https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_withdrawal_from_Afghanistan
"The final and complete withdrawal of Soviet combatant forces from Afghanistan began on 15 May 1988 and ended on 15 February 1989 under the leadership of Colonel-General Boris Gromov."
So right off the bat, we withdrew more quickly.
"Under the leadership of Gorbachev, the Soviet Union attempted to consolidate the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's hold over power in the country, first in a genuine effort to stabilize the country, and then as a measure to save face while withdrawing troops. During this period, the military and intelligence organizations of the USSR worked with the government of Mohammad Najibullah to improve relations between the government in Kabul and the leaders of rebel factions.
The
diplomatic relationship between the USSR and the United States improved at the same time as it became clear to the Soviet Union that this policy of consolidating power around Najibullah's government in Kabul would not produce sufficient results to maintain the power of the PDPA in the long run. The Geneva Accords, signed by representatives of the USSR, the US, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of Afghanistan (thus renamed in 1987) on 14 April 1988, provided a framework for the departure of Soviet forces, and established a multilateral understanding between the signatories regarding the future of international involvement in Afghanistan. The military withdrawal commenced soon after, with all Soviet forces leaving Afghanistan by 15 February 1989.[2] "
So the Russians, like the US today, held no illusions about political stabilility no matter wht they did.
"Throughout 1987, Soviet diplomats attempted to convince the United States to stop supplying the mujahedeen with weaponry as soon as Soviet forces withdrew, and to reach an agreement on a power-sharing proposal that would permit the PDPA to remain a key actor in Afghan politics.[4]:128 Najibullah was receptive to the prior, but the Soviet Union did not manage to come to this agreement with the United States. From statements made by Secretary of State George Shultz, the Soviet leadership came under the impression that the US would cease military shipments to the mujahedeen immediately after Soviet withdrawal, with the condition that the USSR "front-loaded" its withdrawal (i.e. withdrew the majority of its troops in the beginning of the process, thereby complicating redeployment).[5]:261 This was conveyed to the Najibullah government, managing to convince him that the Soviet-American diplomatic effort would benefit the Kabul government.
This impression made by Shultz was false – though mixed signals were sent by various US officials at and around time of the summit, Reagan could not agree to stop arms shipments immediately .[4]:132 In late 1987, when this US commitment was conveyed to the Soviet Union, negotiations came to a halt, but proceeded tentatively as the White House and Department of State continued to make contradictory statements on the issue. The issue dissipated when the Department of State suggested that an immediate cessation of US military aid could occur if the Soviets did the same (prior, the US had agreed to an asymmetric cessation of aid, whereby the USSR would be allowed to continue supporting Kabul).[5]:263 On February 8, 1988, the Soviet leadership to announce a conditional date for the beginning of the military withdrawal (which the United States had insisted on for years) in an attempt to encourage the US to compromise on ceasing military shipments.[4]:137 This announcement failed to change the American position on shipments, and simultaneously decreased Soviet bargaining power at the negotiations.[5]:265 Nevertheless, Gorbachev decided that
it was desirable to withdraw within the framework of an international agreement, however flawed, rather than to proceed independently. "We weren't thinking only of Afghanistan," recalled Vadim Zagladin. "There were many processes taking place at that time. The INF agreement on missiles in Europe was particularly important, and all of these things were interconnected."[5]:265"
Fortunately, there is no evidence of the Russians helping us out the way we helped them.
"The withdrawal of the Soviet military began on 15 May 1988, under the leadership of General of the Army Valentin Varennikov (with General Gromov commanding the 40th Army directly).[5]:368 As agreed, the withdrawal was "front-loaded", with half of the Soviet force leaving by August. The withdrawal was complicated, however, by the rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. While the United States was not bound by any commitment to stop arms shipments and continued to supply the Afghan mujahideen in Pakistan, the latter was not delivering on its commitment to prevent weaponry and militants from flowing into Afghanistan through the Durand Line. Likewise, the mujahedeen also continued their attacks on withdrawing Soviet forces.[4]:150 The Soviet Union repeatedly reported these violations of the Geneva Accords to United Nations monitoring bodies, and even pleaded with the United States to influence the factions that they were supplying. The desire of the Soviet Union to withdraw, however, coupled with the United States' inability to control the behaviour of the mujahedeen, meant that the Soviet objections did not yield any results. The following conversation between a Soviet diplomat and a station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency in Islamabad (as told by the latter in a book he co-authored), is cited by Kalinovsky:
Botshan-Kharchenko: You must understand, Mr. Buurdon, that these attacks against our troops as they withdraw must stop.
Bearden: And if they don't?
Botshan-Kharchenko: Then perhaps we will halt our withdrawal. Then what will you do?
Bearden: It is not what I will do, Counselor; it is what the Afghans will do. And I think they will simply keep on fighting and killing your soldiers until you finally just go home.
Botshan-Kharchenko: But you have some control over such matters.
Bearden: No one has control over such matters, Counselor, except the Soviet Union.
Botshan-Kharchenko: Mr. Buurdon, you must still understand that there will be consequences if these attacks continue.
Bearden: I am sure there will be, Counselor.[4]:153 [8]:354
As the Soviet military withdrawal and rebel attacks continued, the deteriorating security of the Najibullah government caused policy disagreements between the different services of the Soviet Union. For example: while the Soviet military had succeeded in establishing a de facto cease-fire with Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces as Soviet troops withdrew through territories under his control, the KGB and Shevarnadze attempted to convince Gorbachev that an attack on Massoud was necessary to guarantee Najibullah's survival. In the words of Soviet military commanders, Najibullah himself also aimed to retain the Soviet military in Afghanistan – Generals Varennikov (in charge of the withdrawal operation), Gromov (commander of the 40th Army), and Sotskov (chief Soviet military advisor in Afghanistan) all pleaded with top Soviet military and political leadership to control Najibullah's attempts to use Soviet troops to achieve his own security, and to convey to him that the Soviet military would not stay in Afghanistan.[4]:161 After the departure of Yakovlev from the Politburo in the fall of 1988[clarification needed], Gorbachev adopted the Shevarnadze-KGB line of policy regarding supporting Najibullah at the cost of antagonising rebel factions, and a halt of the withdrawal was ordered on November 5, 1988.[4]:167 In December, Gorbachev decided to resume the withdrawal, but also to carry out an operation against Massoud, ignoring arguments from his advisors and military commanders on the ground. In January 1989, the Soviet withdrawal continued, and on January 23 Operation Typhoon (1989) [ru] began against the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud.[4]:170 Up until the end of the military withdrawal, Shevarnadze and the head of the KGB unsuccessfully attempted to convince Gorbachev to retain a contingent of Soviet military volunteers in Afghanistan to defend land routes to Kabul. On February 15, the 40th Army finished their withdrawal from Afghanistan. General Gromov walked across the "Bridge of Friendship" between Afghanistan and the USSR last. When Gromov was met by Soviet TV crews while crossing the bridge, he swore at them profusely when they tried to interview him. Recalling the events in an interview with a Russian newspaper in 2014, Gromov said that his words were directed at "the leadership of the country, at those who start wars while others have to clean up the mess."[9]"
Doesn't a lot of this sound familiar? Except that up to today, the Taliban is not attacking US military or civilians as they did Russians.
We are getting to leave in a much more orderly process - a whole magnitude less bloody - that the British and Russians got to leave with.
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