B. The Unitarian Accord: The Bright Line Between Independent Agencies and Other Executive AgenciesProfessor Kagan contends that the "common ground" for discussing the issue of centralized presidential control or policy-based <*pg 874> influence over discretionary conduct of nonindependent executive agencies is that the "current system of administration is not strongly unitary."119 But her analysis actually supports quite a different conclusion: in one form or another, we all seem to be unitarians now. Despite Kagan's disagreement with the notion that the unitarian position is constitutionally mandated,120 her own defense of centralized presidential authority over nonindependent executive agency decisionmaking is aggressively unitarian. Kagan's unitarianism regarding EOP authority over and policy-based influence on discretionary regulatory conduct of nonindependent agencies is significant because, from the inception of centralized presidential regulatory review in 1981 during the Reagan administration, such agencies have been the site of the dispute over unitarianism. The Reagan executive orders did not assert such EOP authority on or influence over the independent agencies.
The Clinton administration not only accepted, but also extended the unitarian premises of the Reagan and Bush administrations. For example, Professor Kagan acknowledges that the Clinton administration's executive order, in contrast with earlier versions, claimed, at least "implied
," the "authority ultimately to displace the judgment of agency officials," an authority that "even Reagan . . . had disclaimed."121 That is, the Clinton administration apparently asserted "presidential directive authority over discretionary decisions assigned by Congress to specified executive branch officials (other than the President)."122 And that authority was asserted aggressively without the additional authorizing legislation that the ABA and former Carter administration Counsel Lloyd Cutler had recommended.123 This is a strongly unitarian position in that it assumes authority in the EOP to command agency decisionmaking, essentially substituting presidential priorities for those of agencies and displacing the exercise of enforcement discretion nominally lodged with agency leadership.124
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Thus, Professor Kagan's vision (ostensibly expressing the Clinton administration's view) is quite unitarian. While rejecting the constitutional basis for this unitarian stance, Professor Kagan (and other nonconstitutional unitarians)125 reach their position on grounds of policy and through principles of statutory interpretation. To reach this unitarian end, Professor Kagan advocates a presumptive "interpretive principle" -- that, absent an express statutory provision that precludes presidential involvement in agency decisionmaking, a "standard delegation" to a nonindependent executive agency should be "read . . . as including the President."126 This means that the unitarian approach guides administration of executive agencies other than independent agencies, which were excluded from the Reagan and Bush executive orders and whose decisionmaking Professor Kagan recognizes to have been "insulate . . . from the President's influence."127
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?51+Duke+L.+J.+851
Bottom line: while Kagan has denied in writing that she believes in a unitary executive, a close analysis of her views supports the allegation that she is a unitarian.