Wikileaks 2009: U.S. embassy does not foresee demonstrations or massive migrations if Fidel passes

[flamingdem]

Wikileaks 2009: U.S. embassy does not foresee demonstrations or massive migrations if Fidel passes

ID: 187408

Date: 2009-01-15 17:22:00

Origin: 09HAVANA35

Source: US Interests Section Havana

Classification: SECRET

Dunno: 08HAVANA969

Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000

OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0035/01 0151722

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 151722Z JAN 09

FM USINT HAVANA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4042

INFO RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY

RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY

RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0015

S E C R E T HAVANA 000035

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PINR, SMIG, PREL, CU

SUBJECT: THE SPECULATION ON FIDEL'S HEALTH

REF: 08 HAVANA 969

Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) SUMMARY: Fidel Castro's extended absence from public

view, especially during the celebration of the 50th

anniversary of the revolution, combined with the long time

since he has written one of his occasional "Reflections"

pieces is prompting speculation in the international press

that his health has taken a turn for the worse. Comments by

Venezuelan President Chavez that Fidel will never be seen

again have caused some to speculate that he may already be

dead. There is, of course, no mention of this in local Cuban

press and the rumor mill on the street is subdued, if not

silent, on the issue. Whatever the situation, from our

vantage point the likelihood of a substantial short term

effect on migration or security in Cuba is small, even if the

Comandante's death is announced.

WHAT WE KNOW NOW

2. (C) Fidel has not written a "Reflection" piece since

December 15. Especially given the significance of the 50th

anniversary of the revolution on January 1, this is unusual.

The celebrations themselves were surprisingly subdued,

confined to a short ceremony featuring President Raul Castro

in Santiago (reftel). It also appears true that Fidel was

not seen by the latest in a continuing stream of

international visitors: Presidents Torrijos of Panama and

Correa of Ecuador. It is particularly noteworthy that Correa

did not see him, as he is considered an up and comer within

the South American left. Fidel was last photographed with

Chinese President Hu Jintao in November. In the picture he

appeared alert, but thin and weak. Were it not for the 50th

anniversary celebration, Fidel's current absence would not

have generated as much speculation in the international

press. He has gone silent for extended periods on other

occasions since he stepped out of public view in July 2006.

But each time he reemerged after speculation about his

condition in the foreign press reached a certain crescendo.

3. (C) Perhaps because the Cuban public has grown accustomed

to false alarms over the past two years, while the level of

speculation in the international press has increased, the

local rumor mill is not producing much more than usual. We

remain in regular contact with members of the dissident

movement, and none has detected anything out of the ordinary

in the past few weeks. The ongoing crackdown against their

activities, which went into high gear following the

hurricanes last fall, continues unabated. We have noticed no

notable change in the local security posture in Havana, e.g.,

no additional police on the street or obvious military

movements.

AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN HE IS DEAD?

4. (S) At this point, we do not believe the announcement of

Fidel's death would alter the local security situation in any

significant way. GOC officials would most likely manage the

death announcement and subsequent funeral arrangements, etc.,

in great detail with a view towards putting the best face on

the situation, both domestically and to the world. Utmost

care will be given to ensuring that the Cuban public

understands that Raul and the rest of the GOC remain in firm

control. The event will be treated with appropriate

solemnity, but also designed to achieve maximum propaganda

value. It is probable that no announcement will be made

until the GOC feels confident that all preparations have been

made in accordance with the preceding.

5. (S) We do not believe the announcement of Fidel's death

will spark either violent demonstrations or a quick surge in

migration. The security arrangements noted in the previous

paragraph and the Cuban people's generally conservative

nature after 50 years of repression, combined with still

significant admiration for Fidel personally, argue against

short term disturbances. Far from generating a surge in

migration, the announcement of his death could cause a drop

in such activity as Cubans wait to see if Fidel's passing

brings any change to the island.

6. (S) USINT has reviewed its procedures for dealing with

the death of Fidel and is prepared to deal with potential

contingencies.

[Judi Lynn]

1. That's been a fantasy in the minds of the people Cuba threw out of office. n/t

[flamingdem]

3. This info is great to have because of those in the State Dept. who'll drag out

the old meme about the flotillas heading to Miami and the security problems for the US when Fidel goes. Wonder what La Loba thinks.

[Judi Lynn]

2. Recommendation.

:kick: :kick: :kick: :kick: