Bush, today in his
radio address was bragging about our military forces' alliance with Sunnis in attacking what they claim were al-Qaeda positions. He's basically inviting these sects and their leaders -- who were clearly once involved in battles with our own forces in which U.S. soldiers were killed -- to take positions in and among the Iraqi power structure. That's not what the Shiite-dominated regime is prepared to accept, though.
The Maliki government argues that these Sunnis that Bush and his generals will propose (in their ultimate report) to train and integrate into the Iraqi forces will inevitably turn against the government, returning Iraq to it's status quo under Saddam if they prevail.
Here's Bush's pitch:"The terrorists brutalized the people of Anbar and killed those who opposed their dark ideology. So the tribal sheiks of Anbar came together to fight al Qaeda. They asked for support from the Coalition and the Iraqi government, and we responded.
Together we have driven al Qaeda out of strongholds in Anbar. The level of violence is down. Local governments are meeting again. Young Sunnis are joining the police and army . . . On my visit, I met with tribal sheiks who have fought with us against al Qaeda . . .
Here's a WP report from today:Dark side to the Iraq plan as the Sunnis turnSome insurgents have changed sides, which is good for US troops, but perhaps not so good for the Iraqi Government, writes David Wood.The US strategy of a "bottom up" revolt of Iraqi Sunnis against al-Qaeda extremists is risky and already riddled with problems, say senior American officers and General David Petraeus's own top counterinsurgency adviser.
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But the sudden growth of armed Sunni security forces amid Iraq's sectarian conflict carries "significant" risks for the US and the Shia Government of the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, says Australian David Kilcullen, who just completed a tour as the top counterinsurgency adviser to the US command in Iraq.
Writing in the online magazine, Small Wars Journal, Kilcullen warns that these Sunni groups could become independent power bases in a fracturing Iraq, or may turn against the Baghdad Government. Echoing the concerns of senior commanders, Kilcullen concludes: "It is clear that the tribal revolt could still go either way."
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In newspaper interviews earlier this year, Sunni tribal leaders who had been assassination targets of al-Qaeda stressed that their alliance with US Marines was critical for their own safety. They said that this temporary alliance against al-Qaeda did not mean they intend any reconciliation with the Shia Government in Baghdad, which they said is dominated by "Iranians".
Encouraging the growth of what are essentially friendly Sunni militias runs counter to what has been a four-year US effort to consolidate power in Iraq's central Government and emasculate tribal power bases and sectarian militias.
For that reason, the "bottom-up" revolt won't be measured by any of the 12 benchmarks that are meant to gauge the security and political performance of Iraq's Government. These benchmarks were the subject of an independent evaluation this week by the US Government Accountability Office. It said the al-Maliki Government failed to meet most of the 18 benchmarks set this year by Congress as a condition for funding of the war.
But beyond the benchmarks, several recent assessments have provided a sobering context for the rise of Sunni security forces . . .
more: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/dark-side-to-the-iraq-plan-as-the-sunnis-turn/2007/09/07/1188783496515.html?page=2