From the Department of Not-So-Bright Ideas: arming both sides in Iraq's civil war

[ProSense]

From Think Progress:

American commanders are turning to a strategy “that they acknowledge is fraught with risk: arming Sunni Arab groups that have promised to fight militants linked with Al Qaeda who have been their allies in the past.” Critics say the plan “could amount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war.”

Tensions Within the Sunni Coalition Against al-Qaeda

By Spencer Ackerman - June 11, 2007, 9:02 AM

Is the U.S.-allied Sunni tribal alliance against al-Qaeda in Iraq fracturing?

One of the bright spots in Iraq has been the recent tribal shift in Anbar Province against al-Qaeda. Started after al-Qaeda declared an "Islamic State of Iraq" -- alternative translations put it as the "Islamic Emirate of the Land of the Two Rivers," implying that statehood is a religiously illegitimate concept -- last fall, over 25 tribes decided that al-Qaeda's severe vision for Anbar threatened their interests more than the U.S. occupation does. As a result, tribal leaders created the Anbar Salvation Council, a political alliance that worked with the U.S. against al-Qaeda; and ever since, the U.S. military has reported increasing numbers of killed or captured al-Qaeda affiliates. The tribes have also sent their young men to join the Iraqi army and police, but they also retain a military wing that the U.S. has equipped and worked with, leading some analysts -- and military officers -- to worry about the creation of yet another militia.

Recently, however, strains have been on display in the Anbar Salvation Council. A key figure in its creation, Sheikh Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, has been alienating some of the other tribes through his enthusiastic cooperation with the U.S. and his heavy-handed graft. al-Rishawi denies any such rift, but the Washington Post reports:

more

June 11, 2007

Contracting out counter-terrorism in Iraq

The WaPo had a front-page item on Saturday about U.S. forces, in several instances, aligning themselves with Sunni sectarian militias — including insurgents that have attacked Americans in the past — who are anxious to battle al Qaeda. The Maliki government (and Bush administration policy) has always been that the militias need to disarm, and there should never be private armies working outside the Iraqi security forces, but as far as the new policy is concerned, desperate times call for desperate measures.

As the Post article made clear, the strategy is fraught with complications. In many skirmishes, U.S. troops no longer no which side is which. We’re supporting insurgents with arms, ammunition, cash, fuel, and supplies, and hoping that they won’t, sometime soon, turn around and start using the weapons on us. As one Sunni militia leader put it, “(T)he enemy now is not the Americans, for the time being.”

The NYT follows up today fleshing out some of the risks.

(C)ritics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it could amount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war. The United States has spent more than $15 billion in building up Iraq’s army and police force, whose manpower of 350,000 is heavily Shiite. With an American troop drawdown increasingly likely in the next year, and little sign of a political accommodation between Shiite and Sunni politicians in Baghdad, the critics say, there is a risk that any weapons given to Sunni groups will eventually be used against Shiites. There is also the possibility the weapons could be used against the Americans themselves.

An intelligence officer in a battalion cooperating with Sunni militias said, “We have made a deal with the devil.” That appears to be tragically true.

<…>

Maybe this strategy will work like a charm. Maybe Sunni militias will be effective in battling al Qaeda and will never turn on those they consider “occupiers.” Maybe we’ll support those who were up until recently killing Americans, and they’ll consider us, for now, the enemy of their enemy. Maybe they’ll eventually lay down arms and agree to some kind of reconciliation in an Iraqi political context. We’ll see.

But in the meantime, I have a question: if Sunnis in Iraq are anxious to take up arms in order to drive al Qaeda from their country, what are we still doing there? If counter-terrorism is the goal, and we can withdraw and let Iraqis do it themselves, why don’t we?

Why don't we?


Edited because now the title makes sense!

[gratuitous]

1. Well, the oil deal seems to be going south

Only thing left to do is make the merchants of death happy, and give everybody in Iraq a gun and see what happens. The loyal Bushies will shrug and walk away, content to blame the horrific results on Democrats or an angry God or whatever other scapegoat they can find. Then they'll move on to another country (Iran, Syria, Libya or wherever), set it up and try it all again. Only this time, their hare-brained scheme will work.

[LSK]

2. are these people fucking crazy????

:wtf:

[underpants]

3. It's just good business

you not only get to sell twice as many weapons (well at least the companies you are shinying up to for one of those highpaying jobs after you retire) you not only get to do that but you also get to *wink* *nudge* stay in good terms with whomever wins.....a (in hushhush voice) and whomever doesn't win and needs some weapons *wink* *shoots finger*