Time Machine 2004: UAE royals, bin Laden's saviours

[The Straight Story]

UAE royals, bin Laden's saviours

March 25, 2004 12:04 IST

The Central Intelligence Agency did not target Al Qaeda chief Osama bin laden once as he had the royal family of the United Arab Emirates with him in Afghanistan, the agency's director, George Tenet, told the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States on Thursday.

Had the CIA targeted bin Laden, half the royal family would have been wiped out as well, he said.

The 10-member bipartisan commission is investigating the events leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US.

A host of Clinton and Bush administration officials have testified before the commission.

http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/mar/25osama.htm

[bunkerbuster1]

1. "It's Clinton's fault! Dereliction of Doody!"

just anticipating the knuckle-dragger spin on this, is all.

Of course the point of this story is that UAE royals' connections to Al Qaeda and OBL are very, very well known.

Doesn't mean we can't work with the UAE and have diplomatic relations and all that, but this port story stinks the more you know about it.

[gatorboy]

2. Wasn't Congress run by Repugs at that time?

Considering they are the party of accountability and all that. They didn't seem too worried about it at the time when they were so worried about blow job reports...

[bunkerbuster1]

3. oh, please, if they gave a good crap about security

they would've insisted that the newly-elected boosch find and capture/kill the USS Cole bombers. But they didn't.

They've not a leg to stand on, but that never stops them.

[mzmolly]

4. .

The article isn't clear about when this meeting was?

[bunkerbuster1]

5. The linked story's from '04, but the events are from '99.

It's not clear from the story.

Here's the stuff in the 9/11 report they're referring to:

http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch4.htm

scroll most of the way down for this (they're all over this at the atrios.blogspot.com site):

The Desert Camp, February 1999
Early in 1999, the CIA received reporting that Bin Ladin was spending much of his time at one of several camps in the Afghan desert south of Kandahar. At the beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located in the vicinity of the Sheikh Ali camp, a desert hunting camp being used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates.151

Reporting from the CIA's assets provided a detailed description of the hunting camp, including its size, location, resources, and security, as well as of Bin Ladin's smaller, adjacent camp.152 Because this was not in an urban area, missiles launched against it would have less risk of causing collateral damage. On February 8, the military began to ready itself for a possible strike.153 The next day, national technical intelligence confirmed the location and description of the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. But the location of Bin Ladin's quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.154 The CIA did its best to answer a host of questions about the larger camp and its residents and about Bin Ladin's daily schedule and routines to support military contingency planning. According to reporting from the tribals, Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited the Emiratis; the tribals expected him to be at the hunting camp for such a visit at least until midmorning on February 11.155 Clarke wrote to Berger's deputy on February 10 that the military was then doing targeting work to hit the main camp with cruise missiles and should be in position to strike the following morning.156 Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation.157

No strike was launched. By February 12 Bin Ladin had apparently moved on, and the immediate strike plans became moot.158 According to CIA and Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. Clarke told us the strike was called off after consultations with Director Tenet because the intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to Clarke as if the CIA was presenting an option to attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable; the Bin Ladin unit chief, "Mike," agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Ladin before 9/11.159

[mzmolly]

6. Thanks, I do remember Freepers bitching about this to no end.

In the end their faux tantrum and inability to understand "nuance" works in our favor.