Escalation and appraisal in Afghanistan - Asia Times

[Tierra_y_Libertad]

Anybody remember the "pacification strategy" in Vietnam and how well it worked?

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KG29Df01.html


The recent campaign in Helmand province, in southern Afghanistan, is the first phase of a far-reaching counterinsurgency program. Western and Afghan troops will clear Taliban fighters from villages and later whole districts, then begin a seemingly simple but actually arduous process of building local military
and intelligence forces and delivering medical, construction and veterinary services to the villages.

The Helmand Campaign might be more usefully looked upon, not as a first phase of a larger counterinsurgency program, but as a test case of the program's likelihood of success. Militaries, governments and publics alike might ask: are there viable indigenous military and intelligence forces in place? Are the Afghan state and military becoming more professional and effective? Are the tribes of Helmand shifting support to the Kabul government? Are the Taliban forces losing fighters, especially from local part-timers? Are districts becoming more secure? Unless reliable, positive answers are found to these questions, troop increases might simply be raising the stakes in a losing effort.

But who will assess the success or failure of operations in Helmand? Inasmuch as the US army
seems to have principal control over the counterinsurgency program, it will likely be the judge. Reports will come up from junior and field-grade officers out in the villages and districts, to be assessed by higher-ups. This presents problems as bureaucracies are not reliable judges of their own programs. Reports reaching the Pentagon on the viability of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) were quite optimistic about the professionalism, cohesion and efficacy of ARVN units. But anyone familiar with operations in Laos and elsewhere would know that outside a few units, the ARVN was plagued by widespread corruption, poor leadership and dubious efficacy.

Few US officers will report to their superiors that their program is not working. If they did, even fewer colonels would send the reports upstream, unredacted. Non-military bureaus such as the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department will play important roles in the counterinsurgency and assessing its merits, but they too are subject to institutional pressures.

There will likely be formidable pressure to stay the course and deploy more US troops to support the effort. The American public is generally supportive of the war, which it sees as more worthwhile and defensible than the war in Iraq. Support for the war will likely weaken as casualties mount with the new operations, but the deep recession is focusing a great deal of attention on domestic matters and since the end of conscription, few Americans know anyone in the military.