One more try on the B-52/nuke warheads story... looking to resolve one key issue

[warren pease]

I started a thread on this yesterday and, for some reason, it rapidly descended to an argument on the validity of "reversed speech," which is what one blogger claims has revealed to him the true nature of everything from 9/11 to bird flu to the missing nukes. So that thread didn't work out too well.

I'm reposting my OP here in hopes that people like Rick Myers, Hootinholler, Seemslikeadream, nadinbrzezinski, MrScorpio, Wiley50 and others who have AF experience and/or have been tracking various aspects of this story can contribute to my lack of understanding on one key point, which is:

If you wanted to move nukes from point A to point B, and you were someone with the authority to order such a move, why would you specify that the missiles be mounted on the wing pylons rather than shipped in the approved, conventional way? After all, you still end up with the nukes; you just don't alert the entire Air Force and, in turn, everyone from mass media (coverage one day only) to people like us. So why take the risk?

So why weren't they transported in the approved method? Warheads shipped separately in cases specially designed to contain radioactive emissions, missiles secured in the cargo hold of a transport plane like a C-130, all the proper paperwork in order, nothing weird -- just a normal transfer of nuclear-tipped weapons.

If, say, Cheney had wanted to steal five to launch against Iranian targets and keep one for use in a false flag op, he's certainly got the juice to make those things happen. Also, according to seemslikeadream's posts on an older thread, there is a growing contingent within the military, and the AF in particular, of wingnut dominionist extremists with visions of bringing on The Rapture or End Times or some other apocalyptic scenario.

Cheney, through intermediaries, could have tapped into those resources once the nukes were on the ground at Barksdale in Louisiana. At least Barksdale is recognized as a primary staging point for B-52s going to the Middle East, so movement of nukes would be less suspicious there, and far less noticeable than the crazy breaches of protocol required to get them there in the manner apparently used.

Does anyone have a theory on this? Why the surreptitious actions that were bound to start red lights flashing all over the AF nuclear weapons tracking system? Why not just move them according to protocol and, if that's the plan, steal them later?

Thanks a lot for any light you can shed on this.


wp

[babylonsister]

1. Have you checked out Larry Johnson's blog about this?

http://noquarterusa.net/blog/archives/

He's been writing extensively about this.

I know many threads on DU have been posted about these nukes, but I'm not paying as close attention as you are.
If I think of somewhere else to check out, I'll let you know.

[warren pease]

6. Thank you. I'll have a look at Johnson's blog when I've got a bit more time. n/t

[Junkdrawer]

2. OK. There are four possibilities:

1.) It was all an innocent mistake

2.) Cheney tried an end-around to get nukes into position over the objections of the top military brass.

3.) It was all an elaborate saber-rattle to help spook Iran into making a suicidal first move.

4.) The Secret Government just got caught with their hands in the Nuclear Cookie Jar.

From all of what I read, numbers 3 & 4 are the most credible.

[warren pease]

7. Given the method of transport, # 3 makes the most sense. Thanks n/t

[defendandprotect]

58. Not a mistake --

and #4 most likely --

HOWEVER . . . I think a big clue is that some of these missiles were slated to be revamped????
That would suggest movement and an opening for odd things to happen.

[warren pease]

63. Re revamping/decommissioning....

This is a post from another thread on that issue:


"These nukes are not your 'run of the mill' nukes. While the AF has floated the story that these cruise missiles were being transported for 'decommissioning,' THERE HAS NOT BEEN A LIVE NUCLEAR WEAPON aboard a combat aircraft since 1968! Nuclear weapons are ALWAYS transported in sections in cargo aircraft with armed DOE couriers.

"In previous threads I have shown a USAF budget document that indicates that 38 of these missiles are being UPGRADED this year and that they will remain in inventory until fiscal year 2030. (MY NOTE: I can't find that "previous thread.")

"These weapons were LIVE and placed on the bomber in deployment position. And they are not just nuclear weapons. The AGM-129 is a STEALTH cruise missile designed to strike HARDENED targets. With a variable nuclear yield of 5 to 150 kilotons, and specially reinforced airframes, they are designed to hit bunkers and underground facilities. There is NO conventionally armed version of this weapon.

"At this point, no one can explain how they were loaded, how they were MISSED in pre-flight by the aircrew, and how they were missed on the ground at Barksdale."

Full thread here: http://tinyurl.com/26ucko


So much for the old decommissioning excuse. Besides which, they would have been flown to an airbase in New Mexico rather than Barksdale if they were to be decommissioned.


wp

[defendandprotect]

65. I wasn't suggesting "decommissioning" -- but rather alteration . . . . .

The more important premise I was offering was that these missiles would have been scheduled to be moved -- giving opportunity for something other than the intended movement to have happened -- perhaps -- ??????

[warren pease]

66. altered as in removing a warhead? or in other ways? n/t

[defendandprotect]

67. "Altered" -- as in "UPGRADED" . . . .!!!! !!!! !!!!

Clear now -- ???

Again -- the premise being that they were scheduled for some kind of movement ---

got it?

[warren pease]

68. Yup, thanks. n/t

[defendandprotect]

70. dupe

[NV Whino]

3. I'm not nor have I ever been in the Air Force, but here's my theory

It's simply the old "hiding in plain sight" theory.

If they are caught, it's, "Whoops. Look at that. We made a mistake."

If they are not caught, it's easier to further deploy them (if deploy is the correct word) rather than stealing them and assembling them and then moving them to their ultimate destination.

[warren pease]

8. OK, but I don't think the difficulty of dis- and re-assembling them is too big a deal...

...And hiding in plain site would be far easier and wouldn't raise any red flags if they had simply transported them in the conventional way. I just keep running into that question: why pull a heist, requiring dozens of people to ignore the normal protocols, when a standard redeployment of missiles to another air base would seem to be far more sensible. The previous post about saber-rattling is the only idea I've seen so far that explains mounting to the wing pylons in firing position.

Thanks for the response,

wp

[Zywiec]

16. Why pull a heist, requiring dozens of people?

- How many people do you think it took to install all of the explosives to bring down the twin towers and WTC 7?
- How many people to fire a cruise missile into the pentagon, while hiding a flight and all it's passengers?
- How many people to hide another flight and blow up a hole in the middle of Pennsylvania?

[warren pease]

27. Yeah, but...

Those are unique events for which there are no prescribed alternatives, which was not the case with the nukes, as post #11 describes so well. What I mean is, there are no official regulations for clandestinely placing high explosives in a commercial office building, so there was no question about rules violations since none exist. Not so with the B-52 incident.

Also, I think point #2 is highly questionable given alternative explanations involving another type of plane (some kind of Lockheed creation with a much shorter wing span). I think that's the kind of tin foil that discredits the dozens of legitimate holes in the official conspiracy theory, my personal favorite being the presence of thermite/thermate in a piece of melted steel from one of the towers and established by spectrographic analyses.

And re the Flight 93: A plane definitely went down in that area that day unless everybody in rural Pennsylvania is a paid administration liar. The problem is the debris field was about 5 to 8 miles long, which is completely inconsistent with a crash but is exactly what you'd find if a plane was shot out of the sky by an air-to-air missile.

Also, all the crap about calling loved ones on cell phones? They don't work at airline altitudes and speeds, as was proven by a Canadian pilot/electronics expert who took various planes to various heights at various speeds to test the science behind the official story. So the "let's roll" myth is just more administration psy ops to gain sympathy and credibility for the official fairy tale.

All things are possible, of course, but some are more possible than others.


wp

[defendandprotect]

55. Answering your first question . . . . I don't think extraordinary numbers . . . in fact . . ..

On the weekend before 9/11, many "engineer" type people were visible around the building -- with everything OPEN -- full access.

And -- for weeks before -- a great deal of preparation seemed to have been going on for the wiring --
presumably exposing the steel, etal -- ripping out the walls on certain floors.

No one said they noticed an army of people doing the beginning nor the end run --
but the individuals were noticeable.


Your 2nd question:
obviously, we have missing nukes --
so presume we could have missing missiles --
and, there had been previous plans -- Operation Northwoods -- to suggest a flight of students was hit and brought down by Cuba -- but planes would have been switched and students actually safe.

Your 3rd question --
Same thing -- we have no real evidence that a planeload of people were killed--
We do have info that a planeload of people was landed in Cleveland, I believe --
And, also evidence that a MISSILE was in air just before the Pennyslvania explosion --

[NV Whino]

38. Again, speaking as a layperson

It seems to me that fewer people would be involved with mounting (and inspecting) preassembled weapons on an airplane wing than it would take to bring two (or more) parts of a weapon together and assemble.

Just a speculation here: minimum one to two people per weapon to assemble and move each part and final assemblage. 6 missiles = 6 to 12 people minimum. Inspect already assembled weapons, 1 person. Would the people mounting the missiles inspect them? Probably not. They operate equipment used to mount the missiles to the wing. They are not inspectors. The unarmed missiles were weighted to approximate armed weapons. To see if the weapon was armed, you had to check a small window on the war head. The 1 person inspected only one side of the plane, to boot.

[Parche]

4. Minot AFB

I was stationed at Minot AFB a few years back, and there is NO way that those 'nucular' missiles
could be shipped without anyones knowledge, it is just not in the chain of command with those
type of weapons.

When we moved nuke missiles you had to have at least a LT in charge of the operation, sometimes
a Capt. and security (which I was) was tighter then 'Mortimer Duke'.


Something is fishy about this whole scenario, 'nucular' missiles just dont go flying around
the country without anyones knowledge.

As far as I know they can and what was witnessed be transported by B-52 in that way, very weird
but they can.
I know they always came to our base on a C-5, and then were loaded on a flatbed.

:hi:

[warren pease]

10. Thanks, Parche...

You've described exactly what I understand to be the conventional nuke transportation method. This was so far out of line with any security protocols I've heard of that there's no doubt something very weird happened.

So, given that we know how they *should* have been transported, any speculation on why they did it this way this time?

And thanks for the background on your experience.


wp

[Parche]

18. Transported

You have me on that question, that is a good one, and one we should all find out,
as they have today, new ways to transport the actual warheads, other then the C-5 like it
was back in the 80's, and I never saw them 'transported' like that ...ever.
They would have B-52s always on alert, but that was for other purposes.

And when they take off, they scream, extremely loud

:hi:

[lonestarnot]

5. This was not a mistake.

They may have wanted it to be public knowledge of the event.

[warren pease]

12. In which case...

...you'd think they would have been pitching the story to their favorite media shills, rather than making some lame excuses about "mistakes" and "AF men forgetting proper procedures."

And you'd also think media coverage would have continued for more than a day, and that the nature of the coverage would have morphed into some kind of pitch about how the US is preparing for the horrible possibility it may have to unleash tactical nukes to get at the buried Iranian enrichment facilities. That kind of war-mongering crap.

They can just do a search and replace for Iraq with Iran, change one letter, and trot out the same tired lies, adding nuclear capabilities as the kicker.

I don't know. Maybe they did want a brief public demonstration of their power and ability to get their hands on nukes any time they want. Btw, "they" in all cases above is BushCo, and specifically Cheney, since he's the only madman with sufficient clout to make this happen and he seems to be the craziest and most blood-thirsty of the lot.


Thanks for the reply,

wp

[Blackhatjack]

9. Here is something to consider....

Transported in this manner, the missiles would not show up on the cargo manifest. And if they made the trip unnoticed, there would be no record of their transport.

For those with AF experience, is there a written record of armaments on board before and after touch down?

[lonestarnot]

13. Of course there is!

[warren pease]

14. No AF experience here, but...

... AF vets have posted here on other B-52 related threads and they say no way in hell could this happen without dozens of people either ignoring or disobeying extremely precise handling and security protocols. Here's a thread featuring some of those comments: http://tinyurl.com/26ucko

See posts by Rick Myers and MrScorpio, both of whom have AF experience handling nukes. Also, check out posts number 67 and 74 for comments culled from a forum hosted by Military Times (which is a Gannett paper, btw, not a Pentagon house organ as I had previously thought).

Thanks for the response.


wp


On edit: also see post number 11 right here on this thread.

[lldu]

11. b-52

Having been in charge of a bomb-loading crew on B-52s, I just can't see how it could have happened.
There is a checklist and procedures that you have to follow. That means lots of paperwork.

The aircraft has to be in a special loading area (Normally) and you have to have a badge to get into that area. If the plane is not in a special area, it is then cordoned off as if it were in one and Security Police are policing the area. I once reached over this cordoned off area to get a ladder and almost had an Airman First Class blow me away, he said "Stop, remove your arm from this area or I will shoot!" Didn't take twice for him to tell me, I dropped the ladder, went to the entry point of the area around the plane and showed him my ID, whereupon he let me enter the area.

There would have to be all kinds of exchanges/paperwork taking place just to get the weapons to the plane.

Once the unconventional weapons have been loaded, the bomb loading crew chief has to place written notice at the front of the B-52, on its side w/grease pencil, that unconventional weapons, where and how many, are loaded on that craft. He also makes an annotation in the plane's logs that they are loaded.

Before the plane leaves the area, the actual Airplane crew chief (Not the bomb-loading crew chief) has to make sure everything in the plane's logs are clear (No red "x"s in the log that aren't fixed). So, the plane's crew chief SHOULD have noticed that the weapons were still loaded.

During this time, the Bomb loading crew chief is in contact with the loading scheduler (normally a higher-ranking NCO) saying when the loading started and when the loading stopped. The scheduler writes this all down in a log. He SHOULD notice that they weren't unloaded before the plane left.

The Security police don't just stop guarding a specially-loaded plane. The area stays secure until the weapons have been off-loaded and removed from the site. The Chief of the SPs SHOULD have noted that the weapons were still loaded, as well as the SP on guard.

I would think that the pilot or co-pilot would also look at the logs to see what was loaded. They also should have taken a walk-around of the plane to see for themselves what is on their plane before they take off. I sure would!

Any B-52 pilots here?

[warren pease]

15. Wow. Great information. Thank you...

That's the most thorough description of the tracking protocols I've seen yet. Only one small point: Other posters have said it's actually the navigator who does the official walk-around and has final say on what ordnance the plane is carrying. So in this case, the nav. couldn't have avoided noticing that the plane was carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on the wing hard points.

So in addition to some of the best-trained servicemen and women in the world, who are constantly evaluated for fitness and emotional stability, completely ignoring protocols that have been drilled into them since their postings to a nuclear facility, the navigator somehow completely missed the fact that his plane was carrying nuclear weapons in full-launch position.

And it's all just a big screw-up; everybody had a little LSD that day and just forgot how to do their jobs. I may not have any AF experience, but my bullshit detectors are sensitive enough to notice that this is maybe the most unlikely piece of nonsense this administration has tried to stuff down our throats since the lies about invading Iraq.

Thanks a lot for all the details.


wp

On edit: tpyos

[IDemo]

17. Possibly the most significant post of the day

Thanks, lldu. It would be silly to believe errors never occur in the Air Force, but to believe this entire incident is attributable to "mistakes" would be sillier.

[0rganism]

19. would there be any way the nukes could be mistaken for conventional weapons?

I mean, do they have a big ol' label on them saying "I'M A 10 MEGATON BOMB"? Is it self-evident from the serial number or whatever you guys used to track the loading manifest?

[lldu]

21. Mistaken?

I just can't see how. As for what I loaded, you definitely could tell the difference, but those were not missiles.

I will say that I haven't loaded weapons in over 25 years, but the last ones were on B-52s and I can see no way the directions would have been changed, unless there was MORE security added.

Plus, I never loaded missiles with unconventional warheads.

But, I still feel my description of the process would not be much, if any, different.

[Zywiec]

22. These were not suppose to have any warhead, conventional or nuke

So why would security be as tight as you mentioned for supposed inert bombs? When you went to bomb loading school was there tight security as you loaded big, blue inert bombs?

[lldu]

23. blue

No, no security on blue ones.

[Zywiec]

24. Exactly, so the security procedures for the supposed inert missiles

being loaded on these planes for storage would also be zero. Remember, everyone thought they were inert!

[lldu]

28. I was just documenting the procedure that NORMALLY...

would have taken place with unconventional weapons.

Being that I do NOT know what these would look like on missiles, I would hope that there was an external way to ascertain the correct weapon type being loaded.

Yes, I said "hope" they could tell the difference.....

[Thothmes]

42. Inert bombs

The nose cones would have been in place regardless of whether nuclear conventional or dummy war heads were mounted on the missiles. Believe that the nuc warheads are indistinguishable from convention warheads from the outside, when the nose cone is in place. don't know if the nose cones are color coded.

[warren pease]

44. Color-coded..

The dummies are supposed to be blue, while the nukes are silver.

Plus, they're not supposed to be stored together to eliminate the possibility of just that kind of mistake. So the nukes and dummies should have been well apart from each other. I don't know if that was the case at Minot, but I do know that's the protocol throughout the AF, no matter where the bases are located.

The only way to mistake a live warhead from a dummy is if the dummy were painted silver. And even that wouldn't have been enough, because of bar codes, serial numbers and other ID measures to tell weapons handlers not only if they're handling a real warhead, but detailed specifics on that particular warhead.

But I still don't have an answer to the question in my OP: Why on pylons rather than using conventional transport methods specified in nuclear weapons handling and transportation protocols? I think there's enough evidence around that this wasn't a screw-up -- not when it involved dozens of highly trained professionals, all of whom would have had to completely ignore procedures that have been drummed into them since their initial posting and which they're gone through probably dozens of times before.

It would have required complete abandonment of the chain of command, from the base commander on down to the weapons handlers and security personnel. And finally, the flight crew is alleged to be so lax that during pre-flight inspection they could only be bothered to look at one wing - the one holding six dummy warheads - and not even glance at the one carrying the nukes.

Again, why did so many highly trained, constantly evaluated and professional airmen decide on one fine day in North Dakota to cross completely over the lines they had lived within regarding nuclear weapons security and handling procedures, ignore all their training and experience, not bother to check things that are standard in their normal routines and, further, are core elements of their job descriptions, just say to hell with this tedious nonsense, let's get this over with...? And six nukes were on their way to Louisiana for no apparent reason and with no attention paid to the normal chain of command.

No fucking way; it just doesn't pass the smell test.


wp

[warren pease]

46. More info on secure transport and IDing nuclear weapons...

Excerpted and modified from this article: http://tinyurl.com/295soq


<snip>

Chuck Simpson, blogging at AboveTopSecret, has given us a big missing piece of this particular puzzle. Quoting from his article:


"The practice warheads have standard blue and yellow signs declaring "Inert, non-nuclear." The nuclear warheads have at least three distinctive red warning signs. This error is therefore highly improbable, absent tampering with signage."


Let's examine Mr. Simpson's explanation (clearly from experience) of how you withdraw a nuclear weapon from its storage depot:


"Nuclear weapons are transported from the storage bunker to the aircraft in a caravan that routinely includes vehicles with machine guns front and rear and guards with M-16s. All steps in the process are done under the watchful eyes of armed military police.

"Rules require that at least two people jointly control every step of the process. If one person loses sight of the other, both are forced to the ground face-down and temporarily "placed under arrest" by observant security forces. All progress stops until inspections are made to assure the weapons weren't tampered with.

"All nuclear weapons are connected to sophisticated alarm systems to prevent removal or tampering. They could only be removed from the storage bunker by turning the alarm off. And the squad commander clearly would not have authority to turn off the alarm."

</snip>

More data with which to bury the "mistake" and "accident" explanations, which are clearly designed by administration spin-meisters to put a happy face on a black op planned and approved at the highest levels of civilian government -- i.e., Cheney -- and exposed by courageous AF officers who refused to stand by and watch the beginnings of WW III without blowing the whistle -- and, possibly, temporarily saving the planet. "Temporarily" because as long as there's a Cheney pulling strings, nothing is what it seems and nothing is safe.

wp

[0rganism]

25. How would you tell the difference?

Is there any way a bomb could be mis-labeled before it gets to the loading dock, such that the wrong type of warhead were loaded, or would the type be immediately apparent to the loaders just from the shape or weight or whatever?

Pardon my interrogation, it just seems very much like you know what you're talking about.

[warren pease]

31. Here's a post from another thread re identifying these warheads...

http://tinyurl.com/3cpndz

Sounds pretty unlikely that these warheads could have been mistaken for the dummies.

wp

On edit: here's a bit more on identification from Rick Myers, former AF guy who started many of the B-52 threads around the time the incident was first reported.

<snip>

we get this bit of info from the Air Force Times:

"All ACMs loaded with a nuclear warhead have distinct red signs distinguishing them from ACMs without a nuclear yield, he said. ACMs with nuclear warheads also weigh significantly more than missiles without them."

-- Because there is NO SUCH THING as a non-nuclear AGM-129. It's got a warhead or it doesn't. The W-80 series warhead is the only warhead this missile was built to carry. There is NO conventional warhead for an AGM-129. So HOW THE HELL did the munitions team, the flight crew and the crew chief MISS the 'distinct red signs' on six missiles loaded under their aircraft's wings???

</snip>

Note that this post appeared before the post about replacing the nuke warheads with dummies.

[0rganism]

33. Well that settles it -- no possibility of loader error, then

The Minot loading crew knowingly put unmistakably nuclear-tipped missiles on the B-52 in what appears to be a clear violation of protocol. The guys at Barksdale figured this out immediately, I would guess, from just looking at the paintjob.

So the question becomes, was the munitions team aware of the procedural requirements? If not, then the USAF needs to seriously revamp its training program.

If they did know procedure, then why the fuck did they violate it? Did they do so as some kind of prank ("Hey, this'll really freak 'em out over at Barksdale!"), or on orders from someone in their chain of command, or what?

[Zywiec]

35. Note that this post appeared before the post about replacing the nuke warheads with dummies.

Also before they mentioned the only way to distinguish the difference is by looking through a "stamp-sized" window to see if it's blue (inert) or silver (nuke). Not the "distinct red signs" or "different paint jobs" that others have talked about.

[warren pease]

36. Yeah, the correction is several posts down the thread from the OP...

...and simply states that, while these missiles are specifically designed to accept ONLY nuclear warheads (i.e., not conventional explosives), they will also accept dummies for target practice. Nothing contradictory there; just adding information in the interests of accuracy.

And looking through the window is simply one of many scripted ID procedures and is part of the protocols involved in handling, securing, transporting and loading the missiles. If you read any of those posts from the Air Force Times thread, you'll see that there are more steps involved in moving nukes than in a heart-lung transplant.

I got the impression there were other distinctive markings besides the colors seen through the window, but I'd have to re-read the entire thread linked above to find the references within the right posts -- and I'm just not up for it right now. Feel free to give it a shot, though.


wp

[warren pease]

37. More on IDing nukes...

From the WaPo article:

<snip>

A munitions custodian officer is supposed to keep track of the nuclear warheads. In the case of cruise missiles, a stamp-size window on the missile’s frame allows workers to peer inside to check whether the warheads within are silver. In many cases, a red ribbon or marker attached to the missile serves as an additional warning. Finally, before the missiles are moved, two-man teams are supposed to look at check sheets, bar codes and serial numbers denoting whether the missiles are armed.

</snip>

Emphasis mine.


wp

[Zywiec]

39. In many cases, a red ribbon or marker attached - not always obviously n/t

[warren pease]

29. Same handling and security protocols in place, as I understand it, since 1968. n/t

[sicksicksick_N_tired]

20. Well, in that case, I am absolutely convinced the "mistake" assertions are a lie.

:scared:

:wtf: is going on?

:shrug: Freaky!!!

[Blackhatjack]

26. This single post needs to be on the Greatest Page... it answers the question, no doubt

I would ask a follow up that is not critical to whether this was a 'mistake' but nevertheless is important:

Does every nuclear weapon have an identifying number and an electronic 'beacon' that shows up on an inventory of exactly where every nuclear weapon is at any given moment?

IF that is the case, how many individuals would know that the given nuclear weapon is on the move if it is being transported somewhere? THanks.

[lldu]

30. Zywiec has a point

If they were assumed to be duds, then they may have bypassed the whole loading procedure. But, someone had to know and I would hope they looked different than any ordinary missile warhead. The load crew SHOULD have at least noticed the difference.

Edit: added last sentence

[warren pease]

32. See my post # 31 above n/t

[Ignis]

34. K&R. Thanks for not letting this die quietly, Warren. (nt)

[Lokijohn]

40. The author of this link has a pretty good summary....

and some interesting speculation re: the 5/6 B52 nukes.

<http://ratiocinatonsofasavageheart.blogspot.com/2007/09/strange-case-of-six-misplaced-nuclear.html>

[druidity33]

41. question for you?

I'm still a little confused as to whether i should be worried about the 5 nukes or 6 nukes discrepancy... was there ever a confirmed missile total of any kind? Is there any evidence to point to one having gone missing?

:scared:

[warren pease]

43. Yes, you should still be concerned about that, imo...

I may have missed something on this, but as far as I know, those six nukes are still unaccounted for. And the official explanations haven't even tried to address this point, at least in any way that satisfies observers who have been tracking this episode.

We're told that either five or six left Minot and either five or six landed at Barksdale. That discrepancy has yet to be resolved.

Here's what I think: From the mounds of information on DU and elsewhere, I think six left Minot and six arrived at Barksdale. The initial report that five had gone missing from Minot and landed at Barksdale was, I think, supposed to become the official story. This would allow black ops people to steal a nuclear warhead that the public didn't even know was missing. And here's why they wanted it.

I think this was a move signed off at the very highest levels of govt. -- which would be Cheney -- to accomplish two related objectives. The first was removing a warhead, dialing it back to minimum kilo-tonnage (which ranges from 5kt to 150kt on this particular warhead), transporting it (probably by van, delivery truck, private plane or boat) to the scene of the next 9/11-style false flag op, placing it for maximum terror and minimum property destruction, and blowing up a relatively small area of a major coastal blue city -- coastal to justify the administration's babbling about small boats as delivery systems and mushroom clouds in US harbors.

This would be blamed on Iranian religious fanatics, would provide the final justification for war with Iran and would probably be the event that allowed Bush to invoke NSPD-51 and HSPD-20, the presidential orders signed back on May 9th that, among other repressive actions, creates the operational framework for implementing martial law, with Bush given the sole responsibility for ensuring orderly Constitutional government -- and we all know how he venerates "that goddamn piece of paper."

The second objective was to stage the rest of the nukes at Barksdale, the primary ME staging area for B-52s, pull another stealth loading job onto another B-52, or leave them attached to this one. However, there are reports that the pylon/wing hard-point interface was damaged and required eight to 10 hours to fix at Minot before missiles could be loaded on both wings, which would suggest using another plane to make sure the mission could be carried out. Either way, then it's sent to, say, the US base on Diego Garcia and is used to start WW III by nuking the alleged Iranian underground nuclear materials enrichment facilities.

There's some speculation out there that the grand plan, featuring a US attack on Iran using these "bunker-buster" cruise missiles, was timed to coincide with the Israeli attack on Syria Sept. 6. Fortunately, sanity and/or good luck prevailed.

Various sources report that elements within the Air Force, supported by U.S. intelligence agency personnel, successfully revealed the ultimate destination of the nuclear weapons and the mission was aborted due to internal opposition within the Air Force and US intelligence community. The visible faces of this opposition were three thus far unidentified AF officers who ratted the plan out to a reporter at Military Times.

By the time it circled the world several hundred time via the internet, the cover was blown and BushCo shifted from covert operations to damage control. And the WaPo article from yesterday is just another piece of planted hogwash to try and make this whole story go away.

So, that's the long version. The short one is that, yes, you need to keep doing your own research into the missing missile issue. At the very least for your own curiosity, and possibly your safety as well.

I really think the target is Portland for a bunch of reasons I've mentioned elsewhere on DU. You can check some of posts on this thread: http://tinyurl.com/26ucko for specifics on my conclusions. I just hope the scenario calls for them to "discover" the bomb and disarm it before it goes off, since these kinds of drills occasionally tend to "go live" and turn the exercise into a real-life situation that happens to exactly mirror every detail of the drill -- like 9/11/01 and 7/7/05 (London train bombings).

I hope we survive the next 15 or so months, and I further hope these bastards can be evicted from their snake pit as mandated by the Constitution on that glorious day in January 2009. Immediate impeachment would be far better, but that's obviously not going to happen, busy as Congress is on important matters like anti-Moveon resolutions and signing off on Bush's latest request for $200 billion more to "fight them over there so we don't have to fight them here."

So I guess if a dirty bomb actually does explode on US soil, we'll have to fight them over here, too, which will no doubt cost another $500 billion for the first year alone, further enriching the already obscenely rich arms manufacturers, petrochemical companies (since domestic drilling will again be necessary when OPEC no longer accepts US currency), executives of "private security companies," chain-link fence and razor wire manufacturers (tens of thousands of miles of the stuff to keep the rabble contained) and the hedge fund crowd, which always profits no matter the situation.

The peasants, however, are going to have to get a lot better at taking a flying fuck, because all social programs will be eliminated to support the war effort. Sacrifices to be made, don'tcha know, and they're never made by the ruling class. It's just not the natural order of things.


Best of luck,

wp

[AuntPatsy]

45. Interesting and not entirely out of the realm of possibility considering

the people we are dealing with.

[druidity33]

51. wow

you just articulated my very worst fears in almost every scenario. What can we do?

What have i been doing? I've been writing to my elected officials, and LTTEs, signing petitions, and going door to door next month... and going to local peace rallys. I buy local, have an energy efficient home with PVs and solar H2O, carpool everyday, recycle, etc.

What else can i do? I have a family and am slowly being crushed by debt... not enough hours in the day.

:(

[warren pease]

57. What to do...

Well, my only hope is that with enough publicity and enough public awareness of past false flag ops, we can keep Portland from vaporizing. To that end, I'm writing a backgrounder on false flags that will accompany a flyer describing the upcoming exercises in Portland and raising issues about their intentions.

I'm working with a group called Oregon Truth Alliance -- http://www.oregontruthalliance.org/ -- and we plan to hit every single government official's office, including congresspersons, the mayor, the police and fire chiefs, county and city commissioners, the fucking ignorant, co-opted mass media, the local AAR affiliate, KPOJ, and local left radio (KBOO) and a bunch more places.

I just learned that there are going to be 15,000 security types in town that week to supplement the locals. According to a DHS news release, "TOPOFF 4 will involve more than 15,000 participants from all levels of government, international partners and the private sector in a full-scale, simulated response to radiological dispersal device attacks." You can read the entire announcement here: http://tinyurl.com/25ywsq

As for your activities, you're doing what you can to survive while trying to get the word out, too. I honestly think affiliating with a like-minded group is a great idea because a) you know you're not the only one who suspects BushCo will stop at nothing to create its dream of a servile citizenry paying ever higher taxes to support endless war, and b) the power of a dedicated group of anti-administration people seems to increase geometrically rather than arithmetically with the addition of just one or two new voices.

Or you could take a trip to Portland and see if we're prescient or just paranoid loons.


wp

[krispos42]

47. My question is "How were the missiles stored?"

There are two options for storing the missiles: warheads on, or warheads off.

I imagine that is would be far simplier from a maintenance and security perspective to keep the warheads routinely separate from the missiles. Until it was time to prep them for a planned mission, of course.

I can accept the possibility that a certain number of the stealth cruise missiles were also on a ready alert status, perhaps one or two bomber loads, at any one time, in case world events demanded a nuke-armed bomber in the air. Where would such "ready" missiles, assuming they exist, be stored? In the same bunker as the unmounted nukes, or in the same bunker with the unarmed missiles? I don't know if this is policy or not, but I can conceive of it being such.

It is possible, then, that the reason this happened was because the wrong six (or five) missiles were taken from a bunker with a few dozen missiles to chose from?

[warren pease]

48. See the second paragraph of post #44 n/t

[DemoTex]

49. How do we know that the 8/30 or 8/31 incident was isolated?

Remember, I saw two B-52s landing at Barksdale on 9/5 with F-16 escorts. I was on I-20 westbound, close enough to I/D the Buffs and F-16s, but probably too far to notice any external stores (especially since I wasn't looking for them).

This question nags me: If those two B-52s of 9/5 had nukes, where are they now? Under wraps at Barksdale? Transported to Diego Garcia awaiting further orders from President Cheney? Sitting on the hot pad at MacRahanish AFB? Safe at the Crawford Pig Farm awaiting Junior's next brush-clearing binge?

[warren pease]

53. Short answer: We don't...

Given your background, you know this stuff way better than I ever will. I find it inconceivable that five lonely nukes are considered adequate for what could easily become theater-level carnage rather than just localized tactical bunker busting.

And those warheads' dial-a-death capabilities seem to fit either scenario pretty well, without the use of ICBMs, whose removal from their silos alone would probably result in an international Defcon 1 condition or its equivalent. Plus you can't recall them, which is maybe not the most worrisome thing to the Overlord but should be a serious consideration for the people who actually handle these things.

There are so many details about this that not only doesn't the official story resolve anything, even the most informed speculators haven't yet been able to really nail this down. All anybody's willing to say at this point is that it's not a screw-up or "mistake," as was first reported. The discrepancy as to the number of nukes (5 or 6), the method of transportation, the length of time they spent unguarded at both Minot and Barksdale, who ratted out the plan, were they encouraged/ordered to do so by the remaining few sane people at the top of the food chain, how are we to believe that dozens of highly trained professionals all picked the same day and same operation to forget all nuclear weapons handling protocols and simply go nuts for a few hours?

None of these questions have been answered satisfactorily. And of course mass media won't touch it, except for that west wing plant in yesterday's WP -- which is another indicator that this is a huge story involving all the top dogs, along with the Overlord himself, and if we ever find out exactly what's going on, it will be a) one of the stories of the century (admittedly a young century, but still...), and b) never spoken of in American mass media. As usual, we'll have to seek out sources of information published anywhere but America to learn what's happening in our own country.

That and the internets, of course.


wp

[CK_John]

50. Where are they now? Why has a second outsider been brought in to do another inquiry? n/t

[hootinholler]

52. Basically, you're asking the same thing I've been asking from go.

:shrug:

There's no telling at this point, just a string of curiousities and the answers all smell. Like the second investigation happening after the stand-down on the 14th. Like where are the missiles now?

We won't be hearing from SLAD anymore, she was tombstoned on one of the missile threads. :(

-Hoot

[warren pease]

54. What's up with this new investigation? I hadn't heard about it...

And I thought slad was suspended for a week, not tombstoned. She was/is a great resource and researcher. I hope she returns soon.

wp

[defendandprotect]

60. dupe

[hootinholler]

69. It was mentioned upthread...

But it was in prior threads last week. Sorry I don't have a reference, but at the time it struck me that some independent eyes (or damage control) was being brought in.

Great news on SLAD! I agree. I just saw the tombstone on her profile.

-Hoot

[defendandprotect]

56. Where were the atomic bombs going to end up -- ???

What I think we're missing here is that we have a huge mix now of privatized operations -- much of it secret.

Therefore, we don't know what has happened BEFORE with either missiles or a-bombs being moved around and some ripped off -- or what may still be planned??

This may have been an interruption in a plan in the works -- not the first shipment????

[defendandprotect]

59. And wouldn't there be a bit of URGENCY for an investigation of this???? Where's Waxman????

Actually -- who would be doing the investigating -- ???

[defendandprotect]

61. Maybe the story and the cover are the same -- MOVE 6, STEAL 1 -- ?????

[warren pease]

64. That would help the official liars keep their lies straight...

And I think that's what's happening. The sixth is slated to be used for the domestic act of "terror" that Santorum and others in the GOP, along with their pals in the media echo chamber, have been salivating for to "save" Bush's presidency.

Why the hell not? It's not as though they're above killing thousands of people to advance their agenda -- or millions in the case of disposable brown people in Iraq.


wp

[AuntPatsy]

62. I wish I could help I really do but all I have found is pretty much what you already have.

I'm glad your keeping up on it, I too think its important. So thank you for all of the time your putting into it. There are so many issues out there that need to be looked at, and one person cannot handle all of them.

[defendandprotect]

71. Did fact they were on list for "upgrading" make them vulnerable for steal --- ?????

[warren pease]

72. Not sure, but it probably did make moving them less noteworthy. n/t