Two of his initial core advisor group, with him throughout his campaign, are executives with Citigroup.
The backstory, which makes a kind of unhappy sense of the bailout, is that Paulson, before heading Treasury, was the vastly overpaid CEO of Goldman Sachs from 1998 - 2006. In 2004, the major investment houses, led by Goldman Sachs, demanded and got the removal of the EU regulation that required them to maintain a capital cushion against leveraged investments and other risk when doing business in Europe. The agreement stipulated that the SEC would be responsible for warning of problematic overextension, but in 2006, Paulson, in his capacity as Treasury Sec'y, pressured the SEC into discontinuing its oversight.
This, in effect, removed any short-term downside to marketing instruments that the investment institution couldn't back up. No one would be allowed to know the institution was vastly overextended, and if they eventually had to default on some instruments, there would be no capital for them to lose. The losses would fall to associated private insurers, like AIG, who would in turn default to the U.S. government. See
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html?_... Goldman Sachs was a major generator of and trader in mortgage-backed credit default swaps, and Paulson was CEO of G-S during much of that period. After the revelations of the credit crisis, important foreign purchasers, especially China, the Saudis, and EU banks were understandably furious with the U.S. investment community, and there were hints they were considering retaliating by removing support from the U.S. dollar. China could sell some of its large holding of U.S. Treasury bonds as could European banks, and the Saudis could replace the dollar with the Euro as their trading currency. Given the shaky U.S. economy, those actions would, without question, crash the dollar.
At that point the financial community started buzzing with stories of the large investment houses, including Citigroup, buying back the bad CDS's from the foreign investors, although they did not apparently have the capital to do so. Much of Paulson's bailout spending could be seen as pre-agreed reimbursment of the investment houses' rescue of the dollar which they, themselves, with Paulson's help, had put in danger. Of course Paulson couldn't take credit for this "heroic" rescue because his and his colleagues responsibility for the crisis, and their willingness to wager U.S. gov't money, would end up front and center.
I'm not sure what's going on with Paulson's second wave of bailout spending, but it looks a lot like a hugely expensive (to U.S. taxpayers) celebration of dodging the bullet. Unfortunately extraordinary exemptions from accountability were written into the bailout bill that passed Congress (
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=389&topic_id=4118292&mesg_id=4118292">see my journal article), so it would take passing a Congressional amendment to rein this in.