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Edited on Wed Sep-09-09 03:11 PM by HamdenRice
The main argument for mandatory insurance, private or public, is reasonable and it is in the abstract sense desirable. But the costs outweigh the benefits -- the costs to people who can barely afford it, and the political costs to Democrats in passing it.
The basic argument is that we don't want healthy people not paying into the system, then getting sick, and getting benefits. This relies on the idea that insurance is "cost spreading" in which healthy people pay for sick people.
The economic problem with this argument is that health insurance is not like fire insurance. Fire insurance is pure insurance; you only use it when there is a fire. Owners of unburned property pay for burned properties.
But health insurance is both a system of insurance and a system of savings. When you buy a health insurance policy, you are buying protection against getting hit by a truck or getting cancer, and you are also buying something like a Christmas Club, putting away money for the routine checkups, flu shots, ob-gyn exams, and minor procedures that we all definitely will have. That's not insurance; that's savings, and it's a big part of a good health insurance plan. Most of us will not get hit by trucks, and our biggest health expenses will be in our last years of life.
People who don't buy insurance are pretty financially in the same position whether they pay for checkups through insurance or out of pocket. In fact, what makes the system so atrocious, is that because of insurance company profits, you are actually better off paying for routine health care out of pocket than paying premiums that are skimmed for profits, and moreover, running the risk of having your insurance company screw you over, with regard to some of the expenses of routine care -- assuming you have the ability to save, which most of us don't, unless we're force to through payroll deduction (ie insurance again).
The big reason for getting everyone in is the catastrophic cases, but many of these can be eventually paid down by premiums. That means that one way of enrolling people, actually is to wait until they get sick or hit by a truck. Most younger people who get sick, get better. Let them "free load" if they think they can't afford it. When they come into the hospital after getting hit by a truck, sign them up, and make them stay in program at least until they have paid back in premiums what they took out when being signed up. In fact, this is the way it has come to work somewhat informally in New York. Many people are uninsured, but when you go to the emergency room at a decent, public hospital, they sit down with you and sign you up for various public and subsidized insurance plans.
Most people will get better, continue to work, and eventually pay off whatever they took out of the system.
A penalty for not signing would be a political disaster, as well as a hardship for many families. Moreover, the same incentive can be achieved simply by giving a tax deduction for health premiums. Those who don't pay premiums would obviously not get the deduction. It's kind of similar in incentive to a penalty, but instead of saying, "we're fining you for not buying insurance" they would be saying, "you can't get this deduction because you're not buying insurance."
Same exact financial impact on the taxpayer; no punitive component.
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