The Importance of Preventing Central Tabulator Mediated Election Fraud

[Time for change]

While there may be an infinite number of specific ways to rig an election, election fraud may be perceived as falling into three general categories:

1. Preventing people from voting
2. Causing individual voting machines to switch or delete voters’ votes
3. Causing county central tabulators to wrongly tabulate vote counts received from the county’s precincts

Though many or most Americans who are concerned about the integrity of our election system are focused mostly on category # 2, specifically the potential for DRE machines to be programmed to switch votes, it may very well be that the other two categories represent a greater threat to our election system, and it appears almost certain that the 2004 presidential election was “won” by the wrong candidate more because of illegal vote purging (category # 1) or central tabulator mediated fraud (category # 3) than electronic vote switching.

Recall that the 2004 presidential election depended on Ohio. In 2004, less than 15% of Ohio votes were cast on electronic voting machines, whereas 73% were cast on punch card machines and 12% were cast on optical scan machines. Furthermore, analysis of the 2004 Ohio vote count patterns indicated that electronic vote switching was an unlikely cause of massive election fraud in 2004.

Illegal purging of hundreds of thousands of Ohio voters was probably a much more important cause of election fraud in 2004, and probably accounted for a net loss of enough Kerry/Edwards votes to alter the outcome of the 2004 election all by itself.

While category #s 1 and 3 are of great concern, the rest of this post will confine itself to category # 2, central tabulator mediated fraud.


County central tabulators

The county central tabulators receive vote counts from all the precincts throughout the county. They generally receive the counts electronically by modem, and they receive a whole bunch of physical evidence (tapes from individual voting machines, memory cards, provisional ballots, etc.) as well. The central tabulators tabulate and report the vote counts for the whole county and the by precinct, using processes that vary from state to state. These processes can be quite complicated, as indicated by this article from Verified Voting, which explains how people can monitor the tabulation process.

The “pre-tabulator” vote counts for individual precincts are the vote counts that are posted by the individual precincts shortly after poll closing on Election Day. The “post-tabulator” vote counts are the vote counts that are reported out by the county central tabulator, and those are the official counts. For obvious reasons, the pre-tabulator and post-tabulator vote counts should match in a fair election.


Reasons why central tabulator mediated election fraud may be more practical than vote switching on individual electronic machines

Though I believe and millions of other people believe that the 2004 election was stolen, I doubt that anyone but the perpetrators know precisely how it was done; nor does anyone know precisely why exit polls in 2006 predicted a much larger Democratic Congressional victory than the official election results indicated; and more important, nobody knows what mechanisms of election fraud will be perpetrated in 2008 (if those elections are actually held) or in future elections.

But there are reasons, I believe, to think that central tabulator mediated fraud is a more practical way to influence a national election than is programming vote switching for individual voting machines. The individual voting machines at the precinct where I did poll watching in 2006 registered about one hundred votes per machine. Few voting machines register much more than that. So consider how many individual voting machines would have to be rigged to change the results of a presidential election.

County central tabulators, on the other hand, tabulate the results for a whole county, which in large counties may account for a million or more votes. So you’d have to rig the results of ten thousand individual voting machines to achieve the impact of rigging the results of a single large county tabulation. I’m not saying that I know for certain that the former couldn’t be accomplished more easily than the latter. But it boggles my mind to see how it could.


The likely role of central tabulator mediated fraud in the 2004 Ohio presidential election

The combination of exceptionally long voting lines throughout Cleveland on Election Day 2004 on the one hand, and yet surprisinglylow official voter turnout in Cleveland, is very perplexing, especially since Cleveland used punch card voting, which is not subject to the delays that electronic voting tends to cause. That finding alone suggests foul play, since long voting lines should be associated with high voter turnout, not low voter turnout. And since Cleveland is a very heavily democratic city with over three hundred thousand registered voters, the potential for fraud is obvious.

Because I was very suspicious of this I tried to ascertain whether or not the pre-tabulator and post-tabulator vote counts for Cuyahoga County matched. The post-tabulator vote counts were published on the Cuyahoga county web-site, so that part was easy. I then requested the pre-tabulator vote counts from the Director of the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, Michael Vu. Though Vu repeatedly promised to obtain those for me, he never followed through. So I collaborated with Ray Beckerman’s Ohio Project to conduct an audit to obtain the pre-calculator vote counts. The initial audit of 15 precincts (out of 1458 in Cuyahoga County) showed a net loss to the Kerry/Edwards ticket of 140 votes. However, the audit was never able to be completed.

The other way that the vote count in Cuyahoga County could have been confirmed would have been to conduct a county-wide hand recount of the votes. The rules of the Ohio recount specified that a 3% recount of each county would be conducted, and if any discrepancies were found in the recount (between the pre-tabulator and the official post-tabulator precinct counts), then a county-wide hand recount would be conducted. No vote discrepancies were found in the Cuyahoga County 3% recount. However, many anomalies were observed at the recount, and two election workers were convicted of rigging the vote count.

Another county that probably involved central tabulator fraud was Warren County. That was the site of the infamous lockdown, which allowed Republican officials to tally the Warren County vote in private, rationalized by the bogus excuse of a “national security emergency”. Warren County Republican election officials claimed that they learned of this “national security emergency” from the FBI – a claim that was soon denied by the FBI. Yet the Warren County results continued to stand.


How central tabulator fraud could be prevented or identified very early

It should be obvious how central tabulator fraud could be identified very early after it occurs. We know that if central tabulator fraud is perpetrated, the official post-tabulator precinct counts will not match the pre-tabulator counts, which are calculated at each precinct shortly after poll closing.

The post-tabulator counts are easy to identify, since they are the official counts and will be posted on the county Board of Elections web site as soon as the results become official. The pre-tabulator counts are more difficult to obtain. Because of the difficulties I had obtaining those counts following the 2004 presidential election, I talked with voting rights organizations to ascertain how I could obtain them. I was astounded to hear from them that they had also tried but had rarely been able to obtain the pre-tabulator counts.

Thus, it appears that within weeks or days following the election, the pre-tabulator vote counts either tended to disappear, or else county Boards of elections tended to be unhelpful in making them available to enquiring citizens – as my experience with Michael Vu demonstrated.

But they must be available at the time of poll closing, since each precinct must report them to the county central tabulator. In many jurisdictions, they are required to be publicly posted at each precinct at the time of poll closing. But even if they aren’t posted, there should be no reason why poll watchers couldn’t obtain them. In fact, that is one of the most important tasks of today’s poll watchers. The problem is, however, that poll watching organizations have been unable to or not interested enough in recruiting enough poll watchers to cover all or even the good majority of precincts.

When I volunteered to do poll watching for the Democratic Party for the 2006 election I was told that it was an all day job, lasting from early in the morning until late at night. There must be a great many people who would like to help out but for whom taking a whole unpaid day off of work would be a great hardship.

I think that if there was a national organizing effort it should be possible to get at least one person for each precinct in the country – at least in states where the presidential election was expected to be close – to obtain pre-tabulator vote counts for president, Senator, Governor, and House of Representatives. It seems to me that get out the vote drives, which were used to such great effect in 2004, take a lot more work and organizational effort than that. If need be, depending upon how long results are required to be posted in specific jurisdictions, some volunteers could be assigned to more than one precinct.

If we could do that, it would then be possible to spot central tabulator fraud almost immediately after a county announces its official results. In a very close election, the election may not have even been called by then. With that kind of evidence in hand, it could immediately be made available to the candidate, who would then be an absolute fool to concede the election if the mismatch between pre-tabulator and official (post-tabulator) vote counts seemed great enough to alter the results of the election. Such a scenario very likely could have prevented John Kerry from conceding in 2004, and very well could have altered the results of that election.

[Stevepol]

1. Vitally important! Thanks for the post. K&R!

[Time for change]

3. Thank you -- I wish that our elected representatives would consider this with the same seriousness

that we do!

[Demeter]

2. Excellent Summary! MUST READ AND BOOKMARK!

[Time for change]

14. Thank you -- I believe that they did quite a bit of cheating in 06 as well

But they probably would have done a lot more if not for the efforts of the election integrity organizations.

[hfojvt]

4. poll watchers?

I have worked as a poll watcher in the last two elections, but both times I only worked until about 2 PM. My purpose was to help get out the vote, recording who had voted so we could call those who had not (in 2000 I only did the calling). I don't know about Iowa, but in this town we don't have near enough poll watchers to cover every precinct. Nor do we have precinct people for every precinct. Maybe we will by 2008, but so far, it is hard to get much enthusiasm.

[Time for change]

11. I wasn't aware of that definition of a poll watcher

Neither my poll watcher training nor my personal instructions had anything to do with getting out the vote, or anything but observation. Here's a random definition of a pollwatcher that I googled, regarding S. Carolina: "A poll watcher is someone who is appointed by a candidate or a political party to observe the election day procedures in a precinct in South Carolina".

I was told that one of my most important responsibilities was obtaining the final vote counts at the time of poll closing. But like with you, we had only a minority of precincts in Maryland covered.

But I don't see why we couldn't get people to cover all the precincts in the state if a major effort was put into it. In 2004 I was not a pollwatcher, but I was part of a group to get out the vote. I went to PA because it was a swing state, and Maryland was not. There were so many volunteers that they couldn't find any work for me or dozens of other people, so they had me sit at a table in front of the polling place to hand out literature. With all that enthusiasm to help, I don't see why they couldn't get someone from each precinct simply to obtain the vote counts when the polls close. All it would take is a re-direction of energy.

[Senator]

17. Our "definition" included all those things

As a poll watcher here in NJ, we were tasked to observe -- with attorney on call for "situations," zero-check machines at outset, tally a checklist of "our voters," return the list at midday for contacting the "missing," then return in time for poll close to document by-machine results for precinct (this included initialling the printout).

We "central tallied" ourselves at the "results parties."

Big But, we're in an area that often has close races. There's no incentive to closely track results without that. It's just not in human nature to care too much about even a seemingly large shrinkage or bloating if the final result is not at issue. There's really no point to it for "the competitors."

But an election is NOT a contest -- it is a survey.

This is why auditing has to be built into the system. The burden for "proving" accuracy of the official results needs to be shifted onto election administrators where it belongs.

We are ALL (even non-voters) entitled to unquestionable accuracy, not just the "sore loser" candidate and his supporters.

---

[L. Coyote]

5. Comments Regarding Cleveland and Cuyahoga County

"The combination of exceptionally long voting lines throughout Cleveland on Election Day 2004 on the one hand, and yet surprisingly low official voter turnout in Cleveland, is very perplexing, .... long voting lines should be associated with high voter turnout, not low voter turnout. .."

Long lines cause more voters to not vote. Challengers and inadequate machine numbers caused the long lines. Purging voters from the heavily Dem precincts lowered the machine allocations to Dem precincts.

"No vote discrepancies were found in the Cuyahoga County 3% recount. However, many anomalies were observed at the recount, and two election workers were convicted of rigging the vote count."

The recount should still be done county-wide, given the crimes associated with the recount. However, if ballots are in the wrong precinct, they recount wrong just like the counted wrong.

Noone has been able to explain why there is a 6% differential change in a subset of all Cuyahoga locations with three precincts and and two or three ballot orders (2\3 and 3\3 precincts). The sample size is large, 166,953 votes representing 1/34th of the Ohio votes. In this subset, for each precinct with Kerry-Bush vote-switch probability = 0.50 ( K-B P = 0.5) if the ballot is moved to the wrong precinct, there is an adjacent, paired precinct with K-B P = 0.0. Their only difference is how cross-votes (ballot in wrong precinct pile) count, and, as adjacent precincts at the same locations, their candidate support levels should average very near equal. When these precincts are separated by Kerry to Badnarik vote-switch (K-b) probability versus K-B cross-vote probability, there is a significant, 6.15% difference in the Kerry vote. When sorted into two K-b groups the Kerry vote is equal. When the sort separates the K-B P = 0.50 and K-B P = 0.0 precincts, the 6.15% K-B vote-switch differential is evidenced. In the precincts with K-B vote-switching P = 0.50, the Kerry margin over Bush is 6.15% lower.

This pattern repeats in other subsets of the Cuyahoga vote.

Download http://jqjacobs.net/politics/precinct_switching.ppt featuring evidence of election fraud.
MORE data: http://jqjacobs.net/politics/xls/cuyahoga_t_tests.xls

The obvious explanation is ballots are in the wrong precinct. Ohio punch card ballots have no precinct ID marks, excepting fingerprints of voters, of course. This offers a method of ascertaining the statistical findings that support the finding that ballots ae in the wrong precinct, thus were counted for an unintended candidate. Recounts count them wrong all over again, of course.

SOURCE:
The 2004 Ohio Presidential Election: Cuyahoga County Analysis
How Kerry Votes Were Switched to Bush Votes
http://jqjacobs.net/politics/ohio.html

[Time for change]

8. I absolutely agree that a total hand recount SHOULD have been done county-wide

However, it wasn't. Given Kenneth Blackwell's vigorously partisan approach to elections and his lack of scruples, that's not surprising.

With regard to the long lines, although precincts that used electronic voting demonstrated an inverse correlation between machines per registered voter and voter turnout (because the lack of sufficient numbers of machines slowed the lines downs), no such correlation was demonstrated for precincts that used punch card voting, as Cuyahoga County did. Therefore, lack of sufficient numbers of machines seems an inadequate explanation for the long lines. While it is undoubtedly true, as you say, that many voters left without voting because of the long lines in Cleveland, the lines were still long after they left, and still the turnout was very low. Therefore, I think it is reasonable to strongly suspect that vote deletion at the central tabulator level accounted for some of the low official turnout.

And as you say, the ballot order rotation problem also accounted for vote switching, with a net loss to the Kerry/Edwards ticket, although even with that, the great majority of Cleveland voters voted for Kerry/Edwards.

[tiptoe]

6. Clint Curtis testified vote machines can be made to match the central tabulators.

Careful:

How central tabulator fraud could be prevented or identified very early

It should be obvious how central tabulator fraud could be identified very early after it occurs. We know that if central tabulator fraud is perpetrated, the official post-tabulator precinct counts will not match the pre-tabulator counts, which are calculated at each precinct shortly after poll closing.
...

"...As long as they are networked together, they can talk to each other."

Curtis Testimony Transcript with link to video segment

...
Q: And if you had a recount and no paper trail, would that be, as soon as that had happened, would that be reversible by seeing the discrepancy between the tabulator, the central tabulator code, and what the individual machines which had not been tampered with code?

A: Not if I wrote it.

Q: Why not? In other words...

A: In other words I could make it match.

Q: You could work back from the tabulator to the individual machines, so that the tabulator could tell the machines to switch their results?

A: Yes. It talks both ways. You could flip it to whatever you need.

Q: And they actually do talk to each other. this the machines and the tabulator?

A: As long as it's hooked up. As long as they are networked together, they can talk to each other.

Q: So in other words, there is absolutely no assurance whatsoever on anything with regards to these machines.

A: Absolutely none, unless you look at the source code and make sure it's safe before it goes in.

Q: Thank you very much. [APPLAUSE]
...

Is it possible for a central tabulator "intent-on-fraud" to have modified precinct vote machines with fraudulent data BEFORE the precinct-counts become posted, i.e. at least at some precincts whose officials permit central-tabulator feedback to happen before the precinct counts are taken? ... And for those precincts whose officials are "responsible" and have taken their precinct counts "which are calculated [from each vote machine's programmed count?] at each precinct shortly after poll closing" BEFORE being uploaded to the central tabulator, a well-programmed-for-fraud central tabulator might be able to detect a record of such count having already been "calculated" for one or more individual vote machines, and refrain from attempting to feed-back fraudulent data to those particular vote machines, thereby averting fraud detection??

Another possibility: How is data from individual precinct vote machines uploadable to central tabulators? Just once (presumably) after consolidation of all individual vote machine totals (manually?), after polls have closed?...or (possibly) partially, intermittently while polls are open (which presumes a data connection per individual vote machine)? If the latter, then intermittent updates to central tabulators can result, also, in downloads with fraudulent data happening incrementally throughout the evening, instead of one consolidated total at time of poll-closing. Can election officials control the upload (and feedback-download) process...or is there just one way to "do it"?

[Time for change]

7. Yes, I realize that what I'm proposing here won't prevent all kinds of fraud

In particular, it won't prevent or lead to the identification of vote switching at the individual machine level. What you describe here is an elaborate type of individual machine vote switching, where all individual machines in a precinct or in the county are coordinated with the central tabulator, so that they match. Whether it's done like that, or whether individual machines are programmed to switch votes prior to the results being communicated to the central tabulator, the pre-tabulator results will match with the official post-tabulator results.

However, we have little idea what types of election fraud will be perpetrated. The idea I describe in this post will, if widely used, I believe, prevent or provide for early identificaton of a very large category of election fraud.

[marions ghost]

10. Good plan of action. It seems to me

If you have dependable precinct counting--ie. each precinct counts its votes separately and with no connection to anywhere else--then pre-tabulator results compared to post-tabulator results would certainly work as a way to prevent the most glaring kinds of fraud at the central tabulator. This is pretty basic. There is NO logical reason not to do this. They're probably afraid of too many recounts
being called. Tough.

It's interesting that the elections boards do NOT want pre-tabulator results to be seen by citizens groups. :eyes: That is just wrong.

[Time for change]

13. It seems as if there were active efforts in 2004 in many states to perpetrate and/or cover up fraud

Ohio, that state that decided the election, is probably the number one example of that, if not number two after Florida. I hope to see Kenneth Blackwell in prison some day for the way he handed Bush a second (fraudulent) term.

[PATRICK]

9. The extreme importance

of this cannot be brushed aside by the Dems. Massive efforts to tackle the many hundreds of thousands of votes threatened by pre-voting suppression and election day vote barriers is like controlling the drug traffic or illegal immigration. The effort itself is necessary to show political strength and determination and encourage the voters. it won't solve the problem.

It has been noted by Palast that vote suppression sets the big stage for loss. From then on the election is vulnerable to theft and chaos. In between, the DRE's have for a practical matter been chosen by the crooks to aid and abet the suppression sometimes simply by malfunctioning and being unavailable. Their benefits to central tabulation is to provide cover by simply hiding the vote counting process while again, the "glitches" can be dredged up to explain discrepancies. Although ALL methods great and small involve a whole generation of GOP vote fixers, the necessity of winning against the tide of the American will means the final tweaking MUST be the thing. Everything else, as bad as it seems, simply does not guarantee victory- as 2000 showed. Someone or something on top has to tip the scale.

Attacking the little stuff might start a tidal weave to shake the confidence even of those fixers at the top, but according to the past dismal record, not even enough to make our pressure count more than that upon GOP loyalists. The party, damn it, has to protect itself and the voters by getting at the tabulators.

Are we going to just sit here and watch into the wee hours of ANOTHER election night while the totals chug up and down and sideways like gas prices when the cartel needs cash? Respond in knowledgeable indignation to a locked down media sweating in fear for their jobs as they deliver final judgment upon America in favor of blatant fraud? belatedly take to the streets in chaos that actually might be spun to cover for a recount or accountability?

Something must be done now. It always had to be now, and it never was. belatedly ditching the DRE's might not be such a victory if it is not timely and itself creates one more cover- chaos- for central tabulation fraud.

The party has to slam this in front of the public's eyes and be more determined to hold fraud to account(win or lose) than the other side to cheat. That will take some sea change for many party leaders who, balancing their fears, guarantee all of them will come true in spades. We know, we know, and not enough is being done and time, again, is running out.

[Time for change]

12. Yes, it is a great mystery to me why our Democratic representatives do so little about this

Same thing with impeachment, which is just as important.

I have to wonder whether large numbers of them are being blackmailed or threatened.

[Dj13Francis]

15. Years of stolen elections

I'd like to relate some of my experiences in the frightening phenomenon of stolen elections... Last year I was a volunteer staffer for the Congressional campaign of Clint Curtis, who ran against Teflon Tom "The Fiend" Feeney. The week before the election, a Zogby poll had the race at a statistical dead heat. I personally ran an exit poll at one polling place, in the most Republican precinct in Volusia County. I was there for 12 hours, and as best I could, spoke to as many people as I could as they left. My unscientific poll had the numbers near even; 51-49 in Feeney's favor, which wasn't bad for a precinct with 61% registered republicans. Once the polls closed I waited for the numbers to be tallied, and the final count at that precinct had the margin at 58-42.

As the night progressed and the returns came in, it seemed as though 58-42 inexplicably was the rule. What had been thought a close race turned out to be an easy victory for Feeney, despite his being named one of the top 20 most corrupt congresspeople in Washington by CREW a few months earlier. We knew the election was stolen, and Clint did not concede defeat. He was one of five candidates who challenged their election in Florida, a story completely ignored by the media.

Once the data became available from the four counties in our district (which inexplicably took more than a month for them to produce,) Clint began looking through the data for anomalies. Based on their relative fishyness, several precincts were targeted for canvassing. I spend several weekends, along with many other volunteers, canvassing these precincts to get affidavits signed. We asked people to sign affidavits, swearing upon penalty of perjury, as to how they had voted in the election. As you might imagine, there was a small percentage of people who refused to sign such a document. However that small percentage was not enough to stop us from getting more affidavits than votes in several precincts. We had the proof we needed for our case, in which we simply were asking for a re-vote.

Then the House Administration Committee, under Democratic leadership, threw out the challenge without ever examining the proof we obtained. Their inexplicable reasoning was that our affidavits did not constitute "proof" of anything. They don't seem to realize that this kind of thing will keep happening as long as it is tolerated. Most people don't believe their government is capable of corruption at this fundamental level, and continue to deride us as conspiracy theorists. I'm glad the recent story regarding California's Secretary of State's findings is being reported in at least some alternative media. It helps to wake people up to what we've been fighting for years.

[Time for change]

16. That is truly disheartening

I just cannot understand the attitude on this of our Democratic representatives.

Btw, I met Curtis in January 2001, when we were both part of a small group lobbying Senators to object to the 2004 election. I'm very sorry he lost that race, and even sorrier that the Democrats wouldn't do anything about it.

[Ellipsis]

18. Agreed, the most critical flaw IMO is/was central tabulation.

While this may seem to be a logical approach to cost and instant gratification, it overlooks the motivated "conscious-less few" and the extent they will go to secure an outcome they desire by exploiting vulnerabilities in central tabulation design.

Three central tabulators in Ohio for over 40 counties, secure one machine and change the final outcome of the 2004 presidential election.


Another great Synopsis!


As always...


Thanks.