The single most dangerous moment of the nuclear missile age

[NNN0LHI]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter031598a.htm

Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, March 15, 1998; Page A01

MOSCOW — At dawn on the morning of Jan. 25, 1995, a four-stage Norwegian-U.S. joint research rocket, Black Brant XII, lifted off from an island off Norway's northwest coast. Ninety-three seconds after launch, the fourth stage burned out, hurling the rocket and its payload nearly straight up. snip

The rocket was spotted by Russian early-warning radars. The radar operators sent an alert to Moscow. Within minutes, President Boris Yeltsin was brought his black nuclear-command suitcase. For several tense minutes, while Yeltsin spoke with his defense minister by telephone, confusion reigned.

Little is known about what Yeltsin said, but these may have been some of the most dangerous moments of the nuclear age. They offer a glimpse of how the high-alert nuclear-launch mechanism of the Cold War remains in place, and how it could go disastrously wrong, even though the great superpower rivalry has ended.

Russia and the United States still rely on a doctrine that calls for making rapid-fire decisions about a possible nuclear attack. If a Russian president wants to retaliate before enemy missiles reach his soil, he has about eight minutes to decide what to do.

[MrNJ]

1. Thanks for this 13.5 year old article.

Is there a point you are making?

[dems_rightnow]

2. Because there's nothing to be learned?

From something that happened 13 years ago? Is that YOUR point?

[truebrit71]

3. Wow...

:popcorn:

This could be fun..

[On the Road]

7. Perhaps the Point is in the Title

"Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die"

and in the body:

The prospect of a mistake "has become particularly dangerous since the end of the Cold War," Vladimir Belous, a retired general and leading Russian strategist, wrote recently. He added that "a fateful accident could plunge the world into the chaos of a thermonuclear catastrophe, contrary to political leaders' wishes."

Who knows -- Putin might have an itchier trigger finger than Yeltsin did. People are probably even less aware now of these dangers than in 1998.

[Posteritatis]

4. September 26, 1983 was probably a closer call

It still saddens me that so few people know who Stanislav Petrov was (though I got the impression he preferred it that way).

[TheWraith]

5. I know, and I agree.

The planet owes the fellow a debt.

[Pab Sungenis]

6. Able Archer 83 was also pretty damn close.

Even though it's been reported that Reagan's positions on arms control were changed by watching "The Day After" I think the two close calls within a couple of months of each other has a lot to do with it, too.

[Posteritatis]

8. I don't think many people knew about Petrov's close shave until some years after

But even one close call was probably enough, especially after a few decades of thinking about what the stuff'd do.

The eighties were pretty goddamned scary in hindsight.

[formercia]

9. I was there

Able Archer '83

I was on the Incident Response Team. We came within 20 seconds of a massive launch by the Soviets. The Soviet Bombers were hot on the runways and the ICBMs were fueled and hot.
Fucking Reagan ordered live Tactical Nuclear Warheads to be issued, rather than the practice ones. The Soviets truly believed that Reagan and Bush were out to take them out and they were going to fire everything they had at us. I was sure this was going to be it.