Blowing Cheney's Cover

[dogday]

Blowing Cheney's Cover
Ray McGovern
April 10, 2006


Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, the publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in Washington, DC. A 27-year veteran of the CIA, he is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.



When you invest so much effort into tangling the web—in this case, corrupting intelligence analysis in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq—it becomes hard to know when to stop. Vice President Dick Cheney went to inordinate lengths, including 10 visits to CIA headquarters, to ensure that that crucial NIE on weapons of mass destruction was alarmist enough to scare Congress into authorizing war. And when the evidence turned out to be flimsy, Cheney had a back-up plan: The CIA made me do it.

Ever since their exaggerated claims about Iraq’s possession of WMD turned out to be baseless, the Bush administration’s defense has rested on blaming the government’s intelligence analysts. But one of the great revelations from Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald’s court filing last week is more evidence that the White House—not the CIA—distorted intelligence on Iraq. It was then chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, acting on orders from Cheney, who presented evidence of Iraq seeking nuclear weapons material to reporters as a “key judgment” from the NIE, when in fact it was a subject of debate in the intelligence community.

The White House plan to scapegoat the intelligence community about Iraq—aided by eager-to-please CIA Director George Tenet—worked beautifully. But only for a while. The plan faltered once it became clear there were no WMD and former Ambassador Joseph Wilson blew the whistle on the centerpiece report used to deceive Congress and conjure up the specter of a mushroom cloud. That report conveyed the cockamamie story about Iraq seeking uranium in the African country of Niger, in which Cheney took uncommon interest.

Cockamamie? Easy to say in retrospect, you say. No, it was easy to say from the outset. And that is why CIA analysts in early 2002 threw it into the circular file, where it deserved to be—for several good reasons. For starters, the government of Niger does not control the uranium mined there. Rather, it is tightly controlled and monitored by an international consortium led by the French. CIA analysts all agreed that the notion that Baghdad could somehow siphon off some of that uranium and spirit it back to Iraq was preposterous.

http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/04/10/blowing_cheneys_cover.php

[formercia]

1. So much for Freedom Fries

scapegoating the French for trying to tell the truth.

[Jack Rabbit]

2. Kicked and recommended

EDITED for typing

The thing that must be kept front and center:

The intelligence was bad because the Bushies wanted it that way.

They lied to us not so much when they said Iraq had WMDs, but when they said they knew Iraq has WMDs. They knew nothing of the sort. They knew the intelligence had been maipulated and that it was, in its raw form, inxonclusive at best. They knew the intelligence was manipulated becuase Dick Cheney and Scooter Libby were making frequent trips to Langley to tell intelligence analysts what they wanted to hear and Doug Feith cherry picking reports and editing the ambiguity out of them.

[dogday]

3. Exactly.................. nt