The term "surge" implies that the military exercise will be over relatively quickly. And the surge is being described by BushCo as a maneuver that will be over in 6 to 8 months.
But the real intent and strategy behind the "surge" might be found in some of the recent efforts by administration mouthpieces to convince right-wingers that a surge of troops in Iraq is a good idea.
Americans are being sold a "surge" but it seems likely that we'll actually be buying a long-term escalation of the war. A classic bait and switch.
RW organizations and publications such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Daily Standard (Bill Kristol's rag) are out there vocally calling for the surge, always with very "we-cannot-fail" flowery language. These articles either come right out and say that the surge must be "long and lasting" or they stay silent on how long additional forces would be required to stay. But even where there's silence on the length of the surge, it seems obvious, from the various rationales for the surge, that "clearing and holding Baghdad," "securing Anbar Province," and other tasks are no 6 month jobs.
Here are some recent articles:
The Right Type of "Surge"
Any troop increase must be large and lasting.
by Jack Keane & Frederick W. Kagan
12/27/2006 2:00:00 PM<snip>
We need to cut through the confusion. Bringing security to Baghdad--the essential precondition for political compromise, national reconciliation and economic development--is possible only with a surge of
at least 30,000 combat troops lasting 18 months
or so. Any other option is likely to fail.
The key to the success is to change the military mission--instead of preparing for transition to Iraqi control, that mission should be to bring security to the Iraqi population. Surges aimed at accelerating the training of Iraqi forces will fail, because rising sectarian violence will destroy Iraq before the new forces can bring it under control.
<snip>
Of all the "surge" options out there, short ones are the most dangerous.
Increasing troop levels in Baghdad for three or six months would virtually ensure defeat. It takes that long for newly arrived soldiers to begin to understand the areas where they operate. Short surges would redeploy them just as they began to be effective.
In addition, a short surge would play into the enemy's hands. Both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias expect the U.S. presence to fade away over the course of 2007, and they expect any surge to be brief. They will naturally go to ground in the face of a short surge and wait until we have left. They will then attack the civilian population and whatever Iraqi security forces remain, knowing them to be easier targets than U.S. soldiers and Marines. They will work hard to raise the level of sectarian violence in order to prove that our efforts have failed.
<snip>
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/124mvwef.asp******************************
Send More Troops to Baghdad and We'll Have a Fighting Chance
By Frederick W. Kagan
Posted: Tuesday, December 26, 2006<snip>
The increase in US troops cannot be short-term. Clearing and holding the critical areas of Baghdad will require all of 2007. Expanding the secured areas into Anbar, up the Diyala River valley, north to Mosul and beyond will take part of 2008.
It is unlikely that the Iraqi army and police will be able to assume full responsibility for security for at least 18 to 24 months after the beginning of this operation.
This strategy will place a greater burden on the already overstrained American ground forces, but the risk is worth taking. Defeat will break the American army and marines more surely and more disastrously than extending combat tours. And the price of defeat for Iraq, the region and the world in any case is far too high to bear.
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Why We Need More Troops in Iraq
By Joseph Lieberman
Friday, December 29, 2006; Page A27
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/28/AR2006122801055.html