... is located at the following link:
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c110query.htmlEnter the search terms "6304 pcs" (without quotes) and conduct a search. The version entered into the calendar in the Senate will be the first link labelled:
1. FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Placed on Calendar in Senate)
OnEdit: Direct link provided by gristy:
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-6304
I'm not actually going to post the entire text because it is almost 100 pages long in PDF format and would create a message so long I doubt anyone would actually read it. Besides, the links are enough.
I am posting this because a thread over in GD: Presidential purports to offer the "full" text of the current bill and generates an argument based on that "full" text. However, the text provided is merely the first page and excludes the portion that effectively provides immunity for the telecommunications company. I attempted to correct this error, but my comments are seemingly buried. I am further posting this in GD rather than the other group because I am not linking this directly to the current Presidential campaign, i.e. this is not provided to offer, implicit or otherwise, criticism of any individual. I am merely trying to correct some of the apparent misunderstanding about this bill.
Finally, I want to provide a summary of a current _Harvard Law Review_ article analyzing the elements of this bill. Due to copyright restrictions I cannot post the whole text of course, and I cannot provide a direct link because you need an account. (For those with access to LexisNexis Academic, the full text is available there or through another journal repository in the June 2008 edition (121 Harv. L. Rev. 2200) of the review.
In the following summary, I have added emphasis to a passage that summarizes the problem. To add a bit to that conclusion (which was centered on aspects of the bill other than immunity) allow me to further add that the requirement of telecommunications companies and others that are directed by a national authority to engage in surveillance activities only to show that they were presented with an order that they were informed by the issuing authority was legal is what effectively provides them with something that could be called "blanket immunity." (Obviously, this is not strictly true since they do have to follow the terms of the FISA law, but that law, as proposed, provides immunity for the illegal acts committed under the current administration and then effectively legalizes those acts so that the kinds of cases now pending could not be brought.) Due to the "exigent" circumstances clause of the bill, this allows a national authority to engage in surveillance activities for seven (7) days prior to submitting to the FISA court and call them legal. This loophole effectively allows indefinite surveillance as the executive can and will use creative methods to define "exigent" circumstances for any instance the executive deems proper to its own interests with *no* accountability because the bill allows legal surveillance for a period of seven days without review, provides for review that is only of the process, not the details, and removes from liability anyone involved in said process.
The summary is as follows:
NOTE: SHIFTING THE FISA PARADIGM: PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES BY ELIMINATING EXANTE JUDICIAL APPROVAL
SUMMARY:
Under the proposed amendments to FISA currently under consideration in Congress, however, not only would the particular brand of surveillance utilized by the TSP be subject only to executive authorization, but so would many of the foreign intelligence surveillance techniques that had previously required ex ante approval from the secretive federal court that FISA created for that purpose, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). ... In addition: The law further modernized FISA by allowing the executive branch to conduct warrantless surveillance without FISA court approval where the target of surveillance is located in a foreign country, permitting the Attorney General to direct a third-party to provide the government with "information, facilities, and assistance" to obtain the desired electronic surveillance information, and requiring the Attorney General to submit to the FISA court for approval for general use those procedures used to collect information about non-U.S. persons located in a foreign country to ensure that the target is outside the United States. ... Ultimately, "through a combination of government tactics, the mandate of the FISA court, and federal court interpretations of the FISA law, the FISA safeguards which were intended to balance individual rights against the government's claims of national security have been essentially eviscerated." ... Such a system could force public consideration of the difficult weighing of liberty and security interests and ensure meaningful oversight of the government's conduct of surveillance. ... The reliance on political checks proposed in this Note avoids the problem identified by Congress when it initially enacted FISA and raised by the TSP - that "the substantial safeguards respecting foreign intelligence electronic surveillance then embodied in classified Attorney General procedures" were not enough to overcome "the inappropriateness of relying solely on executive branch discretion to safeguard civil liberties." ... Also important is the Senate's advice and consent power, through which it could require prospective officials to commit to following the standards.
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
