First: The Volcker Rule addresses the practice of insuring these bad securities. The
Volcker rule says NOTHING and does NOTHING about the horrendous banking practices that
cratered the economy (namely bundling sub-prime garbage with good loans and selling the
package on the secondary market).
So, absolutely not--the Volcker rule--which addresses the insurance issue only--is
not Glass Steagall. Not even close.
Secondly: Glass Steagall disallowed banks from engaging in commercial banking and investment
banking. The entire reason these banks became "too big to fail" is because they
grew into these huge banking and investment houses. Wall Street and the financial
community lobbied our politicians hard to repeal it. They wanted it gone. And so it was.
I'm sure we've passed a lot of "reform", but most of it does not solve the huge problems
we face. Yes--financial institutions can no longer have hidden credit-card fees. But guess what, look
at the newspaper--now those same financial institutions are charging $60 a year just to
use a debit card. The banks don't mind that kind of non-reform "reform". They always
find a way around it. It's meaningless.
Now, bring back Glass Steagall--which was a great law from 1933-1999, by the way!--and that
means real change. We won't get real, meaningful change. We'll get more "reform", because
Wall Street doesn't want to change-and they call the shots with our elected officials.
...this is nonsense.
Glass-Steagall wasn't about the systemic risk posed by the size of commericial banks. Glass-Steagall was about
separating commercial banking from investment banking:
•Banking Act of 1933 (P.L. 73-66, 48 STAT. 162).
Also known as the Glass-Steagall Act. Established the FDIC as a temporary agency. Separated commercial banking from investment banking, establishing them as separate lines of commerce.
Krugman:
Too big to fail FAILI’m a big advocate of much strengthened financial regulation. One argument I don’t buy, however, is that we should try to shrink financial institutions down to the point where nobody is too big to fail. Basically, it’s just not possible.
The point is that finance is deeply interconnected, so that even a moderately large player can take down the system if it implodes. Remember, it was Lehman — not Citi or B of A — that brought the world to the brink.
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They certainly were worried about systemic risk in 1982, when I had something of a front-row seat. There were fears that the Latin debt crisis would take down one or more money center banks — Citi, or Chase, say. And policy was shaped in part by the desire to make sure that didn’t happen. Bear in mind that this was in the days before the repeal of Glass-Steagal, before finance got so big and wild; the New Deal regulations were mostly still in place. Yet even then major banks were too big to fail.
So I think of the pursuit of a world in which everyone is small enough to fail as the pursuit of a golden age that never was. Regulate and supervise, then rescue if necessary; there’s no way to make this automatic.
When has there ever been a law that allows the break up big banks that pose a systemic risk? The Volcker rule does exactly what Glass Steagall did---separate commercial banking from investment banking.
In addition, look at the
new powers given to the FDIC that were not covered by Glass-Steagall.
Something the bill does for the first time ever,
regulate hedge funds:
Raising Standards and Regulating Hedge Funds- Fills Regulatory Gaps: Ends the “shadow” financial system by requiring hedge funds and private equity advisors to register with the SEC as investment advisers and provide information about their trades and portfolios necessary to assess systemic risk. This data will be shared with the systemic risk regulator and the SEC will report to Congress annually on how it uses this data to protect investors and market integrity.
- Greater State Supervision: Raises the assets threshold for federal regulation of investment advisers from $30 million to $100 million, a move expected to significantly increase the number of advisors under state supervision. States have proven to be strong regulators in this area and subjecting more entities to state supervision will allow the SEC to focus its resources on newly registered hedge funds.
So the current bill separates commercial from investment banking and in addition, regulates hedge funds for the first time and empowers the FDIC to deal with large complex institutions that pose a systemic risks, which Glass-Steagall did not address.