To have a straw man there would need to be distortion, and there is none. This isn't the first post I've read that tried to spread those ideas, and they motivated me to read as much as I can about this, trying to figure out who was giving out the straight poop and who wasn't and why. Were there a few people who gamed the system? Sure. But even $1.3 trillion in sub prime doesn't explain the leveraged $130 trillion that eventually blew up. It is foolish and cruel to blame the victims, the vast majority of people that have and are losing their homes. It's a falsehood, yet it seems to be a common theme among the tea bagger, libertarian, "I got mine" crowd. Don't know what your motivation is, but there are places where beating up on defenseless people might be better received.
Here's some facts from Nomi Prins book "It Takes a Pillage". Some people write about this, she lived it as a managing director at Goldman Sachs and running the international analytics group at Bear Stearns in London.
It just smokes the argument that subprime played anything more than a minimal role. 13 Bankers, Bailout Nation, Econned, Broke, USA, others - lots of books explain various facets of this in detail.
By the way, prices aren't reality yet. Give it a few more years, there is more damage coming. And it will be a lot harder to blame defenseless people.
This Was Never about the Little Guy
The Second Great Bank Depression has spawned so many lies, it's hard to keep track of which is the biggest. Possibly the most irksome class of lies, usually spouted by Wall Street hacks and conservative pundits, is that we're all victims to a bunch of poor people who bought McMansions, or at least homes they had no business living in...But so you know, it wasn't the tiny loan's fault...Here are some numbers for you. There were approximately $1.4 trillion worth of subprime loans outstanding in the United States by the end of 2007.(4) By May 2009, there were foreclosure filings against approximately 5.1 million properties.(5) If it was only the subprime market's fault, $1.4 trillion would have covered the entire problem...Yet the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the FDIC forked out more than $13 trillion to fix the "housing correction," as Hank Paulson steadfastly referred to the Second Great Bank Depression as late as November 20, 2008, while he was treasury secretary.(6) With that money, the government could have bought up every residential mortgage in the country-there were about $11.9 trillion worth at the end of December 2008-and still have had a trillion left over to buy homes for every single American who couldn't afford them, and pay their health care to boot.(7)
But there was much more to it than that: Wall Street was engaged in a very dangerous practice called leverage... a ratio that ranged from eleven to one to fifteen-to-one for the major commercial banks. Actually, it's unclear what kind of leverage the commercial banks really had, because so many of their products were off-book, or not evaluated according to what the market would pay for them.(8) ... Leverage included, we're looking at a possible $140 trillion problem. That's right-$140 trillion! Imagine if the financial firms all over the globe actually exposed their piece of that leverage. But for $1.4 trillion in subprime loans to become $140 trillion in potential losses, you need two steps in between. The most significant is a healthy dose of leverage, but leverage would not have had a platform without...securitization. Financial firms run economic models that select and package loans into new securities according to criteria such as geographic diversity, the size of the loans, and the length of the mortgages. A bunch of loans are then repackaged into an asset-backed security (ABS). This new security is backed, or collateralized, by a small number of original home loans related to the size of the security. Some securities, for example, might be 10 percent real loans and 90 percent bonds backed by those loans. Some might be 5 percent real loans. Whatever the proportion, the money the mortgage holders pay to lenders on their loans is used to make payments on new assets or securities. Those securities, in turn, payout to their investors.
...the securities themselves were a much bigger problem than the loans. Between 2002 and 2007, banks in the United States created nearly 80 percent of the approximately $14 trillion worth of total global ABSs, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and other alphabetic concoctions or "structured" assets. Structured assets were created at triple what the rate had been from 1998 to 2002. Bankers from the rest of the world created, or "issued," the other 20 percent, around $3 trillion worth...issuers raked in a combined $300 billion in fees...Investment banks, hedge funds, and other financial firms could use the $14 trillion of new securities as collateral against which to borrow money and incur more debt (leverage them). There is no way of knowing exactly how much was leveraged, because the players operated in an opaque system-that is, a system without proper regulatory oversight or enforcement to detect or curtail leverage. But a conservative estimate of the average amount of leverage is about ten to one, considering the roughly eleven-to-one leverage of the major commercial banks and the thirty-to-one leverage of investment banks. So, we're talking about a system that ultimately took on $140 trillion in debt on the back of $1.4 trillion of subprime loans. How insane is that...In 2005, the mortgage on some little home in Stockton provided the capital for two or three ill-advised loans that soon disappeared into an ABS. But it was the global banks, the insurance companies, and the pension funds-particularly in Europe-that purchased the related ABSs. Like their U.S. counterparts, European financiers bought boatloads of ABSs with borrowed money. (13) They also shoved them off-book into structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that required no capital charge and little reporting.
By the fall of 2008 those ABSs, CDOs, and all their permutations would be known as "toxic assets." They were considered by many to be the major cause of Big Finance's failures and losses. The push for TARP centered on ridding banks of these poisonous creatures. But make no mistake:toxic assets are not the same as defaulted subprime mortgage loans; loans are merely one of the ingredients that make up the assets. All the subprime loans in existence could have defaulted and the homes attached to them could have been devalued to zero (which didn't happen), but without the feat of securitization, the banks couldn't have become nearly insolvent. Toxic assets became devoid of value, not because all the subprime loans stuffed inside them tanked, but because there was no longer demand from investors...
References:
1. Justin Fox, "18 Tough Questions (and Answers) about the Bailout," Time, September30, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1845816,00.html2. E. D. Hirsch Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Trefil, The New Dictionary of Cultura Literacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), p. 51.
3. Tracy McVeigh, "The party's Over for Iceland, the Island That Tried to Buy the World," The Observer, October 5, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/05/iceland.creditcrunch; Lee Christie, "Las Vegas Tops Foreclosure List," CNN Money, February 5, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/05/real_estate/zip_code_ foreclosures/index.htm.
4. Subprime borrowers: "A classification of borrowers with a tarnished or limited credit history ... subprime loans carry more credit risk, and as such, will carry higher interest rates as well," Investopedia, "Subprime," Forbes Digital,
http://www.investopedia com/terms/s/subprime.asp; Eric Petroff, "How Will the Subprime Mess Impact You?" Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/07/subprime-impact.asp. 5. Data from Realtytrac,
http://www.realtytrac.com "Foreclosure Activity Decreases 6 Percent in May," press release, June 11,2009.
6. Nomi Prins and Krisztina Ugrin, "Bailout Tally," June 2009,
http://www.nomiprins.. comlbailout.html; United States Department of the Treasury, "Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library," press release. November 20, 2008,
https://treas.gov/press/releases/hp1285.htm. 7. Data from the United States Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/mortoutstand20090331.htm. 8. Andrew Ross Sorkin, ed., comment on "As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends," Dealbook, comment posted September 21, 2008,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman- morgan-to-become-bank-holding-companies.
9. 2002-2007 data from Thomson Reuters Financial,
http://www.thomsonreuters.com/business _ units/financial.
10. Sarah Butcher, "Sector View: Securitization Is Backed by Demand," Risk, October 12, 2004,
http://news.risk.efinancialcareers.com/ITEM_FR/newsItemId-3542. 11. Gregory Cresci, "Merrill, Citigroup Record CDO Fees Earned in Top Growth Market," Bloomberg, August 30, 2005,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.FcDwf1.ZG4&refer=us. 12. Jody Shenn, "CDO Market Is Almost Frozen, JPMorgan, Merrill Say," Bloomberg. com, February 5,2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=aCk0Qr1f2Eew&pid=newsarchive13. "EU Wants Banks to Come Clean on Toxic Assets," EU Business, February 26,2009,
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1235566921.44.