http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/10/is-military-rule-in-egypt-really-temporary/71djNovember 10, 2011 Philippe Droz-Vincent
The end of Hosni Mubarak’s regime marks a critical juncture in Egypt’s civil-military dynamic. In the breakdown of institutional order following the dictator's ousting on February 11, 2011 and the subsequent disappearance of the police, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reluctantly assumed power. The time frame for this arrangement (initially scheduled for six months) is currently unpredictable and may be prolonged. Faced with a possible surrender of its influence held under decades of authoritarian rule, the military is trying to strike a delicate balance. While not eager to impose indefinite military rule, the army seeks preservation of its political and economic privileges in the emerging system. The military was able to project a cohesive façade in the first months of the revolution, but as pressures mount from the civilian front in the lead-up to November 28’s legislative elections, the Egyptian military is slowly discovering it is no longer the agent of its own desires.
Under Mubarak, the military in Egypt was a key component of the regime—much more than its counterpart in Tunisia under Ben Ali. Though in recent decades the Egyptian president was technically autonomous from the army, the high command was often consulted on fundamental issues: for example, the privatization debates post-2004 or later with the question of Mubarak’s succession. And while not involved in day-to-day crackdowns (as the ministry of interior and its dreaded secret police) the armed forces operated as the regime’s last resort. Prior to 2011, the army responded to the president’s call on several occasions: it provided institutional support in the wake of an Islamist plot following the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat; it crushed a rebellion of Central Security Forces in Cairo in 1986; and it helped defeat Islamist insurrections in Upper Egypt in the 1990s. The military has since been charged with regularly trying civilians accused of terrorism in special military tribunals.
Egypt’s military also has substantial holdings within the national economy: it owns a number of for-profit enterprises (factories for the manufacture of cement, jeeps, washing machines; the bottling of water) as well as agricultural farms and large swaths of reclaimed desert land. These economic inroads have served as an importance source of patronage for the officer corps, and they reflect how successful the military has been in shielding itself from the effects of economic liberalization and the rapid decrease in state resources.
Even so, the army has paradoxically managed to maintain a popular image as national protector—an image capitalized on in the first months of the revolution. In the 18-day confrontation (January 25-February 11) between the Mubarak regime and the massive populist protest movement, the army was often ambiguously situated and only occasionally threatening: a feature later erased by the much-heralded slogan “the people and the army are one”—the Tahrir Square expression of confidence in the military meant to tip soldiers toward the protesters' side.