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There were a lot of factors involved in the mortgage industry crisis, ranging from changes in home equity loans to fraud to loose investors to overly-aggressive lenders, but none of it happened the way you spell it out. As always, "minorities" (and by that I mean historically discriminated against groups, however you define the traits that make them discriminated against) got the least favorable terms, the least access to loans, and the least leeway when they encountered troubles.
My spouse was in the mortgage industry when it exploded over the last ten to fifteen years. It started with the deregulation of banks, which allowed mass conglomerate banks to make money by taking a few risky loans. They didn't target minority investors with their new products, they targeted investors and wealthier home-owners with equity locked into their homes. In Texas, where home equity loans were illegal, they campaigned to legalize them (under Bush, of course, who screwed up Texas before sticking it to the rest of the world), and once they did, lenders targeted borrowers with a barrage of new loans and loan formats and schemes. There were 5/15/80 plans, where you could borrow 80% on the first mortgage, 15% on a second mortgage, pay 5% down, and avoid PMI. There were home equity loans, and aggressive appraisal systems that assumed a house would increase in value in a short time, so that the 80% cap on equity loans could be maximized.
As these loans created new mortgage companies, from small broker offices to larger banks, the investors had so much growth and wealth tide up in the loans that the only way to justify their existence was to loan more and more, and sell the loans to get money to sell more loans. Brokers and lenders no longer made money by carrying loans, but by originating them and selling them to a secondary market who managed and collected on the loans.
As these companies strove for more and more loans to maintain their business income, and as the equity market in Texas (an overlooked source of much of the problem) began to reach the down side of the Bell Curve, lenders came up with more and more creative ways to entice people into borrowing. Use an aggressive ARM to buy a house outside your income bracket (thus driving housing prices higher). Refinance a two year old loan to take advantage of a lower interest rate. Refi from a fixed 8% loan to a five year 5% ARM with a 1% yearly cap, so that you can hold the house 8 years before the interest rate increased above your original loan. Lenders got to where the connection between the actual loans and the lender's income was irrelevant--the only income from the loans came from origination fees, discount points, and the selling price to a seconday lender (the lenders who buy the original mortgages from the lender who originated the loan).
Eventually everything got out of hand. It turned from a mortgage industry into a Ponzi scheme for many companies. At about that time, BushCo took over, deregulated even more, refused to enforce the regulations that already existed, and fraud exploded into the scene, exactly as it had in the 80s with the S&L crisis. Scam artists would found a cheap piece of property, and get a straw buyer to put his or her credit rating on the loan documents. They would fake an income statement for the straw buyer, get an appraiser to value a 100K property at 500K, get the money from the lender, make three payments (just enough to make the loan look viable), then skate with what was left of the 400K overage. The lender would sell the loan as top rated paper, and the new holder of the mortgage would think they had an A+ loan, only to have it collapse in the end.
A more legal version of this was for a loan originator to get an honest appraisal and credit check on the borrower, then sell the loan when the market fell below the loan value. The loan still seemed perfect, but the new loan holder was stuck with an upside down mortgage.
As the other side of the Bell Curve became a downhill ski slope, lenders got desperate. They made riskier loans, they made more aggressive incentives, they got more aggressive and less honest with borrowers on the terms of new loans they were offering. And they stretched their loans out into the historically underrepresented markets--the "minorities" you are talking about. They then used agressive and deceptive sales and marketing pitches to rake in these loans, hoping only that they could get a loan, sell it on the secondary market, and reap the profits while the secondary holder got stuck with the bad paper, and the borrower got stuck with a time-bomb ARM they had no chance of paying off.
As always, minorities were the victims in these schemes--they were the last to benefit, and the first to get the shaft.
Eventually nothing could continue the illusion. The Bell Curve bottomed, the mortgages began to collapse as the ARM increases were triggered beyond what the borrowers could bear, and the credit dried up at the exact same time that borrowers needed the loans to escape their ARMs, and at the exact time that the values of the mortgaged properties collapsed below the loan value, so that no one could refinance these loans.
Don't blame minorities. Don't blame Main Street, either. Sure, individuals should be expected to monitor and manage their own finances and credit ratings. But the problem here wasn't the individuals. The problem was that the protection system built up since the last Great Depression was dismantled, destroying the protection of the entire system that kept individual mistakes from collectively creating an entire systemic collapse.
In short, if an individual trips on a sidewalk because he's not watching his feet, it's the individual's fault. But if dozens of individuals trip in exactly the same spot, you know there is a problem with that spot. At that point, the bigger blame for the problem goes to the people hired to maintain the sidewalk for their failure to do so. That's where we are now. This is Wall Street's problem, and their fault. More than that, this is Washington's fault, and Pennsylvania Avenue's fault, for ignoring a problem everyone saw coming.
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