Hon. Ken Salazar
Office of the Secretary
Department of the Interior
1849 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240
Re: Reconsideration of Arctic Ocean Exploration Drilling Plans for 2010
Dear Secretary Salazar:
In October and December of last year, you approved Shell Oil Company’s plans to drill for oil in
the Beaufort and Chukchi seas this summer. We write to formally request that you reconsider
your approvals of Shell’s drilling plans in light of the ongoing Deepwater Horizon exploration
drilling oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The events surrounding the spill provide significant new
information that requires the Minerals Management Service (MMS) to supplement its analysis of
Shell’s drilling plans. The new information goes to the heart of the decision to approve Shell’s
plans, and accordingly you should suspend your approval of the drilling pending reconsideration
of the environmental analysis in light of the Deepwater Horizon spill. Because Shell’s drilling
could commence within sixty days, your urgent action is required.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) requires you to permit offshore oil and gas
activity only “subject to environmental safeguards,” 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3), and in full compliance
with National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a). To fulfill this mandate,
you have the authority to suspend operations when necessary to carry out the requirements of
NEPA or to conduct an environmental analysis. 30 C.F.R. § 250.172(d); see also id. at §
250.172(b) (providing for suspension of operations when “activities pose a threat of serious,
irreparable, or immediate harm or damage . . . . includ a threat to life (including fish and
other aquatic life) . . . or the marine, coastal, or human environment”).
NEPA compels supplementation of environmental impact analyses when “there are significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed
action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii); Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Alexander, 222
F.3d 562, 566 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“NEPA imposes on federal agencies a continuing duty to
supplement existing EAs and EISs in response to ‘significant new circumstances or information
relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.’”) (quoting
40 C.F.R. § 1509(c)(1)(ii)).
Despite the different operating environments, the Deepwater Horizon spill is directly relevant to
the analyses underlying your decision to approve Shell’s Arctic Ocean exploration drilling plans.
MMS did not analyze or disclose the effects of a large oil spill from Shell’s activities before
approving the plans, even though it acknowledges that such a spill could have devastating
consequences and could be difficult to clean up in the Arctic Ocean’s icy waters. The agency
concluded that a large spill was “too remote and speculative an occurrence” to warrant analysis,1
in part because, “since 1971, no large crude or condensate spills have occurred from well-control
incidents while drilling approximately 14,000 OCS exploration wells.”2 MMS also concluded
that “a large spill likely would not be from a well-control incident.”
snip
....should re-evaluate the Department’s decision to approve Shell’s drilling plans without examining
the potential impacts of a large oil spill from Shell’s exploration drilling in the Arctic Ocean.
In addition, MMS approved Shell’s exploration plan despite the fact that, as MMS staff
recognized, Shell did “not adequately describe plans to respond to loss or disablement of
drilling unit,” the Frontier Discoverer.8 This is a critical omission, because Shell’s plans for
responding to an oil spill rely on being able to use the Discoverer to drill a relief well. Shell
does not explain how it will stop an oil spill if the Discoverer is disabled. The catastrophic loss
of the Deepwater Horizon and the resulting spill highlight the central importance of requiring
Shell to have a plan to respond to loss or disablement of its drillship. On that basis, you should
re-evaluate the decisions to approve the drilling plans.
The Deepwater Horizon spill also raises serious questions about the adequacy of Shell’s oil spill
contingency and response plans. Shell’s drill sites are remote, with much less onshore
infrastructure or available emergency response equipment and personnel than in the Gulf of
Mexico. An oil spill from Shell’s drilling could occur when sea-ice is in the area, significantly
complicating clean-up efforts.9 Shell’s worst-case oil spill scenario contemplates a daily spill
rate roughly equivalent to the reported Deepwater Horizon spill rate,10 but the capacity to
respond to such a spill in the Arctic Ocean is likely much smaller than in the Gulf of Mexico.
For example, Shell’s Chukchi Sea oil spill response plan discloses only six major offshore spill
response vessels (only three with identified storage capability),11 the most critical of which could
......
snip
.....the Deepwater Horizon spill, testified before a Senate committee last August, the Coast Guard has
“limited response resources and capabilities” in the event of a major oil spill in the Arctic
Ocean.14 In comparison, BP reported that it had mobilized response vessels, including 32 spill
response vessels with a skimming capacity of more than 171,000 barrels per day and an offshore
storage capacity of 122,000 barrels within forty-eight hours of the Deepwater Horizon blowout.15
As of the morning of April 30, Unified Command reported that “75 response vessels are being
used including skimmers, tugs, barges and recovery vessels”16 and President Obama explained a
total of “300 response vessels and aircraft” were on-site fighting the spill.17 Despite the quick
mobilization of these significant response resources, the Deepwater Horizon spill remains
uncontained.18
The new, and evolving, information from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is significant, and it
calls into question issues that are central to your decision to approve Shell’s proposed
exploration drilling. It requires reconsideration of that decision, and given the importance of the
areas at risk and the issues you must reconsider, you should suspend your approvals of Shell’s
drilling during the pendency of that reconsideration. Such a suspension would not only fulfill
NEPA and OCSLA’s purposes, it would further your commitment to let science guide your
decision-making in the Arctic Ocean. A suspension would also be consistent with your recent
decision to commission a United States Geological Survey study to, among other things,
“determine what research is needed for an effective and reliable oil spill response in ice-covered
regions.”19
In addition, suspending your approval of Shell’s drilling plans would also permit you to ensure
that a reassessment of the plans that addresses the significant gaps in the Alaska MMS’s NEPA
13 Id. at 1-19.
14 Allen Senate Testimony at 18; see also id. at 12-15.
15 British Petroleum, BP Initiates Response to Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (April 22, 2010),
http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/2931/528479 /.
16 Deepwater Horizon Response (April 30, 2010),
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/doc/2931/534... /.
17 Statement by the President on the Economy and the Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (April 30,
2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-pr... -
mexico.
18 Additionally, critical oil spill response supplies staged in Alaska upon which Shell’s spill
response plans rely, such as chemical dispersants and in situ burn booms are reported to have
been deployed to the Gulf of Mexico to aid in the ongoing response efforts there.
19 U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies Initiative that will Inform Oil
and Gas Decisions for Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (April 13, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_releas... .
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processes recently detailed by the Government Accountability Office.20 According to the report,
“the Alaska OCS Region shares information—including information related to NEPA analyses—
on a need-to-know basis.”21 “nterviews with staff analysts in the
Environmental Assessment Section . . . indicated that they believed that these informationsharing
practices hindered their ability to complete sound environmental analyses under
NEPA.”22 In fact, “some of own scientists have alleged that their
findings have been suppressed.”23 NEPA analyses of oil spills and the impact to the Arctic
environment based on this “need-to-know” approach constitutes an unacceptable risk to the
people and resources of the Arctic. Furthermore, a suspension would allow you to more fully
consult with federally recognized Alaska Native tribal governments on decisions involving
Shell’s drilling plans in fulfillment of the Obama administration’s policy of ensuring meaningful
and regular collaboration on issues that affect tribal governments.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned groups respectfully request that you prepare a
supplemental environmental analysis of Shell’s drilling plans, suspend your approvals of Shell’s
drilling pending that analysis, and reconsider the approval decisions in light of new information
from the Deepwater Horizon spill.
Sincerely,
ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
EARTHJUSTICE
GREENPEACE USA
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
NATIVE VILLAGE OF POINT HOPE
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
NORTHERN ALASKA ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER
OCEANA
PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT
RESISTING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION ON INDIGENOUS LANDS (REDOIL)
SIERRA CLUB
THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
20 Government Accountability Office, Offshore Oil and Gas Development, Additional Guidance
would Help Strengthen the Minerals Management Service’s Assessment of Environmental
Impacts in the North Aleutian Basin, GAO-10-276 (March 2010) (GAO report).
21 GAO report at 25.
22 GAO report at 26.
23 GAO report at 27.
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cc:
Lisa Jackson, Environmental Protection Agency
Jane Lubchenco, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Liz Birnbaum, Minerals Management Service
Nancy Sutley, Council on Environmental Quality
Eric Schwaab, National Marine Fisheries Service
David Shilton, Department of Justice