put together a nuclear program. That was why you had the agreed framework back in 1994 under the Clinton administration. The idea was, you provide the carrots, maybe they'll back off. It was -- it made a lot of sense, but it didn't work because the North Koreans cheated on it and were trying on the sly to enrich uranium.
So it is not -- so what has happened in recent days, at least in terms of an announced or desire by the North Koreans to develop a nuclear weapon, that's not new. They've been trying to do this for years. What is new is that you do have, I think, a much more effective mechanism, or at least a more promising mechanism for dealing with them, because the people who have direct leverage, the people who can turn the spigots economically and politically, are now fully engaged and invested in this. That was not the case in the 1990s; it was not the case earlier in this decade; it is the case now.
Q But, Tony, results -- I'm trying to get you to focus on results. You invaded a country that had no nuclear weapons and all the while a country further developed their nuclear capacity.
MR. SNOW: You may have better intelligence than I do. You're --
Q It's not a question of me. I think the intelligence is not as unclear as you're projecting it as.
MR. SNOW: No, I think it is. People have been trying to assess. ... The North Koreans have proceeded. Absolutely right; given. But now what has happened is that the people, again, who are most directly capable of influencing their decisions have stepped up and said, you know what, the old policy of appeasing these guys apparently isn't going to work anymore. So you have to look prospectively now, and say, okay, what is going to be happening in the future that we think is going to enable us to modify the behavior of the North Koreans?
Q Just one more, I just want to be clear. You're suggesting the Clinton approach was appeasement?
MR. SNOW: No, what I'm saying is that in the past what has happened is the attempt to say to the North Koreans -- because I think the Clinton administration, again, tried something and it was worth trying, which is to say, okay, we're going to give you a bunch of carrots: You guys renounce; we're going to try to give you a light-water breeder reactor, we'll give you incentives. And the North Koreans took it and ran away with it. What has also happened is that in response to bad behavior in the past, people have said, you know, what we'll do is we'll increase aid, we'll increase trade.
So rather than using the term "appeasement," what I will say is that you had primarily a carrots-oriented approach. Now you've got carrots and sticks. ...
Q And your belief is that the march to war against Iraq in no way limited this administration's ability to dissuade North Korea from developing nuclear weapons?
MR. SNOW: Absolutely right, absolutely right, absolutely right. The two are, in fact, separate issues that are worked on by separate people. ..."