It's late fall, 1975, Portugal has relinquished their claim to East Timor, the Eastern half of an Island in the Indonesion archipelago, and the native inhabitants are preparing for independence. But, the US backed Indonesian regime of President Suharto, a brutal tyrant, has no intention of allowing the Timorese to assert their independence. They are busily preparing to snuff out that aspiration by force. In December 1975, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger visit Indonesia. Two newly declassified documents from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, released to the National Security Archive, shed light on the Ford administration's relationship with President Suharto of Indonesia during 1975. Of special importance is the record of Ford's and Kissinger's meeting with Suharto in early December 1975.
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http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/#doc4)
On the eve of Indonesia's full-scale invasion of East Timor, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. During this meeting with Suharto, Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: "We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have."
Kissinger did indeed stress that "the use of US-made arms could create problems," but then added that, "It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation." Thus ...
Kissinger's concern was not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively--and hence illegally--but whether the act would actually be interpreted as such--a process he clearly intended to manipulate.(26) In any case, Kissinger added: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly."
Indeed, timing and damage control were very important to the Americans, as Kissinger told Suharto: "We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. . . If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home." Kissinger also asked Suharto if he anticipated a "long guerilla war," apparently aware that a quick military success would be easier to spin than a long campaign. Suharto acknowledged that there "will probably be a small guerilla war" but he was cagey enough not to predict its duration. Nevertheless, his military colleagues were optimistic; as one of the architects of Indonesian policy, General Ali Murtopo explained to a U.S. scholar some months before the invasion, "the whole business will be settled in three weeks."(27)
After the invasion and slaughter of East Timor in which about 1/3 of that island's population was decimated (approximately 200,000), the ever thoughtful Ford sent by diplomatic pouch a small gift to General Suharto, a set of golf balls.
http://www.eurotrib.com/ (look in the right column, direct linking doesn't work)
this has been posted on the DKos too