Big Problem, Dubai Deal or Not

[cal04]

In the political collision between the White House and Congress over the $6.8 billion deal that would give a Dubai company management of six American ports, most experts seem to agree on only one major point: The gaping holes in security at American ports have little to do with the nationality of who is running them. The deal would transfer the leases for ports in New York, Baltimore and Miami, among others, from a British-owned company to one controlled by the government of Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates. But the security of the ports is still the responsibility of the Coast Guard and the Customs Service. Foreign management of American ports is nothing new, as the role already played by companies from China, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan and trading partners in Europe attests.

(snip)
The administration's core problem at the ports, most experts agree, is how long it has taken for the federal government to set and enforce new security standards — and provide the technology to look inside millions of containers that flow through them. But only 4 percent or 5 percent of those containers are inspected. There is virtually no standard for how containers are sealed, or for certifying the identities of thousands of drivers who come in and out of the ports here to pick them up. If a nuclear weapon is put inside a container — the real fear here — "it will probably happen when some truck driver is paid off to take a long lunch, before he even gets near a terminal," said Mr. Flynn.
That is where concerns about Dubai come in. While the company in question has not been a focus of investigations, Dubai has been a way station for contraband, some of it nuclear. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer, made Dubai his transshipment point for the equipment he sent to Libya and Iran because he could operate there without worrying about investigators.


(snip)
The unstated assumption behind the arguments of critics is that transferring corporate responsibility for the port terminal leases to a conservative Muslim country that bred two of the Sept. 11 hijackers increases the likelihood of another act of terror. Some independent experts, like Dr. Irwin Redlener of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, warn of the risk that "a lot of critical information about the movement of cargo is now accessible to new owners."

(snip)
"I'm not worried about who is running the New York port," one senior inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency said, insisting he could not be named because the agency's work is considered confidential. "I'm worried about what arrives at the New York port."

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/politics/23assess.html?hp&ex=1140670800&en=6d1ee61ea35c53a7&ei=5094&partner=homepage

[TreasonousBastard]

1. And, again I say...

that the FDA and Agriculture departments have been far less than effective in stopping all of the rotten food, invasive pests, and other dangerous goods entering the ports.

Customs and the Coast Guard haven't made a serious dent in any contraband from heroin to fake Rolexes.

INS hasn't stemmed the tide in illegal entries.

All of these agencies, and more, have been working for years, long before 9/11, and have not been able to do the jobs they have had all that time.

So, now we think they're going to add terrorism to the list and be any better at it?

Working for Chertoff?