"New manual at odds with key Iraq tactics"The 282-page counterinsurgency field manual, unveiled Friday, seeks to bring together the best practices in fighting sustained insurgencies that the United States has learned during the Iraq war. It also lists tactics that have tripped up American forces, such as trying to make local security forces act like the U.S. military and overemphasizing killing or capturing enemies rather than providing for the safety of the population.
Although the military has moved away from some of these tactics, others are widely used in Iraq.
Most special operations forces in Iraq spend the bulk of their time and resources trying to kill or capture Al Qaeda members and insurgents. But the manual says the best use of those troops is not hunting enemies but training Iraqi security forces or police.
Perhaps the most controversial section may be the manual's warning about large, sprawling bases, the very kind the Army has erected in Baghdad. The manual warns that such military bases could suggest "a long-term foreign occupation."
FM 3-24 COUNTERINSURGENCYI've skimmed the new manual and it appears to have more in common with the
"IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT" than it does with Dubya's expected decision to send 30,000 more targets AKA troops to Iraq.
Why do we set high standards for anyone who wants to practice medicine, engineering, etc. and allow someone to be Commander in Chief who has no training or experience?
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