The Wise Men's Meeting of November 1 and Planning To Stay the Course, November-December

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http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/v/13161.htm

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume V, Vietnam 1967


374. Editorial Note

On November 1, 1967, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach submitted to Secretary of State Rusk a report entitled "Prognosis for Vietnam." The purpose of the study, compiled on an interagency basis, was to make projections of progress in the war 1 year hence if current policies and programs were continued. The report consisted of a section on politics authored by State Department analysts, an economic projection by the Agency for International Development and William Leonhart of the National Security Council Staff, an analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency on the anti-Viet Cong infrastructure effort, and a final section by Leonhart examining pacification. In the covering memorandum, Katzenbach distilled the conclusions of the study:

"In briefest summation, there is a consensus that one year from now we will be stronger than we are now, making continued progress against the VC, and slowly building up the GVN--but that there will not have been a decisive and undeniable breakthrough, that the enemy will still be very much with us, that it will remain difficult to produce dramatic and convincing evidence of a victory in the near future."

The full text of the study is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Top Secret WPB Chron., Nov./Dec. 1967.



375. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, November 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE Primarily McNamara Recommendations. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was marked as a draft as a means of eliciting opinion on its content; see footnote 1, Document 177. In the attached covering note, McNamara wrote: "Yesterday at lunch I stated my belief that continuation of our present action in Southeast Asia would be dangerous, costly in lives, and unsatisfactory to the American people. The attached memorandum outlines an alternative program. The memo represents my personal views. Because these may be incompatible with your own, I have not shown the paper to Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow or Bus Wheeler. After you have read it, if you wish me to discuss my proposals with them and report back to you our joint recommendations, I will do so." In his memoirs, McNamara asserted that this memorandum served to "do one thing: it raised the tension between two men who loved and respected each other--Lyndon Johnson and me--to the breaking point." On November 29 the President announced that McNamara would step down as Secretary of Defense at a later unspecified date and would be nominated for the post of President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (also known as the World Bank). See McNamara's In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, pp. 311-314.

SUBJECT
A Fifteen Month Program for Military Operations in Southeast Asia

This memorandum explores the likely consequences if we go ahead with our presently planned course of action in Vietnam and considers whether more promising alternatives exist. The purpose is to begin to focus for your decision the actions we should take over the next 15 months in order to achieve the maximum progress towards our objectives in the South while retaining the maximum domestic and international support for our efforts.

In Section I, "Outlook If Present Course of Action is Continued," I state my opinion that continuing on our present course will not bring us by the end of 1968 enough closer to success, in the eyes of the American public, to prevent the continued erosion of popular support for our involvement in Vietnam.

In Section II, "Possible Alternative Courses of Action," I examine both a halt in the bombing and an expansion of our military operations as alternative means of achieving our political objectives in Vietnam.

In Section III, "Recommendations," I state my belief that we should announce a policy of stabilization of our military effort indicating that we plan no further increase in our forces in South Vietnam, and no expansion of our operations against North Vietnam. This posture would help to convince Hanoi that we are prepared to stay in Vietnam as long as necessary, and that we are resigned to a long struggle. It would also increase support for the war at home by removing anxiety about possible increases in our activity. To further increase support for the war effort and to probe the possibilities of a negotiated settlement, I recommend we plan on a halt in the bombing of the North. And finally, I suggest we examine our military operations in the South with a view to taking steps which will reduce our casualties and increase the role of the Vietnamese.



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