Afghan war costs now surpass Iraq’s: $6.7 billion for February alone

[unhappycamper]

Afghan war costs now surpass Iraq’s: $6.7 billion for February alone
By John Byrne
Thursday, May 13th, 2010 -- 8:58 am

The amount of money the United States is spending on its war in Afghanistan has surpassed the cost of its war in Iraq for the first time.

US taxpayers shelled out $6.7 billion for the Afghan war in February, the most recent month for which statistics are available, as opposed to $5.5 billion for the war in Iraq. The total cost for the two wars is now approaching $1 trillion.

Maintaining the US presence in Afghanistan has grown in price since the US began redeploying some troops from Iraq. Keeping US forces in Afghanistan is also more expensive because the country is landlocked and it is harder to transport supplies.

~snip~

The amount spent for each US soldier now costs American taxpayers roughly $1,000,000 a year, according to a report published in October 2009. The cost is so high in part because fuel and other supplies must be transported in some cases by helicopter in special bladders. In some areas it is difficult to supply troops without airlifts.

In 2006, Congressional researchers estimated that the accumulated costs for each soldier in Afghanistan would be about $390,000. The sharp rise in costs reflects the increase in mine-resistant troop carriers and surveillance equipment, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The unique difficulties of transporting soldiers around the mountainous, isolated terrain in Afghanistan also burdens U.S. taxpayers, military analysts say.

[DavidDvorkin]

1. We could have had single-payer health care ...

In financial terms, anyway.

[Robb]

2. Iraq cost $12 billion per month, on average, in 2008.

This is less, which is good.

[Flaneur]

7. It's still billions of dollars A MONTH down a rat hole.

We could use that money for something productive...

[ladjf]

3. Bring the troops home now. nt

[whattheidonot]

4. years and years

year and years of screwy policy coming home to roost. that is the Middle east and Afghanistan.We are in head high with no end in sight. when it affects enough people we we will change.The changes needed are so many it is mind-bogging and not the sort of things we as Americans are accustomed too. Alot of sacrifice and life style changes like maybe riding a bus. Of course there have been few politicians pushing an anti-war program and what that might mean. just about all changes would drive the cost of oil down?

[amborin]

5. knr

[Tierra_y_Libertad]

6. But..but..we have to protect Malibu from the mighty Taliban Navy! K&R

[amborin]

8. bound to fail:

"As you can see, McChrystal plan opens his biggest military campaign to date by invading a region that has seen many invasions and much fighting during the last two thousand years, including operations by Alexander the Great (also shown on the chart), both of the 19th Century Anglo-Afghan Wars, and the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s."



"................Historically minded tribal cultures, like the Pashtun, have had plenty of time to learn and remember the strengths and weaknesses of this terrain by resisting these invaders using the timeless arts of guerrilla war. Note, for example, the stunning similarity of Alexander the Great’s invasion route in the figure to that of the Soviet’s shown here.

McChrystal’s first move in implementing his pacification strategy was to invade Marjah (which is in the western part of the shaded area) in mid February. The aim of this operation was a variation of Marshall Lyautey’s ink spot theory: namely to clear the Taliban out of Marjah, secure the area, and prevent the return of the Taliban. Success in this operation would set the stage spreading the area of pacification by clearing the Taliban out of the more populated city of Qandahar. And so, moving from west to east along Alexander’s (and the Soviet’s) route, the ink spot would spread to Qandahar in the eastern part of the arc.

Without being critical, I note that neither Porter nor his sources mention the role of Afghan army and police forces in the unravelling of McChrystal’s plan. Porter is certainly aware of these limitations, having written several important reports on this subject. Nevertheless, the implication of the Taliban re-infiltration of the Marjah region is clear: the Afghan security forces in the region are either insufficient or ineffective (or both) to perform their job of protecting the people by permanently cleansing the area of Taliban.

The inability to spread the “ink spot” McChrystal tried to insert with the Marjah offensive has its roots in the central flaw highlighted last September in my critique of McChrystal’s escalation plan, which was submitted to President Obama last summer. This inability also means that US forces will be needed to provide security to the Marjah region, if McChrystal sticks to his strategic aim. This requirement, which would have been easily foreseen, had McChrystal presented Mr. Obama with a straightforward assessment of the very limited capabilities of the Afghan security forces, will now result in our forces being spread out to protect this region, assuming we want to protect the Marjah “ink spot.” The deployment of US pacification troops will probably take the form of an array of strong points and outposts, backed up with quick reaction reinforcements, kept on alert in nearby bases, together with airpower. ..........."

snip

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