New Report Released in Advance of Administration Interim ReportWASHINGTON, July 11 -- The National Security Network (
http://www.nsnetwork.org/) released a summary report of its "Measuring the Benchmarks" series in advance of the Bush Administration's report to Congress.
The report can be found at:
http://hosting.bronto.com/993/public/NSN_Interim_Benchmark_Report.pdf and
the executive summary can be found at:
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/167 The executive summary is below. This report summarizes weekly reports
produced by NSN over the past several weeks. They are available at
http://www.nsnetwork.org/. Executive Summary
For the past six weeks, the National Security Network has been
systematically evaluating the progress that is being made in Iraq on the 18
benchmarks outlined by the President and Congress. Now, as the President
prepares an interim report for Congress, NSN is releasing this interim
report summarizing progress on key benchmarks.
The policy that the President outlined in January was based on the
premise that the security situation had deteriorated to a point where no
political progress was possible. His policy was based on improving security
through greater troop deployments and traditional counterinsurgency
methods. According to his plan, the Iraqi government would assume greater
responsibility for providing security and take complete control of security
in November 2007. The improved security situation would allow for more
political space where deals could be struck on key political benchmarks
that would bring about national reconciliation
Since the President announced his "surge" policy, more than 25,000
troops have been sent to Iraq, approximately 600 have been killed and more
than 3,000 have been wounded. Meanwhile, Americans are now spending $10
billion per month on the war.
Unfortunately, this investment has yielded no real progress. The
President's policies have failed to bring security to Iraq. The country
remains mired in multiple civil wars with Sunnis fighting Shi'a, Sunnis
fighting each other in Anbar and Diyala, Shi'a fighting each other in the
South, and Kurds fighting Sunnis around Kirkuk and Mosul. Iraqi Security
Forces, who are supposed to be taking on greater responsibilities, cannot
be trusted to enforce the law fairly, and all too often turn on American
troops or take part in sectarian violence. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government
is teetering on the verge of collapse. One third of the Cabinet, including
the major Sunni party as well as the party of Muqtada Al Sadr, is currently
boycotting the government. Without the participation of these groups there
can be no meaningful progress on any of the key political benchmarks
including the oil law, de-Baathification, or amending the constitution.
The President's "surge" has failed to bring about stability or
political reconciliation. The chances of a dramatic shift that might change
the situation are extremely unlikely.
Iraqi Security Forces (
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/151)
1. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations
2. Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed
enforcement of the law
3. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of
operating independently
It has been almost 750 days since President Bush first declared that,
"As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Unfortunately, Iraqi security
forces are still incapable of providing security. Because of their poor
performance and lack of manpower, the President's Baghdad Security Plan is
far behind schedule. The actual number of available-for-duty forces is
between one-half and one-third of the total forces cited by the Pentagon.
Meanwhile, these forces cannot be trusted to enforce the law fairly.
Numerous times, trained Iraqis have turned against American forces or taken
part in sectarian violence. Put simply, on this front the Administration is
failing to meet its benchmarks for success and there is little sign that
progress is likely.
De-Baathification (
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/153)
4. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification
In May of 2003, the Bush Administration enacted ill-conceived de-
Baathification laws, which alienated the Sunni population, fomented
sectarian divisions and established a recruitment pool for insurgents.
Repealing the harsh de-Baathification laws is absolutely critical to
bringing Sunnis back into the political fold in Iraq and achieving
reconciliation. It has been more than a year since President Bush declared
progress on this front and yet there is still no agreement. The latest
attempt to amend the law was thwarted this spring by Ahmed Chalabi, a
former ally of Neoconservatives, who used his position as head of the
de-Baathification Commission to build opposition and block the legislation.
With Iraq's government still in gridlock, progress in the near future
appears unlikely.
Sectarian Violence (
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/162)
5. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating
militia control of local security.
6. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia
disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable
only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.
The President's "surge" has had little impact on the overall level of
sectarian violence. The recent attack in Northern Iraq, which killed 150
people, is just the latest example of the lack of security. Meanwhile, the
Iraqi government has yet to act on its promises to help disarm the Shi'a
militias, who have stood down and allowed American forces to take on Sunni
insurgents, while they reap the benefits. Even worse, a majority of
Baghdad's residents continue to be supportive of the militias. Unless there
is a massive and unforeseen change in conditions on the ground, sectarian
violence and militia control are likely to remain at unacceptable levels.
Amending the Constitution (
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/163)
7. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the
constitutional review
Three years ago, the United States handed over power to a sovereign
Iraqi government. Today, there is still no agreement on what this
government's constitution should look like. While some progress has been
made, Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds still cannot agree on key elements of their
constitution. The committee established to look into these matters has
missed numerous deadlines and is in gridlock. An inability to come to an
agreement could lead to the eventual collapse of the government and an
increase in violence in areas that have, to date, remained relatively
peaceful-most notably the oil- rich city of Kirkuk.
The Oil Law (
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/166)
8. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without
regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and
implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq
benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an
equitable manner
Agreeing on a system for fairly dividing oil revenues between Shi'a,
Kurds, and Sunnis is crucial to national reconciliation. Unfortunately, the
oil law -- which was recently approved by the Cabinet and awaits passage
through Parliament -- does not accomplish this goal. Instead, the law has
the potential to harden sectarian divisions and further exacerbate the
ongoing civil wars. Sunni leaders have come out against the law, including
an influential group of clerics who issued a religious edict condemning it.
The largest Shi'a bloc in parliament opposes the law, and the leaders of
the Kurdistan Regional Government have not agreed to the final version.
Ramming through a major law that is opposed by key minority groups is not a
recipe for reconciliation.
Even if the oil law were to pass, it still does not address many key
questions on implementation. Moreover, oil production remains below prewar
levels and corruption is causing massive losses. Unless these problems are
addressed, the law itself is irrelevant.
report:
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/167
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
