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Amy Goodman: What do you think of Senator Levin calling for the Maliki and the whole government to disband?
Nir Rosen: Well, it's stupid for several reasons. First of all, the Iraqi government doesn't matter. It has no power. And it doesn't matter who you put in there. He's not going to have any power. Baghdad doesn't really matter, except for Baghdad. Baghdad used to be the most important city in Iraq, and whoever controlled Baghdad controlled Iraq. These days, you have a collection of city states: Mosul, Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah. Each one is virtually independent, and they have their own warlords and their own militias. And what happens in Baghdad makes no difference. So that's the first point.
(The second point is also notable.)
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And it's rather worse than this: Baghdad with its large population (and therefore large need for services/resources) and its mixed population (although apparently less so than before the "war") is a liability. Specifically, faction fighting and supply problems (considered broadly) can probably be expected to continue: the former at least until the Sunnis are completely driven out -- and some Shia (sub)group establishes complete control; and the latter until whoever controls Baghdad also controls what it depends on (resources and "supply-lines")... no small thing.
Iraq is something of a "warring states" problem. But there's a tremendous complication in the intermingling of the various groups. And while there's apparently been considerable "cleansing" of Sunnis from Shia areas (and vice-versa to some degree), this process cannot be considered finished until enclaves are driven out, and large, more-or-less sustainable geographical areas are completely "cleansed".
But even in such "cleansed" areas, there will remain the problem of which (sub)group is in charge there.
Now, I suppose it's possible that some power-sharing arrangement between these (sub)groups is possible in places. But it's probably more likely that fighting will continue in many places until one (sub)group or another establishes control over large geographical areas -- especially those of value. (Indeed, this could continue on until Shia areas, at least, are under the control of one (sub)group -- one individual. Of course, other foreign intervention could change the particulars -- if not the overall dynamic -- as our intervention has.)
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Replacing Maliki is about US politics -- and maintaining the illusion that there's any course we can take in Iraq that might acheive reasonable, attainable war-objectives.
But there isn't.
However, there are political objectives that the neocons might acheive by such political maneuvering ("war"-related, other) -- like vesting Democrats in a failed "war" and diminishing our chances in 2008 -- or setting the stage for continuing/further military misadventures.
And we're particularly vulnerable to such maneuvering when Congress isn't in session.
Domestically, it promises to be a long, ugly slog until 2009. And it promises to be an even uglier, longer slog for our soldiers, the Iraqis -- and their neighbors. (Eg, refugee problems aren't being adequately dealt with.)
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This seems appropriate:
Jean Ritchie, "The Soldier":
They say that the war's nearly won, And declare there's a change in the wind. And my feet stumble on, And the year's come and gone, And they say that the war's nearly won.
Another day shall arise, Another red morning sun, My seasons are counted and marching away, Still a soldier and far from my home. Sweet peace when will you come again? You turn like a far star alone. Will I ever be blessed with your innocent breast, And be free and be safe and be home?
Still, they say that the war's nearly won, And declare there's a change in the wind. And the years stumble on, And a thousand years gone, And they say that the war's nearly won.
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