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180,000 Draftees
140,000 non-draftees
Now, the Draftees tend to reflect what the people on the street think (Vietnam is the classic case, as long as most Americans supported the War in Vietnam, so did the draftees, once the Majority of Americans turned against the War in the Summer of 1968, the Draftee army rapidly deteriorated i.e. turned against the war).
Remember the term "Enlistees" include both people who are drafted and who enlist into the army.
Now, the "fact" that 140,000 are NOT Draftees does NOT mean those act like other Soldiers in Armies filled with nothing but such volunteers (The accurate term is Mercenary, but that term has bad connotations, for good reasons, so Countries that have such non-drafter armies tend to call them anything else, "Volunteer" is the most popular term today). Soldiers in non-Draftee Armies enlist for pay, no pay no who are paid for serving agree to do so. This concept of pay tends to separate such Soldiers from the people as a whole (The Chief reason Mercenaries have such a bad name). You just do not have that with draftee armies, when most of the soldiers are draftees (You can have it in armies where the draft is used to fill in Mercenary units, but Frederick the Great maintain that if you do that never have more then one such draftee per two volunteers in such an army. Frederick the Great kept a Mercenary Army that Prussia would replace with a universal service army about 20 years after his death, thus his comments on draftees are NOT relevant to armies where most of the soldiers are draftees, as the Egyptian Army of today).
As to the people who ARE not the draftees in a typical draftee army, many "Volunteer" so to avoid the draft, i.e. as a volunteer you have a better say in where you serve as oppose to someone who is drafted. Furthermore many draftees stay in an draftee army after their period of service for various reasons. While they are then counted as "Volunteers" not "Draftees" many still think and act like the Draftees.
As to Officers as oppose to "enlistees", Officers tend to be all Volunteers, but like lower ranks, many volunteer to be an Officer in the army then to be a Draftee in the same army. This mostly affect the Junior officer ranks. Please note, some Draftee Armies, tend to make Officers out of people connected to the ruling elites not the people as a whole. This is how Saddam ran the Iraqi army. In such situation, such Officers have no connections with their men and will abandon the men for almost any reason (This happened in Desert Storm, the Sunni Officer Corp Abandoner Shiite units to their fate, and went back to Baghdad to support Saddam).
Just pointing out the Egyptian Army is more an Universal Military Service Army then an Volunteer army (the US has had a Volunteer army since the early 1970s). The Egyptian Army is much like Saddam's Iraqi Army, officered by people connected to the ruling elite. The problem is the enlisted ranks tend to be the same as the people, thus reluctance to fire on the people. In such situation draftee Armies like Egypt's tend to stand on the side. This is what happened in Eastern Europe (except Romania) when the Soviet Union was Collapsing. The Army refused to send in units to uphold the Communist Government for while the Officers where loyal to the Communist Government, the enlistees were not. Thus the Army froze in their barracks and everyone was happy.
Romania was the sole exception, but then the ruling elite tried to use its Police Forces (A mercenary unit) to stay in power. The Enlistees ranks in the Army resented that and finally the Officer ranks decided that the ruling communists had to go, so un-leased the army onto the Police (The last Communist ruler of Romania ended up being executed by a firing squad). The army had no other choice, it had to act or face irrelevancy and it could NOT rely on its enlistees to fight for the communist government. Thus once a decision was made to use troops it had to be with the people.
Now, when Poland suppress solidarity in the early 1980s, the Polish Army did the suppression, but the officers of the Polish army saw a bad choice, suppress solidarity or face Soviet intervention, there was no third choice. The Army suppressed solidarity and the enlistee ranks and the people accepted it, for it was clear that the Soviet Red army was about to do the same. I do NOT seen that threat to Egypt, thus I do not see the Egyptian army suppressing the people of Egypt.
Just pointing out that the Army will only suppress the Egyptian people if the army thinks Egypt (not the Egyptian government) is threatened. The threat not only has to be clear to the Officer ranks, but to the draftees. One fear of the Egyptian army is if it un-leases troops, what if a unit defects to the rioters (As did a Russian tank Company of ten tanks did during the attempted Coup against Gorbachev and Yeltsin)? That unit, isolated, but motivated (even through draftees, as were ALL Russian enlistees then and now) was enough to put fear in the coup plotters. What other units will defect if sent in to suppress Yeltsin? Will the units actually go? Reports released afterward was an order was issued but no other military unit was willing to attack Yeltsin's hold on the Soviet Congress building (What the Soviet calls their "White House"). No one wanted to attack and the coup failed.
During the attempt by hardliners to retake the Government from Yeltsin a few years later, the army went in and removed them. Again reflecting the fact that the Army's enlistees backed Yeltsin NOT the people ho tried to overthrow him.
The big point was both times, the enlistees were the key, as long as the enlistees were draftees they reflected what the people thought and would NOT do anything against what the people as a whole wanted.
I bring up the above cases, for it is up to the Egyptian Army to support the people or the ruling elite. The enlistees will tend to support the people, the Officers the ruling elite. Unless someone threatens Egypt, the Army will either stand off to the side (as it did the first few days of the second attempt to overthrow Yeltsin) or throw itself on the side of the people (As the army did when the hardliners tried to overthrow Gorbachev and Yeltsin and then a few days after the attempted coup against Yeltsin).
Side note: In the above I referred to a the first Coup against Gorbachev and Yeltsin. It was an attempt by hardliners against both. It signaled the death of the Soviet Union, and the "Independence" of the various former Soviet member states. In the first attempt, Yeltsin and his supporters took over the Soviet "White House" their Congress building while Gorbachev was under control of the coup leaders. Thus Yeltsin lead the opposition against the Coup for Gorbachev was in no position to do so.
The Second Coup was a few years later when hardliners attempted to take over the Government from Yeltsin. This time the hardliners took over the Russian White house and held it till driven out by the Russian Army. Two different coup attempts, and the army response was different in both cases, but both times reflected what the people of Russian wanted NOT what the coup plotters wanted.
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