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Edited on Thu Sep-06-07 10:48 PM by Snazzy
Was just posting in one of yesterday's threads. Not sure how I missed the hoopla being a cspan addict, but circa start of August Bushco got its nose bloodied when we had this (excuse text spew, sorry. And RRW is a very interesting search term): STATEMENT ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS Senate - August 1, 2007 ________________________________ By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. FEINGOLD, and Mr. CASEY): S. 1914., A bill to require a comprehensive nuclear posture review, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services. Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today with Senator Collins, Senator Durbin, Senator Feingold, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Casey to introduce legislation to authorize a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons policy and posture. Before we ramp up funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program as the administration has requested, we should have a clear, bipartisan consensus on the role nuclear weapons will play in our national security strategy and the impact they will have on our nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007 does three things. First, it authorizes the President to conduct a nuclear policy review to consider a range of possible roles of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy. The administration may reach out to outside experts and conduct public hearings to get a wide range of views. The policy review will provide options and recommendations for a nuclear posture review. This report is due on September 1, 2009. Second, following the completion of the nuclear policy review, it authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. to clarify U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. This report is due March 1, 2010. Finally, it zeros out funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program until the policy review and posture review reports have been submitted to Congress. In his testimony on March 29, 2007, before the House Energy & Water Appropriations Subcommittee, former Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of Nuclear Threat Initiative, noted that: On the itself, if Congress gives a green light to this program in our current world environment, I believe that this will be: misunderstood by our allies; exploited by our adversaries; complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and ..... make resolution of the Iran and North Korea challenges all the more difficult.
I could not agree more.
Indeed, I remain deeply concerned about this administration's nuclear weapons policy.
As a U.S. Senator, I have worked with colleagues in the House and Senate to stop the re-opening of the nuclear door and the development of new nuclear weapons.
Together, we have eliminated funding for the Advanced Concepts Initiative, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, and the Modern Pit Facility.
These were consequential victories but the fight is far from over.
For fiscal year 2008, the administration requested $118 million for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program; $88 million in the National Nuclear Security administration's budget and $30 million in the Department of Defense's budget.
These funds would be used for Phase 2A activities: design definition and cost study.
This would represent approximately a four-fold increase over fiscal year 2007 funding of $24.7 million.
The House, however, rejected the administration's request and zeroed out funding for RRW in its fiscal year 2008 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill. In its report accompanying the legislation, the House cited the lack of a definitive nuclear weapons policy review as a key reason for withholding funding for what will be a costly new nuclear warhead program. It stated:
The lack of any definitive analysis or strategic assessment defining the objectives of a future nuclear stockpile makes it impossible to weigh the relative merits of investing billions of taxpayer dollars in new nuclear weapon production activities when the United States is facing the problem of having too large a stockpile as a Cold War legacy. Currently, there exists no convincing rationale for maintaining the large number of existing Cold War nuclear weapons, much less producing additional warheads, or for the DoD requirements that drive the management of the DOE nuclear weapons complex.
While the Senate bill did not follow suit, it did cut $22 million from the administration's request, for a total of $66 million, and restricted activities to Phase 2A.
I believe we can match the House's action and this bill would do just that.
The administration is clearly getting nervous about the prospects for funding for RRW.
On Wednesday, the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and State released a 4-page white paper on nuclear weapons strategy: ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century''. It affirmed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and sought to justify funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Among other things, it stated that the Reliable Replacement Warhead program is critical to sustaining long-term confidence in the nuclear stockpile and will help reduce the stockpile and move us away from nuclear testing; and any delay to the program will force the U.S. to maintain a larger stockpile, invest in costly and risky Life Extension Programs, and increase the likelihood that we will have to resume nuclear testing.
These arguments simply do not stand up to scrutiny.
Indeed the evidence clearly shows that there is no need to rush forward with increased funding for RRW. Let us take a close look at the status of our nuclear weapons arsenal.
Are there currently problems with the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal?
No, for each of the past 11 years the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense have certified that the nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable.
Has the Pentagon asked for a new warhead for new missions?
No, there is no new military requirement to replace existing, well-tested warheads.
What about the plutonium pit, the ``trigger'' of a nuclear weapon? In past years, the administration requested funding for a Modern Pit Facility that could build up to 450
pits a year arguing that the pits in our current stockpile were reaching the end of their life-span.
Is our stockpile at risk due to aging pits?
No, a December 2006 report by the National Laboratories showed that plutonium pits have a life-span of at least 85 years, and possibly up to 100 years.
That report validated Congressional action to eliminate funding for the Modern Pit Facility. I am pleased that the administration listened and did not request funding for the facility in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008.
Are we at risk for resuming nuclear testing?
No, as I have argued our stockpile is safe and secure and will clearly remain so for the foreseeable future.
If the likelihood of resuming nuclear testing is increasing it is due to the fact that the administration has, in past years, requested funding to lower the time to test readiness at the Nevada test site from 24-36 months to 18 months and, above all, refused to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT.
What about costs? I find it interesting that the administration would cite the costs of successful Life Extension Programs as a reason to ramp up funding for the RRW.
Has the administration shared with us what it will cost to replace the warhead on our deployed nuclear arsenal with a new Reliable Replacement Warhead?
The answer is no. The administration has remained silent about when the supposed cost savings from RRW will ultimately kick in.
In fact, the development of a new nuclear warhead will likely add billions of dollars to the American taxpayer's bill at a time when, as noted above, the stockpile is safe and reliable. As the House Energy and Water Appropriations report argued:
Under any realistic future U.S. nuclear defense scenario, the existing legacy stockpile will continue to provide the nation's nuclear deterrent for well over the next two to three decades. The effort by the NNSA to apply urgency to developing a significant production capacity for the RRW while lacking any urgency to rationalize an oversized complex appears to mean simply more costs to the American taxpayer.
Before we move any further with this program which would add a new warhead to the stockpile, we should have a better understanding of the role nuclear weapons will play in our security policy in a post-Cold War and post 9/11 world.
If we as a country are going to move away from massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons and explore more conventional alternatives, does it make sense to add a new warhead to the stockpile?
If we are committed to strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, what impact would a Reliable Replacement Warhead have on those efforts?
If the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program can certify the safety and the reliability of our existing nuclear stockpile, should we shift resources from RRW to more pressing concerns?
It is common sense to ask these questions and engage in comprehensive review and debate about these options before we make the decision on manufacturing new warheads.
As it stands now, we are addressing this issue backwards and behind closed doors.
That is, we are rushing to develop a new warhead without an understanding of the role it will play in our nuclear weapons policy and national security strategy and without public input that will lead to a bipartisan policy.
Let us be clear: a rushed, four page white paper is simply not sufficient to answer these questions and make decisions about developing new nuclear warheads.
The administration has promised a more detailed report but its haste to put out this paper suggests that it is more intent on rushing the development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program than in taking a sober, unbiased look at our nuclear weapons policy and posture.
A lack of a substantive debate and review means we are not paying sufficient attention to the potential negative consequences of RRW.
Speeding up the development of a new nuclear warhead may send the wrong message to Iran; North Korea; and other would-be nuclear weapon states and encourage the very proliferation we are trying to prevent.
What to us may appear to be a safer, more reliable weapon could appear to others to be a new weapon with new missions and a violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The American Association for the Advancement of Science issued a report last month acknowledging that a Reliable Replacement Warhead ``could lead to a final selected design that is certifiable without a nuclear test.''
Yet, the report also concluded that absent a comprehensive review of nuclear policy and stockpile needs, the purpose and intention of RRW could be widely misinterpreted abroad.
Pointing out that there has been no high level statement about nuclear weapons policy since the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, it called on the administration to develop a bipartisan policy on the future of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy before moving ahead with RRW. It stated:
In the absence of a clear nuclear posture, many interpretations are possible and the lack of a national understanding and consensus on the role of U.S. nuclear weapons puts any new approach at considerable risk at home and abroad. For example, an RRW plan that emphasizes the goal of sustaining the deterrent without nuclear testing could be perceived quite differently from one that focuses on future flexibility to develop and deploy nuclear weapons for new military mission.
It goes on to state: ..... nuclear weapons are ultimately an instrument of policy and strategy rather than of war fighting, and only with the leadership of the president can there be major changes in that instrument.
Unfortunately we have not seen such leadership from this administration.
Because it pursued the development of low-yield nuclear weapons and a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, because it sought to lower the time-to-test readiness at the Nevada test site from 24-26 months to 18 months, because it sought to build a Modern Pit Facility that could produce up to 450 pits a year, this administration has lost the credibility to take a fresh and open look at nuclear weapons policy and posture.
Only a new administration, free from the constraints of the heated debates of the past, will have the authority to conduct a comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons policy and posture.
A bipartisan consensus on this policy is essential. It will let the world know exactly where we stand on these important issues and help clear up any confusion about our intentions.
Friend and foe alike will know that regardless of who holds power in Congress or the White House, the role of nuclear weapons in our security strategy will not change.
It will strengthen our efforts to convince other states to forego the development of nuclear weapons and make the world safer from the threat of nuclear war.
I believe that bipartisan policy is beginning to emerge.
In a January 4, 2007 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, ``A World Free of Nuclear Weapons'', George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn laid out a compelling vision for a world free of the threat of nuclear war.
They laid a set of common sense steps the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states can take to make this happen including: taking nuclear weapons off high-alert status; substantially reducing the size of nuclear stockpiles; eliminating short-ranged nuclear weapons; ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; securing all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium around the world; getting control of the uranium enrichment process; stopping production of fissile material for nuclear weapons globally; resolving regional confrontations that encourage the development of nuclear weapons.
They conclude:
Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without that bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
We should pay close attention to these words.
In conclusion, let me say that there is a big difference between an RRW program that increases the reliability of the existing stockpile and one that leads to a resumption of nuclear testing.
Congress should ask the tough questions to ensure that this is not a back door to new nuclear weapons with new missions and new rounds of testing.
I firmly believe we should zero out for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program until the next administration takes a serious look at our nuclear weapons programs and issues a bipartisan policy on the size of the future stockpile, testing, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
I look forward to working with my colleagues and the administration to craft that sensible, bipartisan nuclear weapons policy that will make Americans safe and allow us to reclaim a leadership role in the fight against nuclear proliferation.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be placed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1914
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007''.
SEC. 2. REVISED NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW AND NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW.
(a) Nuclear Policy Review.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--The President shall conduct a nuclear policy review to consider a range of options on the role of nuclear weapons in United States security policy. The policy review shall be coordinated by the National Security Advisor and shall include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(2) SCOPE OF REVIEW.--The nuclear policy review conducted under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) address the role and value of nuclear weapons in the current global security environment;
(B) set forth short-term and long-term objectives of United States nuclear weapons policy;
(C) consider the contributions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty''), to United States national security, and include recommendations for strengthening the Treaty;
(D) explore the relationship between the nuclear policy of the United States and nonproliferation and arms control objectives and international treaty obligations, including obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(E) determine the role and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow July 31, 1991 (commonly referred to as the ``START I Treaty''), and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, done at Moscow May 24, 2002 (commonly referred to as the ``Moscow Treaty''), in achieving the national security and nonproliferation goals of the United States and in implementing United States military strategy, and describe the elements of a recommended successor treaty, including verification provisions; and
(F) provide policy guidance and make recommendations for the nuclear posture review to be conducted under subsection (b).
(3) OUTSIDE INPUT.--The policy review shall include contributions from outside experts and, to the extent possible, shall include public meetings to consider a range of views.
(b) Nuclear Posture Review.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Following completion of the nuclear policy review under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States to clarify United States nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The Secretary shall conduct the review in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Advisor.
(2) ELEMENTS OF REVIEW.--The nuclear posture review conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:
(A) The role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning, and programming, including the extent to which conventional forces can assume roles previously assumed by nuclear forces.
(B) The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture, in light of the guidance provided by the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a).
(C) The targeting strategy required to implement effectively the guidance provided by the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a).
(D) The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for removing, replacing, or modifying existing systems.
(E) The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to consolidate, modernize, or modify the complex.
(F) The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying warheads.
(G) An account of the different nuclear postures considered in the review and the reasoning for the selection of the nuclear posture.
(c) Reports Required.--
(1) NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEW.--Not later than September 1, 2009, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a).
(2) NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW.--Not later than March 1, 2010, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the nuclear posture review conducted under subsection (b).
(3) FORM.--Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Sense of Congress on Use of Nuclear Posture Review.--It is the sense of Congress that the nuclear policy review conducted under subsection (a) should be used as the basis for establishing future strategic arms control objectives and negotiating positions of the United States.
(e) Restriction on Funding of Reliable Replacement Warhead Program.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program for fiscal years 2008, 2009, or 2010 until the reports required under subsection (c) have been submitted to Congress.
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