Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2010::

[Robb]

It appears most people talking about it have not read it. So.

...Here's the executive summary (all most reporters will read), followed by a link to the entire report. Since I made the effort to reformat this, I took the liberty of doing some emboldening, which may or may not help. Hopefully it will.

I highly recommend at least downloading the entire report, as it focuses on many issues DUers appear interested in, including growth trends in the Afghan army, influence by regional partners (and non-partners, such as Iran), and the work being done by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan

Executive Summary:

The attached report is an update on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan from October 2009 through March 2010. Events during this period centered around President Obama’s December 1, 2009 speech on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President reiterated the United States Government’s goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our strategy moving forward is to achieve our objectives through three core elements: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition, a civilian surge that reinforces positive action, and an effective partnership with Pakistan. The continuing decline in stability in Afghanistan, described in the last report, has leveled off in many areas over the last three months of this reporting period. While the overall trend of violence throughout the country increased over the same period a year ago, much of this can be ascribed to increased International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) activity. Polls consistently illustrate that Afghans see security as improved from a year ago. At the same time violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year – an 87% increase from February 2009 to March 2010.

In his December speech, in response to the deteriorating situation, the President announced the deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan and requested additional contributions from the international community. Consistent with the President’s policy, an increase of U.S. civilian resources was already underway. On March 31, 2010 there were approximately 87,000 U.S. forces and approximately 46,500 international forces in Afghanistan. Additional U.S. forces are on schedule to arrive in Afghanistan on time to meet mission requirements, with force levels expected to approach 98,000 by August 2010. As of March 31, approximately 113,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 102,000 Afghan National Police(ANP) have been fielded. The Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are broadly on track to meet targeted growth figures of 134,000 ANA and 109,000 ANP by October 2010 and171,600 ANA and 134,000 ANP by October 2011.

International force levels continue to grow at an approximately proportional rate to the U.S. force increase. Currently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has accepted force increase offers from 38 countries with multiple capabilities for operations, tactics, and training. Offers totaling approximately 9,000 troops have been received from NATO and non-NATO partners since the President’s December speech. As of March 2010, approximately 40% of the offered increases of international partner troops have arrived in country.

U.S. forces, deployed in conjunction with international forces, operate under a strategic framework based in large part on U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, focused on population security, while also conducting counterterror operations. This strategy focuses on protecting the population while simultaneously partnering with the ANSF in order to build ANSF capability and eventually transition lead for the security mission to the Afghans, a goal shared by the Afghan Government. A key part of establishing the environment for transition is implementing full partnering between Afghan and international forces. In his November 19 inauguration speech, President Karzai stated a goal of having the ANSF make a full transition to Afghan security lead within three to five years.

NATO Allies and partners have noted that they are cautiously optimistic about the success of the ISAF mission. Many national leaders, however, express concerns over popular support within their countries, which has resulted in continued capability gaps in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) from unresourced requirements not filled by international partners.The most notable gap is the requirement for trainers and mentors to support development of the ANSF. U.S. Forces are taking on this mission, filling the requirements for training and partnering through a combination of embedded partnering of operational units, Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), and re-missioning of combat forces to conduct training.

In terms of operational execution of the ISAF population-centric COIN campaign, combined ISAF and Afghan Government planning teams identified 80 districts as key terrain. In general, key terrain – defined in military terms as those areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them – are those districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world. These districts roughly follow the line of the three major highways in Afghanistan through the most densely populated portions of the country.

Supplementing the 80 Key Terrain districts are an additional 41 Area of Interest districts. In general, these are districts that, for a variety of reasons, exert influence on Key Terrain districts to a degree that renders it necessary to focus information collection and operational resources upon them to support operations in the Key Terrain districts.

The focus of the campaign on these 121 districts does not imply that what happens in the rest of the country is unimportant, but it does indicate that the emphasis of ISAF operations is concentrated in those areas that have been identified by combined Afghan and ISAF planning efforts as the most critical to success. The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) assessed that, out of the121 districts, it had the resources to conduct operations in 48 focus districts (comprised of 45Key Terrain districts and three Area of Interest districts). Operational assessments necessarily focus upon these areas. Conditions in these districts are assessed by means of bottom-up reporting from Regional Commanders to the Commander, ISAF Joint Command (COMIJC). Operationally, ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Government, has commenced conduct of clear, hold, build, sustain, and transition operations throughout Afghanistan as part of an 18-month civil-military campaign plan. Active ANSF and Afghan ministry leadership supports the ongoing Operation MOSHTARAK in central Helmand Province. Combined ISAF, ANSF, and Afghan and international civilians continue to make progress in Marjah. Consolidating gains and continuing to deny the Taliban the ability to re-establish a foothold will be the focus for continued operations. These events collectively demonstrate the increasing proficiency of the ANSF and increased engagement by the Afghan Government.

In order to execute military operations more effectively, the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) continued to refine his strategy by promulgating three new operational directives in addition to the Tactical Directive, Partnering Directive, COIN Guidance, and the Driving Directive issued during the last reporting period. During this period,Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) transferred operational control of all U.S.Forces (less some notional elements) to General McChrystal as Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and virtually all U.S. Forces have been put under NATO operational command as well. Enabled by this, COMISAF continued to institute changes to the command and control structure in Afghanistan in order to create unity of command for all operations and foster unity of effort among the many international partners and organizations in Afghanistan. He has not only instituted organizational changes internal to Afghanistan operations but has also directed his efforts to fostering greater military coordination and cooperation among ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan with the creation of the Tripartite Joint Intelligence Operation Center (T-JIOC), situated in Headquarters, ISAF and manned by ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani forces. The T-JIOC oversees all border incidents.

In the planning and execution of all operations, COMISAF’s first priority is to protect the Afghan population, and in this regard, the population is telling us the trends are positive. From July to November, there was a 50% increase in the proportion of Afghans that saw security improve. Even with the rise in violent events against ANSF and ISAF forces and the civilian population considering the dispute over the August elections, the populated areas saw more improvements than declines. When asked who brings improvements to their area, the population sees the Afghan Government as the source of those improvements. The Afghan population also sees the improvements in the ANSF in Regional Command-East (RC-East), with 91% agreeing that national security forces work for a better Afghanistan.

The overall assessment indicates that the population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan Government in 24% (29 of 121) of all Key Terrain and Area of Interest districts. The establishment of effective governance is a critical enabler for improving development and security. As the operational plan progresses, ISAF is working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to coordinate and synchronize governance and development in the 48 focus districts prioritized for 2010.

The President’s strategy is dependent not only on the application of military capability, but also on increased civilian capacity. Since January 2009, the Department of State (DoS) has more than tripled the number of civilians on the ground in Afghanistan to 992 (as of March 31). These civilians include experts from eleven different U.S. Government departments and agencies,including DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice (DoJ), FBI Legal Attaché, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Marshals Service, Treasury Department, Department of Transportation, and Health and Human Services. U.S. civilian experts contribute to the mission in the field, especially in RC-East and RC-South, where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama will deploy. Civilian personnel will remain deployed insignificant numbers after the security situation improves and lead for security responsibility is transferred to the Afghans.

The increase in civilian personnel is a reflection of the President’s strategy to increase civil military cooperation at all levels of operations. The integration of senior civilian representatives(SCRs) with military counterparts in each of the RC’s provides significant improvements to civil-military coordination that occurred during this reporting period.

On January 26, 2010, the NATO Secretary General announced that former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill would assume the responsibilities of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan, as well as assume responsibility as the NATO Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan by the end of January. The appointment of Ambassador Sedwill signaled a broadening of the mandate of the NATO SCR Office, with a view to empowering the incumbent to assume a greater role in coordinating the delivery of international civil support to the ISAF campaign.

SCR Sedwill explained his proposed approach in the course of an Informal North Atlantic Council Meeting held February 26, 2010, chaired by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. His three priorities comprise: one, overall transition, to include Provincial Reconstruction Team(PRT) efforts to create the conditions for transition; two, stabilization efforts through the provision of timely Afghan Government-led governance and development in the 80 Key Terrain districts, as designated in the ISAF Campaign Plan; and three, optimizing strategic political military coherence with other international community stakeholders, in support of the Afghan Government. The SCR will prosecute these priorities through a restructured office made up of five international directors.

The United States leads 13 of 27 PRTs in Afghanistan. U.S. civilians are posted to all 13 U.S.-led PRTs and to 13 of the 14 PRTs led by our international partners. U.S. civilians operate District Support Teams (DSTs), subordinate to the PRTs, in 32 districts. An additional eight DSTs are scheduled to commence operations in 2010. Since January 2009, the number of U.S.civilians operating in Afghanistan has tripled. As of April 1, 2010, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside of Kabul has more than quadrupled, from 67 to over 350. Embassy Kabul has requested an additional 20%-30% increase in civilian staff levels by the end of 2010.While improving the security situation is a vital first step, progress made to improve the security environment cannot be sustained without parallel improvements in governance and development.A consolidated approach is crucial to the eventual success or failure of the ISAF mission.Additionally, although ISAF plays only a supporting role in the extension of governance and socio-economic development in Afghanistan, it must continue to use focused key leader engagement to highlight issues and work in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan to develop and implement solutions that promote positive changes in governance.

The significance of private sector growth as a focus for Afghan development was underscored at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and at the London Conference in January2010 with international community endorsement of an Integrated Plan for Economic Development proposed by the Afghan Government. The Afghan Government plans to prioritize strategic objectives and promote synergy among key ministries to define development priorities and develop integrated programs to deliver tangible results.

The ultimate resolution to the situation in Afghanistan will result from political and diplomatic means that capitalize on security operations. President Karzai highlighted reintegration and reconciliation as priorities for his second presidential term during his November 2009inauguration speech, and has called for international support of these efforts. The U.S. Government has stated that it supports Afghan-led reintegration to assimilate peacefully into Afghan society those insurgent fighters and leaders who renounce violence, sever all ties with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, and abide by the Afghan constitution.

The Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration program is currently being developed under the guidance of President Karzai’s Presidential Advisor for Internal Security Affairs. The program will be an inter-ministerial effort to respond to reintegration opportunities in key communities. This program is being designed within the context of the delicate political and ethnic context of Afghanistan and the need to avoid creating perverse incentives for joining the insurgency or exacerbating perceptions of favoritism for certain ethnic and tribal groups. In addition, planning is underway for a Consultative Peace Jirga (scheduled for late May) to reach consensus with key representatives of the Afghan people on a way forward for peace and reintegration.

A cross-cutting issue, impacting all aspects of Afghan Government and economics, is the narcotics trade. The U.S. Government is implementing an interagency approved Counternarcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan. The CN Strategy reflects lessons learned from CN activities from 2001 through 2008 – the most significant of which is that large-scale eradication targeted toward Afghan poppy farmers was counterproductive and drove farmers toward the insurgency. The new strategy places primary focus on interdiction of the nexus between narco-trafficking and the insurgency, but also places a heavy emphasis on agricultural assistance to farmers, with the aim of transitioning them to licit crops, creating jobs, and revitalizing Afghanistan’s historically vibrant agricultural sector. The new strategy carries over activities that have proven to be important in a multi-pronged, whole-of-government CN campaign, including capacity building for Afghan CN capabilities, assistance in promoting the rule of law, support for governor-led eradication and public information campaigns, and drug treatment and demand reduction activities. Strategic communications and counterpropaganda, as well as regional engagement with countries and international organizations, are also features of the new strategy. The CN Strategy supports our overall counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan,and is closely synchronized with the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plans(ICMCPs) for support to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the U.S. Agricultural Strategy.

Finally, the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan has signaled just how important the impact of regional actors is for the future stability and security of Afghanistan. In particular, engagement with the contiguous border countries, including the Central Asian States,Pakistan and Iran, in addition to engagement with India, the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC),Russia, and China is essential to sustaining an independent Afghan Government capable of providing security and progress for its people.

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf

[NJmaverick]

1. I recced this FACT filled post

but clearly those with agendas HATE FACTS as they had unrecced something that actually provided FACTUAL INFORMATION TO FORM INTELLIGENT OPINIONS rather than being told how to think with uninformed propaganda/opinion articles.

[ShortnFiery]

2. OMG! How many times can they package the same bullshit and call it "PROGRESS?"

:crazy:

The Afghan People have built a museum in "honor" of the Russians' abject failure ... the last great army these rag tag tribal people forced out.

Shall we take note?

Shall we take heed to our inevitable DEFEAT?

If 250,000 Soviet Troops couldn't pacify Afghanistan, what makes you think the USA (and smattering of NATO troops) can?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/26/AR2010042600087.html

The tribute is a stomach-churning reminder of the fact that Afghanistan continues to be plagued with insecurity and is still hosting tens of thousands of foreign troops.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63P0JI20100426

[NJmaverick]

3. Damn those facts!

[ShortnFiery]

4. What facts? = They're reporting on the lame ass attempts to get the villagers to go along with them.

As soon as the troops pull out, it will be "business as usual."

Wash. Rinse. Repeat.

[zipplewrath]

5. Inside the report

Despite some progress, improvements to national infrastructure remain insufficient to provide
tangible benefits for the populace. This weakness has been exploited by insurgents, who
continue to leverage their religious, ethnic, and tribal affinities with local Afghans for
recruitment, resources, and freedom of movement. Insurgent information operations remain
focused on portraying the Afghan Government’s inability to provide security to the Afghans.
Insurgents have sought to underline this message over this reporting period with high-profile
complex attacks in Kabul and Kandahar. Afghan perceptions of corruption within the Afghan
Government, the inability of the government to provide essential services, and exploitative
behavior of some government officials and ANSF are contributing to the success of the
insurgents’ campaign. These shortcomings are also being highlighted and exploited by insurgents
as part of their strategy to divert support from the Afghan Government to the limited shadow
governance they portray as a viable alternative. One area the Taliban have effectively exploited
is as an adjudicator in providing swift and less corrupt dispute resolution.

Over the first quarter of 2010, the insurgents’ strategy has proven effective in slowing the spread
of governance and development; however, the insurgency has also been under unprecedented
pressure. Reporting indicates increased and often strained efforts to resource the fight, which has
led to tension and sporadic dips in morale. From the insurgents’ perspective, this strain has been
compounded by the recent high-profile arrests of several Pakistan-based insurgent leaders by
Pakistani authorities and removal of many Afghanistan-based commanders, predominantly by
international partner special operations forces (SOF). The arrests in Pakistan have increased
insurgent leaders’ concern over the security of their safe havens. Financial and logistical support
has also proven problematic for combatants operating in areas where recent key leaders have
been arrested. If suitable replacements for those captured leaders are not found quickly,
combatants in those areas will be impacted. International partner SOF operations against
insurgent commanders have also caused short-term disruption to insurgent activity, but their real
value may be the longer-term effect on replacement commanders’ commitment to the
insurgency. This is a difficult metric to obtain data on, but we assess that the combined effects
of the recent high-level arrests and the operations against the lower-level commanders will help
to set conditions for future reconciliation and reintegration.

The corruption is the primary problem. If they don't get their hands around that, they're screwed.
And this ain't gonna help:

However, without specific details of how the election process will be managed at the provincial
level, it will be difficult to complete a comprehensive assessment of the electoral process for the
upcoming parliamentary elections. ISAF will continue to use its influence to promote unity of
effort between the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA, and the donor community to
encourage quick identification of a limited set of practical, technical reforms to reduce fraud at
polling sites. Only if progress is made in this area can we expect to see a better electoral event in
the fall than we experienced last year.

On March 17, 2010, President Karzai signed a presidential decree issuing a number of significant
changes to the extant electoral law, which have the potential to complicate international
oversight and fraud monitoring. On March 31, 2010 the lower house of Parliament (the Wolesi
Jirga) rejected this decree and it now remains in limbo. The full impact of these laws on the
electoral process will be assessed in the near future. It is critical that the fall 2010 elections are
viewed both domestically and internationally as an improvement over the 2009 elections.
The IEC is preparing for a voting capacity for twelve million voters but does not expect more
than six million voters to turn out for the elections. Additionally, the IEC expects approximately
3,000 candidates, 6,800 polling centers, and 20,000 polling stations. ISAF is prepared to assist
with security as needed, building upon last year’s efforts where the ANSF successfully took the
lead in election security efforts.

A bit like Vietnam, we're backing the wrong horse. Of course, part of the reason is that there doesn't
seem to be a "right" horse to back.

[Robb]

8. Respectfully

..."We" backed the wrong horse, but this administration has repeatedly signaled its intent to back several possibilities of the "right" one or ones.

[zipplewrath]

11. Not sure what makes them the "right" ones.

I've lived through this before, so I come by my skepticism honestly. Just because they aren't Karzai, doesn't mean they are the "right" ones. It isn't even clear there ARE right ones. But we're betting the lives of many innocent Afghans, and may NATO troops, not to mention alot of money, that we can find some in the next couple of years. And I'm not sure where in the report I can find this issue being addressed.

[Flaneur]

6. Wow, we've only been there nine years and we already have 24% support.

In key districts.

[Robb]

7. Yet 91% agree that national security forces work for a better Afghanistan.

Compare that to six months ago.

[Tierra_y_Libertad]

9. And, other glorious victories toward the light at the end of the tunnel.

“What difference does it make to the dead, the orphans and the homeless, whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty or democracy.” - Gandhi

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/29-Apr-2010/US-troops-storm-Afghan-lawmakers-home-kill-kin

US troops storm Afghan lawmaker’s home, kill kin

US troops raided the residence of an Afghan lawmaker in the eastern province of Nangarhar, killing one of her relatives, officials said on Thursday. More than 100 US troops on Wednesday night surrounded the village where Safiya Sediqi lives and killed her brother’s brother—in—law, Sediqi, a lawmaker in the lower house of parliament, said by phone. The NATO—led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the United States belongs, said a joint ISAF and Afghan force killed “an armed individual” while pursuing a Taliban facilitator in the Shurk Rod district.

“When we heard some noise outside, Amanullah and my younger brother took the hunting shotgun and went out to inspect,” he said. “As soon as he stepped outside, he was shot and killed.” The troops photographed and fingerprinted all family members, including toddlers, and kept them blindfolded for four hours while searching the home, he said. Mr. Safiya Sediqi, who was not at home at the time of the raid, called the attack “a barbaric act” and “disrespect to the immunity of parliamentarians.” Dozens of people protested the killing on Thursday and called on NATO troops to leave Afghanistan, local resident Abdul Hamid said.

http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&langpair=fr|en&u=http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2010/04/afghanistan-quatre-civils-tu%25C3%25A9s-par-erreur-par-larm%25C3%25A9e-fran%25C3%25A7aise.html&prev=/language_tools&rurl=translate.google.com&twu=1&usg=ALkJrhi5dp_QSK6FjQbl-lharCfNg7pJYg

Afghanistan: French military accidentally kills four young boys (updated)

The insurgents are therefore subject to formal identification. For about an hour, no presence of civilians is spotted in the area. The insurgents have formed between the wall and some sort of discount. They are being shot "file" from top to bottom, with a missile Milan, It is a lightweight craft, tank originally, and now used in combat infantry especially to destroy the walls. "The leave application of fire was granted, given these conditions," said Admiral Prazuck. ". According to the staff, "the rules for opening fire have been met.

Unfortunately, five young Afghan boys aged 10-15 years, are sitting right nearby, between ten and twenty feet, crouched under a tree. The French military have not seen. They do not, moreover, that these boys are affected by shrapnel of the missile. However, they believe they killed or wounded insurgents.

Half an hour later, an Afghan civilian vehicle arrived at the French base Tagab, with five boys injured. One of them died almost immediately and the other four are in hospital transfer of Kabul. Three will die from their injuries. The fifth, more lightly wounded in the arm, was released from the hospital. Their families will receive, or have already received money and other material compensation, according to the practice established by NATO.

[Robb]

10. More than 150 civilians, fully one third of them children

...were killed http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=389x7920128">between 15 February and 15 March in Afghanistan by the Taliban.

You did not seem to care about a single one of their stories.

[Tierra_y_Libertad]

12. Of course I do. But, we're keeping the civil war going.

And, you seem to dismiss the casualties in the name of the "greater good." Which is exactly what the Taliban claim.

So which is it? Spreading "democracy"? Fighting the Taliban? Looking for Al-Queda? Making Afghanistan "stable"? What's the flavor of the day justification for killing people?

[Robb]

13. You honestly believe that?

You honestly believe that if NATO et al leaves, the "civil war" will end?

[Tierra_y_Libertad]

14. I thinks it's far more likely than if they stay.

In either case, it's none of our business. Particularly, since we've (or, Obama and his NATO puppets have) taken sides. We did that in Vietnam, in Iraq, and in countless other countries that we allegedly wanted to "democratize".