This dovetails with Matt Taibbi's contention that the Goldman Sachs people in government (Paulson, et al) allowed their competitor to die but saved their own firm.http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/04/lehman-brothers-aftershocks-28-daysHow the collapse of Lehman Brothers pushed capitalism to the brink...In the days that followed, another US bank met its maker. Washington Mutual, a Seattle-based chain with branches throughout the nation, failed in the biggest high-street banking collapse since the war. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley ripped up their business models as standalone Wall Street banks and opted for the shelter of government regulation, in return for a lower risk structure. As far away as Sydney, one of Australian's biggest banks, Macquarie, had to deny rumours of trouble as its stock went into freefall. And on both sides of the Atlantic, governments took the extraordinary step of bailing out and partially nationalising the banking industry.
Charles Geisst, a Wall Street historian at Manhattan College, describes September 2008 as the most momentous financial turmoil since president Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared a mandatory four-day banking shutdown in March 1933 to halt a panic-driven run on deposits. In the wake of Lehman's failure, institutions accustomed to prosperity suddenly realised they were mortal: "It was a message sent to Wall Street banks that they weren't too big to fail. The reaction was really very severe."
Unleashing the forces of evil
Barclays picked up parts of Lehman from the bankruptcy courts, salvaging about 10,000 of the bank's 25,000 jobs. But many still question the wisdom of the US government's decision to stand by and allow a vast investment bank to go bust, given the intertwined nature of Lehman's trading relationships around the globe. Larry McDonald, a former Lehman vice-president, says the Bush administration could easily have offered the guarantee needed to help Barclays buy Lehman outright: "They put Lehman Brothers to sleep. They executed her. They put a pillow over her face."...
Researching a recently published book on Lehman's failure, "a colossal failure of common sense",
McDonald interviewed more than 45 Lehman executives. They insisted that they warned both Bush's treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, and the then chairman of the New York Fed, Timothy Geithner, of the consequences of inaction: "They were begging Geithner and begging Paulson. They were saying to Geithner 'you're going to unleash the forces of evil on the global markets - you don't understand what you're doing!'"...