Increasingly I found myself spending time with people of means – law firm partners and investment bankers, hedge fund managers, and venture capitalists… They reflected, almost uniformly, the perspectives of their class: the top 1 percent or so of the income scale that can afford to write a $2,000 check to a political candidate… They had no patience with protectionism, found unions troublesome, and were not particularly sympathetic to those whose lives were upended by the movement of global capital…
I know that as a consequence of my fundraising I became more like the wealthy donors that I met, in the sense that I spent more and more of my time above the fray, outside the world of immediate hunger, disappointment, fear, irrationality and frequent hardship of the other 99% of the population – that is the people that I entered public life to serve. And in one fashion or another, I suspect this is true for every Senator: The longer you are a Senator, the narrower the scope of your interactions. You may fight it… But your schedule dictates that you move in a different orbit from the people you represent.
And perhaps as the next race approaches, a voice within tells you that you don’t want to have to go through all the misery of raising all the money in small increments all over again… The path of least resistance – of fundraisers organized by the special interests, the corporate PACs and the top lobby shops – starts to look awfully tempting, and if the opinions of these insiders don’t quite jibe with those you once held, you learn to rationalize the changes as a matter of realism, of compromise… The problems of ordinary people… become a distant echo rather than a palpable reality, abstractions to be managed rather than battles to be fought – A former U.S. Senator, explaining, perhaps inadvertently, how politicians become corrupted, from his autobiography, “
The Audacity of Hope”
Let me concisely paraphrase the above excerpts: 1) A candidate for high political office finds himself spending lots of time with the wealthiest 1% of Americans; 2) He becomes more like them and less like the other 99% of Americans; 3) He becomes dependent upon their money; 4) His opinions change, and he rationalizes those changes as a matter of “realism”.
When I first read Barack Obama’s “Audacity of Hope” in 2007, I was not impressed with it. I had some serious concerns about him, as I expressed in
this post. Much later, as his presidency began to unfold and my concerns about him were confirmed, I expressed my disappointment in another post, titled “
There were lots of Clues”. To summarize that post in one sentence: The rightward leanings suggested in Obama’s autobiography, and other words spoken by him during his campaign for president carried over and even expanded during the course of his presidency.
But of all the things that disturbed me about him, the excerpts that began this post were not one of them. To me, those excerpts read like a confession of sorts. I respect people for admitting to their mistakes or vulnerabilities. Admitting to one’s mistakes is the first step to correcting them or avoiding repeating them. So when I read a public confession I generally interpret it as a sign that the confessor takes the issue seriously and is working on making the necessary corrections.
Well, in this case it didn’t exactly turn out like that. Far from it.
Yet ironically, President Obama has been repeatedly and viciously excoriated by Republicans and other right wingers of all sorts for being a Socialist, a Communist, or “the most liberal president we’ve ever had”. What a joke! In many ways, Barack Obama is the most conservative Democratic president our country seen since the 19th Century.
Not coincidentally, second place probably goes to his most recent Democratic predecessor, Bill Clinton – who was also viciously excoriated by radical right wingers for being “too liberal”. It’s a sign of the times. The corporatocracy, through a judicious combination of intimidation and bribes, has succeeded in insinuating their ideas into large portions of the Democratic Party. As conservative as President Obama has been on economic matters, had he tilted just a little less rightward he probably would have been lambasted for that by the corporatocracy and their lapdog media.
I’m not making excuses for him by saying that. As president of the United States I believe that he should be much more concerned about the lower 99% of Americans than the wealthiest 1%, regardless of the risk. President of the United States is just too important of a job to do otherwise.
High HopesBarack Obama’s election to the presidency brought with it high hopes for millions of progressives/liberals. Even after he won the Democratic presidential nomination most progressives/liberals – even those like me who harbored serious doubts about him – put aside our doubts to work and hope for victory. I wrote several posts comparing him favorably with John McCain in every area of importance, including the economy, about which
I wrote:
Obama has an extensive economic plan, which includes:
fighting for “fair trade” instead of “free trade”, as manifested by NAFTA;
job creation; restoring workers’
rights to unionize; the creation of a
universal 10% mortgage credit to give relief to homeowners; a crackdown on mortgage company abuses; and a
crackdown on predatory lending policies.
William Kuttner, who wrote “
A Presidency in Peril – The Inside Story of Obama’s Promise, Wall Street’s Power, and the Struggle to Control our Economic Future”, also had high hopes. He wrote in the introduction to his book:
For progressives like me, Obama represented a chance to reclaim a tradition of enriched democracy, affirmative government, and social justice…
Earlier in 2008… candidate Obama was
sounding like a radical reformer… In his review of why the system had failed, Obama pointed squarely to the political power of the financial industry: “This was not the invisible hand at work. Instead, it was the hand of industry lobbyists tilting the playing field in Washington.”
It was, sadly, an all-too-prophetic description of his own administration.
Obama’s choice of economic advisorsJust as Obama’s
appointment of the Social Security hater Alan Simpson to the cat food commission set the stage for attempted deep cuts in Social Security, his appointment of deeply conservative economic advisors set the stage for the economic fate of our country during his administration. Kuttner writes:
In many respects, the path Obama chose was determined by the people he appointed… By the time he clinched the Democratic nomination, his advisors had become a much narrower group, as the aides oriented towards Wall Street had efficiently elbowed out the progressives on Obama’s team.
Robert RubinRobert Rubin was Bill Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury. Kuttner explains that although the economy during the Clinton presidency appeared to do well, “It later turned out that much of this growth was illusory, built on financial bubbles”. He explains how, as co-chairman at Goldman-Sachs in the early 1990s, Rubin skated on the edge of insider trading:
Goldman invested massively in legal talent to make sure it could both exploit its privileged position and stay within the law. As he moved up at Goldman, this balancing act was Rubin’s trademark. His other signature move was investing in politicians…
With respect to Rubin’s ideology and “accomplishments” prior to linking up with Obama:
The ideology that Rubin is selling is one part deregulation, one part globalization, and one part budget balance, with verbal solicitude but only modest social outlay for the less fortunate. He is passionate about capping the cost of Social Security and Medicare…
Glass-Steagall had separated largely unregulated and more speculative investment banks like Goldman Sachs from government-supervised and government-insured commercial banks… Glass Steagall was designed to prevent the kinds of speculative conflicts of interest that pervaded Wall Street in the 1920s and helped bring about the Great Depression (and that reappeared in the 1990s and helped cause the crash of 2007). The Clinton administration’s prime architect of the
Glass-Steagall repeal was Robert Rubin. On Capital Hill, the law repealing Glass-Steagall was nicknamed “the Citigroup Enabling Act.” Four months after leaving the White House, Rubin joined Citi as chairman of its executive committee.
On Rubin’s role in the Obama administration:
In the Obama era, Rubin has been a relentless behind the scenes advocate for a commission that would create a formula to put automatic caps on public spending, particularly of Social Security and Medicare…
Kuttner summarizes the absurdity of Obama’s reliance on Rubin and his philosophy:
Given the abject failure of the financial deregulation that Rubin championed as Clinton’s top economic adviser, followed by the collapse of the business model that he promoted as senior executive at Citigroup, it is remarkable that a consummate outsider like Barack Obama did not view Rubin (or his protégé Summers) as fatally damaged goods. On the contrary, Obama felt he needed men like Rubin and Summers for tutelage, access, and validation. That itself speaks volumes about where power reposes in America…
Larry SummersAs a member of Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors and as successor to Robert Rubin as Bill Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers was a big proponent of the kind of financial deregulation that led to our current crisis. He was
ousted as president of Harvard University in 2006 for pursuing reckless financial policies. Yet Obama appointed him as his top economic advisor. Kuttner comments on that:
Summers’s checkered past was more than sufficient to persuade (Obama’s) political team and the official vetters that he was not an acceptable risk for Senate confirmation (for Treasury Secretary). But evidently it did not give much pause to the premise that Obama should put Summers in charge of America’s economic policy.
Ben BernankeAnother indication of Obama’s pro-Wall Street bent was his reappointment of Ben Bernanke as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in January 2010.
Bernanke agreed to provide the Inspector General of the TARP program with certain information only on condition that it not be shared with Congress. Kuttner explains that Bernanke’s anti-regulatory philosophy is right in line with Milton Freidman, extreme enough to be considered to the right of Alan Greenspan:
No wonder the people around George W. Bush were fully confident of Bernanke’s conservatism. It’s worth pausing to savor his statement, which is breath-taking in both its extreme free-market conservatism… For Bernanke, the corrupt stock pools, the extreme speculation on margin, the creation of bogus securities, the watering of public utility stocks, and the other forms of manipulation that pushed the stock market to absurd heights by the late 1920s were of no consequence…
Thus, many Democratic Congresspersons would have liked to put a lot more distance between themselves and Bernanke. But Obama wanted him reconfirmed. Kuttner writes:
Democratic senators again found themselves on the wrong side of a backlash against Wall Street. Once more, they were being asked to walk the plank because of a dubious decision of their president. In the end, the White House used all its leverage on wavering Democrats, and Bernanke
won confirmation by a vote of 70-30… Thus the Wall Street colonization of the Obama administration.
Rahm EmanuelKuttner notes that “If the Obama administration needed one more key official to discourage economic change we can believe in, it was the president-elect’s choice for chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel”. In Emanuel’s three terms in the U.S. House he was the largest recipient of funds from the financial industry. This must have influenced Emanuel’s strategy as head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). Kuttner summarizes Emanuel’s work in that position:
As head of the DCCC, Emanuel displayed the strategic patterns that would continue into his tenure as White House chief of staff… Emanuel’s ideal candidate for Congress was a corporate Democrat who could raise lots of money from Wall Street… Rahm recruited a lot of candidates who were more center-right than they needed to be. In several districts, a more progressive candidate defeated the Emanuel approved candidate in the 2006 Democratic primary and went on to win the general election in November.
The Wall Street bailoutThe Obama administration’s Wall Street bailout was largely a continuation of the Bush administration’s plan. Eminent economists who were NOT associated with Wall Street had a lot of scathing remarks for the Obama administration’s proposed Wall Street bailout plan when it was first proposed. Their underlying messages were very similar: Basically, this was a reverse Robin Hood scheme planned behind closed doors:
Paul Krugman The Geithner scheme would offer a one-way bet: if asset values go up, the investors profit, but if they go down, the investors can walk away from their debt… This isn't really about letting markets work. It's just an indirect, disguised way to subsidize purchases of bad assets.
Joseph Stiglitz The U.S. government plan to rid banks of toxic assets will rob American taxpayers by exposing them to too much risk and is unlikely to work as long as the economy remains weak…. The U.S. government is basically using the taxpayer to guarantee against downside risk on the value of these assets, while giving the upside, or potential profits, to private investors… Quite frankly, this amounts to robbery of the American people. I don't think it's going to work…
James Galbraith The plan is yet another massive, ineffective gift to banks and Wall Street. Taxpayers, of course, will take the hit… The banks don't want to take their share of those losses because doing so will wipe them out. So they, and Geithner, are doing everything they can to pawn the losses off on the taxpayer…. In Geithner's plan, this debt won't disappear. It will just be passed from banks to taxpayers, where it will sit until the government finally admits that a major portion of it will never be paid back.
Robert Reich If the trillions of dollars the Fed has already committed and the trillions more it's about to commit can't be recouped, the federal debt explodes and you and I and other taxpayers are left holding the bag…. The Fed is subject to almost no political oversight… They hide much of the true costs and risks to taxpayers of repairing the banking system. Those risks and costs should be put on the people who made risky bets on the banks in the first place – namely bank shareholders and creditors. Shareholders of the most troubled banks should be wiped out entirely… And top executives who were responsible should be canned. But Geithner and Bernanke don't want to take these steps… They think it's safer to put the costs and risks on taxpayers – especially in ways they can't see.
Dean Baker Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner's latest bank bailout plan is another Rube Goldberg contraption intended to funnel taxpayer dollars to bankrupt banks, without being overly transparent about the process. The main mechanism is a government guarantee that would allow investors to buy junk with a 12-to-1 leverage ratio, where they only risk the downside on their own investment, not the borrowed money.
Robert KuttnerKuttner summarized the whole mess in retrospect:
Bankers were pleased to take the taxpayer money and guarantees from the Federal Reserve but fiercely resisted changing their business models. Industry moguls opposed mandatory mortgage refinancing, which would force accurate valuation of the toxic securities on their books and compel them to acknowledge concealed losses. They resisted any government interference with the speculative trading strategies that had become their main profit centers during the boom years.
In stark contrast with Roosevelt, who made a clean break with the old political and financial regime, Obama and his economic aides chose instead to work in concert with the Wall Street elite. The government’s immense sums of emergency aid were not used as leverage to compel more fundamental reforms. Even when continuing abuses were disclosed – exorbitant bonuses, new speculative schemes, conflicts of interest, refusals to supply needed credit to small businesses and homeowners – Obama seldom criticized the banks except on occasions when he needed a quick dose of symbolic populism. His administration’s goal was to restore trust in capital markets, even if confidence in the existing order was far from justified. All of this would prolong recession and favor Wall Street over Main Street. It was dubious economics, and worse politics.
Not much help for homeownersGiven that the sub-prime mortgage crisis leading to millions of home foreclosures was at the heart of our economic crisis, one would hope that government interventions would be targeted towards helping homeowners rather than relying on a trickle down sort of solution in which primarily banks were targeted for relief. But it didn’t quite work out like that. Kuttner writes:
The Bush administration made the fateful decision to give primary relief to banks, not to homeowners. Obama continued the basic policy… The collapse in housing prices had wiped out at least $7 trillion of net worth of American families…
Obama’s solution was a program called “
Making Home Affordable”. Kuttner explains that this program had several fatal flaws. Perhaps the most fundamental flaw was that it was
voluntary for the banks. Instead of mandating actions on the part of banks, they were given various “incentives”. But the incentives weren’t enough to make it worth the bank’s while to provide much help to homeowners. In fact, in many cases they had an incentive to foreclose rather than help the homeowner stay in the home. Consequently, the banks offered very little help for most homeowners.
There was one provision of Obama’s bill that had some teeth. That was the proposed authority of bankruptcy judges to
compel banks to modify loans to prevent foreclosures. This provision was fiercely resisted by the financial industry, and therefore given very little support by the Obama administration. Kuttner explains:
In this key battle, the White House did not lift a finger to urge wavering legislators to support their president… Word was quickly passed on Capitol Hill that this was not a provision that mattered to the White House.
The only provision of the bill that was opposed by the financial industry therefore died in the Senate.
AlternativesI’ll start this section with a personal note: As the Obama administration was attempting to come up with a plan to address the home foreclosure crisis, and it looked as if their primary intervention would be a bailout of banks, my daughter posed an idea to me: Why not give or loan the money directly from the government to the homeowners? Why go through the banks? How do we know that they will put the money to any useful purpose? I responded something like, “Well, that makes sense to me, and I’d like to see it happen. But I don’t hear anyone talking about it. I don’t know why not. Maybe it’s because the corporatocracy feels that if you give money to banks, that’s capitalism, and therefore good, but if you give money people who are in the bottom 99% on the wealth scale, that’s socialism, and therefore bad.”
Well, it turns out that Kuttner (as well as former U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt) was thinking along very similar lines:
There is a straightforward alternative to the administration’s approach to foreclosure prevention, but it would require much more direct government involvement. And it would take a nervy battle rather than a friendly collusion with Wall Street. In the case of unaffordable mortgage loans still held by banks, a “public option” of direct government financing could reduce borrower costs without relying on largely futile incentive payments to bankers…
The comparison with the New Deal is instructive – and depressing, when one contrasts the boldness of Roosevelt with the timidity of Obama. Faced with an epidemic of mortgage foreclosures, the New Deal created four new institutions…
Maybe that’s why FDR’s first and third presidential terms demonstrated the two
largest average annual increases in job growth of all presidential terms from 1921 (when records are first available) to the present.
Kuttner comments on the difference in government solicitude for banks, compared with the rest of us – the bottom 99%:
The contrast was all too vivid – several trillions in loans and loan guarantees for the banks, and a grudging $3 billion for the homeowners who had been the banks’ victims. As a consequence of the administration’s half measures and failure to move boldly, the mortgage foreclosure crisis is continuing to drive millions of Americans from their homes, depress housing prices… and retard the recovery… Refinancing underwater retail mortgages is comparatively easy. It just requires political will.
In a nutshellThe book jacket to Kuttner’s book summarizes the tragedy of our current situation and the hope for our future:
Progressives hoped that America’s new leader would enact bold policies for real financial reforms – putting Main Street ahead of Wall Street and restoring broad prosperity. But that, writes Robert Kuttner, is not the way things turned out… because Obama… continued Bush-era regulatory policies, filled his administration with high financiers more interested in business as usual… Obama’s desire for consensus at all costs undermined the leadership that the moment demanded, deferred recovery, and energized the right…
But this story is not over. Kuttner shows how Obama and a resurgent progressive movement may yet redeem this president’s promise and enact the sweeping reforms that America needs.
True, the story isn’t yet over. But if Barack Obama’s promise is to be redeemed, as hoped for in the last paragraph of Kuttner’s book jacket, then Barack Obama will first have to arrive at the point where it is no longer true, as he acknowledges in his own autobiography, that “The problems of ordinary people… become a distant echo rather than a palpable reality”.