"Barack Obama, Campaign Manager: How The 2008 Playbook Passed Health Care"

[Clio the Leo]

Barack Obama, Campaign Manager: How The 2008 Playbook Passed Health Care
Sam Stein, 05-13-10 09:09 AM

Shortly before 11 a.m. on a Sunday in mid-December, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was driving through Washington D.C. when he received a nervous phone call from one of his trusted deputies, Sen. Chuck Schumer.

Schumer wanted to know if Reid had seen Sen. Joseph Lieberman's comments on "Face the Nation" that morning. "Lieberman seemed to draw a line in the sand," the New York Democrat relayed. "You should check in with him. He seemed to rule out supporting the bill if it has the Medicare buy-in."

Reid immediately called a staffer to get a transcript and find out if Schumer had it right. He did.

"Alright, I'm headed to the Capitol," the Majority Leader told the aide. "See you in half an hour."

A nearly year-long effort to shepherd comprehensive health care reform legislation through Congress faced a crucial hurdle. Throughout the past week, Reid and Schumer had worked with a group of ten Democratic Senators (five progressives and five moderates) to craft a compromise proposal in place of the public option -- the government-managed insurance plan that had proved too controversial to get past a filibuster. Lieberman had been part of that group. And while in the closing days he had been sending a staffer to negotiations in his place, he had given both Reid and the White House assurances that he'd support an alternative plan that would allow people over 55 to buy into Medicare.

Now, suddenly, Lieberman was announcing on national television that he "would have a hard time voting" for the deal even though he didn't know exactly what was in it.

Making his way toward the Capitol, Reid phoned White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel to discuss the news. "You need to come up here. We need to talk," he said. The hyper-energetic Emanuel, who was in a car as well (driving his son home from his bar mitzvah class) told Reid to hold steady for the time being. "I'll be over to your office soon."

By noon, Emanuel had arrived at the Capitol, dressed in blue jeans and with a cup of coffee in hand. Sitting in an office close to the Senate chamber, Emanuel, White House legislative adviser Phil Schiliro, as well as Reid and Sen. Max Baucus laid out the options (Schumer would arrive from New York City shortly). They could go back to Sen. Olympia Snowe, the one Republican who had offered support for reform. But that would require a dramatic restructuring of the bill.

"He just wasn't honest with me," Reid muttered at one point.

Also en route to the Capitol -- at the summoning of Reid -- was Lieberman, a Senator who once stood in line to be the party's vice presidential nominee but now found himself on the outskirts of his own caucus.

The Senate Majority Leader wanted to call Lieberman's bluff, bring the bill to the floor and force him to vote it down. Dare him to be the one to kill reform, the thinking went.

But before it could happen, Emanuel stepped in. "We need to get it done," he told Reid, according to multiple sources briefed on the exchange. The end game was clear: the Medicare buy-in or any other iteration of a public plan would not get in the way of legislative progress.

When Lieberman finally arrived at the office, Emanuel spoke to him just as directly. "Find a way to get to yes," he said, before insisting that if the objectionable provision was dropped, Lieberman would have to get off the fence.

A deal was reached. Health care reform survived.

<snip>

For the President and his key staff -- many of whom had been with Obama as he plotted his political trajectory years earlier -- the legislative process was derived primarily from the approach they took to electoral politics. The headquarters were different (the West Wing instead of Chicago). And the campaign dealt with a massive piece of domestic policy rather than an actual candidate. But the game-plan came from the same textbook.


and much more on how that happened is here...

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/barack-obama-campaign-man_n_574665.html

[madfloridian]

1. Rahm seems to be in charge of congress.

"But before it could happen, Emanuel stepped in. "We need to get it done," he told Reid, according to multiple sources briefed on the exchange. The end game was clear: the Medicare buy-in or any other iteration of a public plan would not get in the way of legislative progress.

When Lieberman finally arrived at the office, Emanuel spoke to him just as directly. "Find a way to get to yes," he said, before insisting that if the objectionable provision was dropped, Lieberman would have to get off the fence.

A deal was reached. Health care reform survived."

[freddie mertz]

3. "Health care reform survived." "It's moving! It's alive! It's alive!"

Of course, we had to remove the gonads, the teeth, the heart, and the soul to get it off the operating table.





The horror, the horror...

[ShortnFiery]

2. Great. Mandates for all, quality care for some. :( eom

[Clio the Leo]

7. AMAZING how quickly you three were able to read that article. NT

[ShortnFiery]

8. Kudos to you also ... we see you everywhere too. :-) eom

[msongs]

4. it's not who u know, it's who u bl** n quality is expendable nt

[Clio the Leo]

5. Kiddie care....

... was a head fake.

In the week after Massachusetts, the White House bowed to Pelosi's request for space and time. Privately, the outlook was darker than at any previous point. "The whole process had been absurd and this felt like the ultimate tragedy," recalled Pfeiffer. "Health care could die because a Republican had taken Ted Kennedy's seat."

Emanuel presented a Plan B. The president could go with a scaled down bill that -- while falling well short of the meaning of "comprehensive" reform -- would satisfy the more superficial desire for a legislative win.

During the campaign, Obama had been presented with crises that felt as existential as Scott Brown's win (notably the fiery sermons of his one-time pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright). And in each case he had chosen to 'go big' in response. When Pelosi dismissed Emanuel's counter-proposal as "Kiddy Care" his intuition was confirmed. Rather than back off, Obama barnstormed.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/barack-obama-campaign-man_n_574665.html?page=4

[Clio the Leo]

6. The Obama admin wanted to announce the Blair summit during the State of the Union speech...

... almost a month before hand. That is interesting because we might have supposed the idea came from that hugely successful smack down at the GOP retreat. It was quite the opposite.

After introducing his own legislative proposal for reconciliation, the president made an even bolder gambit: proposing a lengthy bipartisan summit on health care reform at Blair House. Administration officials had actually considered unveiling the idea during the Obama's State of the Union address in late January, but ceding to Pelosi, they kept plans private.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/barack-obama-campaign-man_n_574665.html?page=4