Special Operations in Iraq: High Profile, but in Shadow

[ProSense]

Special Operations in Iraq: High Profile, but in Shadow

By THOM SHANKER
Published: May 29, 2007

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Some of the missions are so sensitive that they require the approval of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. Officials in Washington and Iraq said he had been briefed in advance on missions that carry a high risk of civilian casualties or of provoking reprisals.

The raids can also provoke political tensions. The Special Operations teams enter Baghdad’s Shiite neighborhood of Sadr City on an almost nightly basis, said military officers in the capital. Mr. Maliki is an Iraqi Shiite, and his coalition depends on the support of Shiite political blocs.

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“This is also an issue of sovereignty,” the officer added.

In Washington, senior policy makers said they continue to examine whether Mr. Maliki has tried to prevent missions against Shiite militias.

“We understand Maliki is a politician, of course, but when we have really pressed him to do things, he has done them,” said one senior administration official. “We asked him to allow military operations throughout all of Baghdad, including Sadr City, and he has not shielded those Shiite neighborhoods.”

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Back in Washington, policy makers continue to debate the focus of the special missions, and how best to allocate the limited number of elite units against the threat — whether Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, whose spectacular attacks foment unrest; or Sunni insurgents blamed for the improvised explosives that kill the most coalition forces and Iraqi civilians and foment sectarian violence; or Shiite militias and death squads, some of which receive aid from Iran and whose actions likewise have pushed the country toward civil war.

In his recent speeches, at least, Mr. Bush has said Al Qaeda remains “public enemy No. 1.”

But academic experts who analyze the Special Operations missions in Iraq say the battle against any of those threats — Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Sunni insurgents or Shiite militias — requires far better intelligence on the inner workings of those adversaries than the American military is able to gather today.

“My own view is that they still have to solve the intelligence problem,” said Richard Shultz, who specializes in issues of special operations and terrorism at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. “And the way that they are going to do that is not through ‘the surge,’ but by building up local, indigenous intelligence units. That is really the key, and not enough has been done to reach this level of intelligence dominance.”

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U.S. Special Ops' movement at the mercy of the al-Maliki government. Wonder if this has anything to do with the rise in ambushes?

[ProSense]

1. Kick! n/t