I still can't get behind all of the scheming and intentions that are touted behind support for him continuing, but it's instructive in it's explanation of the complex decisions the military may expect Obama to either weigh in on, take a position on, or delegate decisions on . . .
from Asia Times Online:
The difficulties faced by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan have sparked a revolution in thinking inside the American military. Some of thee leaders of this revolution are well known: Generals Petraeus, Odierno, McKiernan and Petraeus counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen. Petraeus, Odierno, McKiernan, Kilcullen have focused on what the military calls "Phase IV Operations" - the post-combat "nation-building" phase of providing stability, reconstruction and economic programs in post-war societies.
Recently, however, the loudest voices calling for more focus on Phase IV operations ("in which wars are really won") have come from the US Marine Corps, and particularly the group of serving and recently retired colonels around marine commandant James Conway and General James Mattis, the current Joint Forces Commander. These are the same colonels, primarily from the Marine Corps 3rd Civil Affairs Group (CAG) who first met with Anbar officials in Amman in 2004 and who, as a result, kick-started the Anbar Awakening. Quietly supported by senior civilian policymakers at the Pentagon, these colonels have been urging Obama transition officials to retain the myriad "Phase IV" operations in Iraq and to set aside increased resources for the inter-departmental structures that have grown up around the effort.
The colonels have a number of allies, including senior Department of Defense policymakers who have brought together Pentagon, State Department and US Agency for International Development officials in an effort to coordinate "nation building" operations.
A core of strong voices, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Celeste Ward, and counter-insurgency wonk Janine Davidson, have emerged as important advocates for increased "interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities vital for developing governance structures in a post-conflict environment", as Ward says.
The new effort has resulted in the creation of the Consortium for Complex Operations, a kind of internal "super think-tank" headed by Davidson that is attempting to draw together government thinking on managing post-conflict societies. Ward and Davidson's initiative was welcomed by the marines, which strengthened its "Phase IV" offerings when Mattis assigned a senior officer to the army's recently created Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College. The marines, the army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and the Consortium - and well-placed defense thinkers at the Pentagon - have been working to shift government thinking and military planning on how best to address the challenges facing the US in the Middle East.
{snip}
Come January, the new Obama defense team will find itself in the midst of an escalating conflict between counter-insurgency advocates who feel besieged by the traditional proponents of the "AirLand Battle doctrine" and those who live in the world of counter-insurgency operations . . .
This contentious battle between red and blue "pill swallowers" has escalated to the point where it now involves the secretary of defense and JCS chairman. Both have attempted to adopt a delicate middle ground, arguing that it is possible for the nation to prepare for both a major war and train its soldiers in counter-insurgency doctrine. "Even the biggest of wars will require so-called 'smart war' capabilities," Gates said recently at the National Defense University. "In Iraq, we've seen how an army that was basically a smaller version of the Cold War force can over time become an effective instrument of counter-insurgency." Mullen, on the other hand, has emphasized the need for the creation of a balanced force, adding, "I do worry about us losing our focus too much in the counter-insurgency world. We need balance in the way we think, in the way we train and in the way we resource ourselves."
In a series of public addresses, Gates has also focused the military on a new mantra. Quoting a turn-of-the-century American general by the name of Fox Conner, Gates says that the US should "never fight unless it has to, never fight alone, and never fight for long". While Gates would never acknowledge it, the mantra is a direct repudiation of the Bush Doctrine of fighting "preventive wars" - which suggests that the best way to keep America's enemies from going to war is to bomb them first.
Nor does he add a fourth principle, the Lincoln Doctrine, that dictates that, in wartime, the US should deploy all the forces it has. The doctrine is derived from Abraham Lincoln's instructions to Ulysses S Grant, just prior to the last campaign of the Civil War. "This time," Lincoln told Grant, "put everyone in." The Gates mantra and the Lincoln Doctrine may provide the best way to resolve the blue pill-red pill debate, as both sides agree that whether or not the new counter-insurgency doctrine becomes the doctrine of the future, the US should not only stay out of unnecessary wars, but also deploy enough troops to ensure victory; it's a view that Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld - and Franks - pointedly ignored.
While it seems unlikely that Obama will decide the military's increasingly nasty doctrinal debate, leaving the question to senior military officers, it seems likely that those who emphasize training soldiers to master "Phase IV" operations will be heeded. The Obama military brains trust contains a large number of Pentagon officials-in-waiting whose primary expertise is in "Phase IV" operations. Included in this number are former marine officer Nate Fick (a fellow at the Center for a New American Security - CNAS) , Roger Carstens (a retired army special forces lieutenant colonel and CNAS fellow), Shawn Brimley (also a fellow at CNAS), influential army colonel Peter Mansoor (a professor of military history at Ohio State University), and retired army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, who helped Petraeus and Mattis write the military's counter-insurgency field manual.
much more:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JK25Ak01.html
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