First, I never claimed that Trump's actions didn't constitute compulsion or commandment - you inserted that caveat. I think his behavior clearly does go beyond mere encouragement to the level of compulsion or commandment. And the fact that the owners, by their own admission, felt compelled to do what the president demanded is considerable proof thereof.
But the Supreme Court doesn't require that the state "compel or command" that a private entity do a particular thing in order for there to be state action. The fact that the government encourages or supports such activity is sufficient. As far as your demand that I produce a "holding" of state action based on mere encouragement that is short of compulsion or commandment, all you need to do is just read the my post and the cases that I cited. It's right in there:
A State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)
That's not
dicta. That's the
HOLDING as the Court specifically states at the very beginning of the case:
Held:
...
2.
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(a) The mere fact that a private business is subject to state regulation does not, by itself, convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. A State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State. Pp. 457 U. S. 1003-1005.
...
[A]lthough the factual setting of each case will be significant, our precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 436 U. S. 166; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 419 U. S. 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 407 U. S. 173; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 398 U. S. 170. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Flagg Bros., supra, at 436 U. S. 164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 419 U. S. 357.
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We are confronted with the question preliminary to any Fourteenth Amendment challenge: whether the State has brought its force to bear against the plaintiffs through the office of these private parties. In answering that question, we may safely assume that, when the State chooses to perform its governmental undertakings through private institutions, and with the aid of private parties, not every action of those private parties is state action. But when the State directs, supports, and encourages those private parties to take specific action, that is state action.
One of the cases cited in Blum also states very plainly that an act need not be compelled in order to constitute state action where the government has encouraged and supported the act:
Our prior decisions leave no doubt that the mere existence of efforts by the State, through legislation or otherwise, to authorize, encourage, or otherwise support racial discrimination in a particular facet of life constitutes illegal state involvement in those pertinent private acts of discrimination that subsequently occur.
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In the present case, Mississippi statutory law did authorize and encourage respondent to discriminate against petitioner on the basis of race. Therefore petitioner can establish that respondent acted "under color of" Mississippi statutory law by showing that respondent was aware of that body of law as prescribing, encouraging, authorizing, legitimating, effectuating, or otherwise supporting its refusal to serve petitioner. The vice of action under color of statute exists wherever the private discriminatory consciously draws from a state statute any kind of support for his discrimination.Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)
Whether Trump's repeated public badgering of the NFL owners constitutes "such significant encouragement" that the owners' acquiescence to changing the rule as he demanded constitutes state action is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. I think it clearly does. But the law they would apply to that fact is unequivocal: an act by a private entity that is encouraged or supported by the government CAN INDEED be deemed state action.
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